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Abstract
Attention to effective local flood response has become a necessity in urban governance as
issues pertaining to floods become increasingly visible with disasters rising. This research
identifies components of response capacity to floods and municipal action, and potential
mechanisms to increase response capacity in the City of Vancouver and District of Maple
Ridge using interviews (n=7), Q methodology (n=12), and a literature review. Findings show
that legislation, institutional behaviour and collective action, technological pathways and
resource management are fundamental to an institution or organization’s response capacity.
Municipal action is influenced by competing priorities as determined through legal
responsibility and liability, collective agreements, public behaviour, risk, vulnerability and
uncertainty, and the politics of municipal governance. It is viewed by participants that resource
efficiency, collaborative, co-management and adaptive co-management techniques could lead
to greater response capacity. The findings presented provide a proposed conceptual framework
to

response

capacity

to

floods

and

municipal

action.

Keywords
Flood management, response capacity, municipal action, disaster risk reduction, Q
methodology.
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Introduction

1.1 Introduction to the Research
Floods are defined as “an overflow of water onto normally dry land. The inundation of a
normally dry area caused by rising water in an existing waterway, such as a river, stream
or drainage ditch. Ponding of water at or near the point where the rain fell” (National
Weather Service, 2010). They can be caused by a host of various conditions—including
severe weather events, sea-level rise, and excess water to a river—and their impacts are
diverse. They have and will continue to impact local, regional and national economies,
exploit inequalities among social classes, and have profound health and political
implications.
Recent reports by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and
others have suggested that under various Representative Concentration Pathway (RCP)
scenarios of greenhouse gas emissions, future climate conditions are expected to cause
more frequent and intense severe weather related events (IPCC, 2007; 2013). Observations
in climate change research, including disaster research, have shown that the effects of a
changing climate are already occurring (NatCatSERVICE, 2015; IPCC, 2007; IPCC, 2013;
Nicholls et al., 2007). With predictions of more frequent and intense severe weather events
in the future, regional resiliency can be expected to decrease as the ability to recover from
a disaster may become difficult if regions experience a multitude of disasters over a short
timeframe, resulting in the failure to effectively and efficiently mitigate impacts as
conditions worsen.
Recent progress toward climate change adaptation and mitigation has been made
with regards to understanding the severity and the necessity to address the issues nationally
and, also, at municipal and regional scales. Due to communities’ differentiated risk (Balica
et al., 2012; Wisner et al., 2004; Cutter et al., 2000; Cutter, 1996), a universal solution that
adapts to future conditions in all communities is impractical. As such, individual
communities must make necessary adjustments to their policy and practices specifically
addressing their vulnerability to the potential conditions and disasters that the community
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may be subject to. In Canada, cities are responsible for addressing local impacts of largescale environmental issues, including natural disaster events.1 Although both the provincial
and federal governments do have a role in disaster governance, the specific implementation
and governance over practices and policies within Canada is, in large, municipal.
Understanding the characteristics of urban governance and local practices seeks to promote
disaster resilient policies and practices in order to mitigate future potential loss caused by
climate change.
In Canada, more frequent flood events caused by sea-level rise, storm surges, or
freshet snowmelt are becoming a new norm. In this introductory Chapter the need for this
study is contextualized and the parameters of the study identified. The research, that is
described in more detail later in this Chapter, is an extension of Sarah Burch’s (2009),
Sustainable Development Paths: Investigating the Roots of Local Policy Responses to
Climate Change, in which the author “seeks to begin a conversation focused on the need
to investigate the highly path dependent trajectories that form the context out of which
human responses to global climate change arise” (185). As Burch explains, development
pathways provide insight on action, identifying barriers and policy-relevant analysis of
environmental issues. As climate change is a very large, encompassing term, this research
explores one aspect of climate change, focusing on components influencing response
capacity to floods and institutional action.
As noted, the following sections of this Chapter provide context for the research
and the parameters of the study. Sections on flood context cover climate change and floods,
and the economic, social, health and political impacts of floods, as well as the role of
government in Canada. Sections regarding the parameters of this research define
development pathways and the purpose of this study and outlines the study area.

1

Refer to Chapter 3, Responsibility and Liability in Emergency Management.
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1.2 Climate Change and Floods
Evidence shows the number of disaster events around the world has been increasing over
recent decades. Over the last century it is evident that the number of reported disasters
leading to loss is increasing, particularly from 1980 to 2014 (refer to Figure 1). Recent
flooding in the United Kingdom (2014), Philippines (2010, 2014), Pakistan (2010), United
States (New York, 2014, and New Orleans, 2005), Haiti (2010) and others are evidence of
an increase in the frequency of flood events around the world. From 2001 to 2011, there
have been approximately 785 disasters per year around the world (Institute of Catastrophic
Loss Reduction (ICLR), 2012). Although not all of these disasters are flood-related, the
evidence is illustrative of an increase in the frequency of natural events around the world.

Figure 1: Loss Events Worldwide, 1980-2014 (NatCATSERVICE, 2015)
Scholars have argued that such an increase can be attributed to climate change
(IPCC, 2007; 2013). As temperatures rise and changes to the energy budget continue,
effects on the hydrological cycle can be seen. Floods are becoming more frequent than in
the past and are, in large part, due to heavy precipitation events, rising sea-levels, and, in
some locations, due to more extreme annual freshet snowmelts. Historical evidence
analyzed by the IPCC (2013) suggest that starting in the late 19th and early 20th century the
rate of global mean sea-level change is unusually high with virtual certainty (99-100%
probability) that global mean sea-level rise has accelerated over the past two centuries.
Between 1993 and 2010, the rate of global sea-level rise was very likely (90-100%
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probability) 3.2mm per year, with 0.8mm per year being attributed to the warming of the
ocean.
Based on the IPCC reports (IPCC, 2007; 2013; 2014a), sea-levels are expected to
continue to rise. Under an extreme scenario, RCP8.5, sea-level rise is expected to increase
by 0.53 to 0.97 meters by 2100. As such, coastal regions can expect more hazardous
conditions in the near future. In some areas, evidence of the impacts on the region are
already becoming a reality. In Tuvalu—a small island country in the South Pacific north
of Australia—the population is in the process of being evacuated as, with climate change,
rising sea-levels are encroaching and if IPCC climate models are accurate (IPCC, 2007;
2013) then Tuvalu is expected to be completely submerged by the turn of the next century.
In Maldives, similar concern over the country’s future is evident. As much as the
area is developing, sea-level rise caused by climate change threatens the safety and security
of the country. While the country is not yet submerged, the situation is dire. As former
environment minister, Mohamed Aslam, stated, “Just because you are not dead now does
not mean you are not dying” (Carrington, 2013).
In Canada, cities are experiencing more frequent and intense floods than in the past.
Exposed to a variety of different flood stressors, Canadian cities are increasingly vulnerable
to flooding. Recent floods in Alberta (2013), Greater Toronto (2013), and lower Manitoba
(2014) have illustrated how severe the impacts of weather-related events can be. In British
Columbia, observations show an increase in precipitation since 1950 (ICLR, 2012). As the
Institute of Catastrophic Loss Reduction (2012) explains,
Since 1950 there has been a 20-30% increase in rainfall in coastal British Columbia, a
5-10% increase in the northern interior, and an annual change in rainfall of -10% to
+25% in the southern interior. The large variation in these projections is due in part to
the potential for large spatial variation that can occur in mountainous regions and
interior plateaus. (50-51).
As climate change continues, regional precipitation can be expected to increase (IPCC,
2013). Current climate change models predict that such exposure to flooding is expected
to increase throughout parts of Canada (IPCC, 2013). As the ICLR (2012) further states,
A 5-10% increase in precipitation is expected over the period through 2050, with the
largest increase occurring in coastal areas and the northern interior. Increased
precipitation is expected across [British Columbia] in the winter, but rainfall should
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decrease in the summer, particularly in the southern interior. There is high confidence
that there will be a 10-15% increase in intense rainfall events. (50-51).
Flooding is an issue. How countries, regions, and local areas perceive flooding as
an issue varies; however, that does not elude the reality that floods are happening and they
are becoming more frequent and intense. Attention to disaster risk reduction research
continues to grow with emphasis being placed on the diverse impacts of flooding (IPCC,
2007, 2013, 2014b; Chambwera et al., 2007; Pearce et al., 2012; Ford et al., 2010; Du et
al., 2009; Confalonieri et al., 2007), climate change vulnerability and vulnerability
indicators (Oulahen, 2014; Mitchell, 1989; Watts & Bohle, 1993; Bohle et al, 1994; Dow
& Downing, 1995; Alexander, 1993; Adger, 2006; Liverman, 1990) and developing
disaster resilient communities (Burby et al., 2000; Norris et al., 2008; Paton & Johnston,
2001; Leichenko, 2011). As climate properties change, the social, cultural, economic,
political and environmental characteristics of regions are vulnerable. It is by examining the
impact to these characteristic properties that we can understand the need and urgency for
appropriate action.

1.3 Economic Impacts of Floods
From 1980 to 2015, observations show that the costs of floods have been increasing and
they have resulted in billions of dollars in damages for single events (EM-DAT, 2015).
Over the last decade, insured losses have ranged between $10 billion to $50 billion dollars
annually throughout the world (Economics of Climate Change Adaptation, 2009).
Damaged infrastructure, loss of material goods, and inadequate local responses and
strategies have resulted in immediate economic damage following a disaster. For example,
in 2013 Calgary experienced a flood that resulted in approximately $6 billion in damages
(Wood, 2013). That same year, Toronto experienced a flood resulting in $850 million in
damages (Mills, 2013). In 2010, the City of Vancouver experienced a flood caused by
heavy rainfall that resulted in 173 filed claims for negligence with the City in association
with maladapted/outdated infrastructure (City of Vancouver, 2013).
Fundamental to the costs to homeowners in Canada is that no insurance company
in Canada offers flood insurance under a home policy (The Co-operators, 2014). While
coverage is offered for extended water damage, this type of insurance covers some types
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of sewer backups and not accidental flooding that may be caused by certain climate related
conditions, including sea-level rise, and riverine flooding (The Co-operators, 2014).
As climate change continues to affect the hydrological cycle, more frequent and
intense storms will likely increase the costs to insurance companies, globally, while in
Canada increasing the costs to homeowners substantially. As the IPCC (2007) reports, “it
is very likely (90-100% probability) that all regions will experience either declines in net
benefits or increases in net costs for increases in temperature greater than about 2-3 degrees
Celsius” (TS-4.7). Their 2014(b) report states,
The incomplete estimates of global annual economic losses for additional temperature
increases of ~2°C are between 0.2 and 2.0% of income (±1 standard deviation around
the mean) (medium evidence, medium agreement). Losses are more likely than not to
be greater, rather than smaller, than this range (limited evidence, high agreement). (663).
As we know from IPCC reports (2007; 2013) in particular, warmer temperatures are linked
to the hydrological cycle. With increasing temperatures, the effects on the hydrological
system will cause more intense and frequent rainfall events. Combine this information with
a rising sea-level scenario, global and regional costs to flood related events can be expected
to increase. In Ontario, a study has suggested that insured losses, due to high precipitation
events and impacts associated with flooding, will continually increase by approximately
13% by the 2020s, 20% by the 2050s, and 30% by the 2080s (City of Vancouver, 2013).
The evidence suggest that to mitigate future costs related to floods it is necessary
to develop effective and adaptive responses. The effectiveness of existing responses to
flooding are difficult to measure as it is only after a flood event occurs that these responses
can be evaluated and the complexity of a system makes it difficult to capture all the costs
and net saving of a specific response. Investment in designing and implementing specific
responses to address flood-related issues may prove to be costly, but understanding how
those decisions are made is something that this research is designed to evaluate. In fact,
many studies have found that adaptation choices have an impact on issues, such as:
macroeconomics (Fankhauser & Tol, 1995); funding allocation (Hallegatte et al., 2007;
Wang & McCarl, 2013; Chambwera et al., 2007); future resource availability (Chambwera
et al., 2007); and risk distribution of the previous issues (Chambwera et al., 2007).
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Although future climate conditions and subsequent costs of flood events have a
degree of uncertainty it is important that action is taken now. Risk-sensitive decisions, as
described by Linquiti and Vonortas (2012) are oriented towards acting or waiting.
According to Chambwera et al. (2007), they recommend that due to minimal temperature
variability over the next few decades the time to invest in adaptation in now. It will be more
beneficial to prepare for the uncertain than to wait for that uncertainty to become a reality.
If the proper infrastructure and adaptation strategies are not in place when this uncertainty
becomes a reality, the costs to urban characteristics and the economic system of a city,
region and/or country could cause a failure/collapse (as illustrated in Figure 2).

Figure 2: Adaptation-Climate Change Cost Relationship (Chambwera et al., 2007,
953)

1.4 Social Impacts of Floods
Vulnerability is a concept that has emerged over recent decades. Its acceptance as a
necessary component in hazards research and its importance in policy-making and coping
strategies have been evident in recent years (Pearce et al., 2012; Ford et al., 2010).
Although it is defined differently from study to study, vulnerability can broadly be defined
as “the potential for loss” (Cutter, 1996, 529). It includes the exposure to environmental
and socio-economic stresses as well as the absence of adaptation mechanisms (Adger,
2006). Common characteristics of vulnerability include the exposure to a threat (Mitchell,
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1989; Watts & Bohle, 1993; Bohle et al, 1994; Dow & Downing, 1995) as defined by
social, economic, and biophysical conditions (Alexander, 1993; Adger, 2006; Liverman,
1990a; Dow & Downing, 1995). As such, vulnerability can be broken down into social
vulnerability and biophysical vulnerability. The latter refers to the physical risk of a
geographic space to a hazard. It includes the types of hazards the region is susceptible to
experience as well as its frequency of occurrence and impact on the system. It provides the
framework by which a system is susceptible to experiencing a hazard at its current stage
and provides the groundwork for adaptation and mitigation strategies for predicted future
conditions (Cutter, 2000). The former vulnerability refers to the risk that a group of people
are susceptible to an event and its impacts (Cutter, 1996; Dow & Downing, 1995). It is a
function of the social conditions to which a group is subject to, thus, influencing that
group’s ability to respond and cope with a hazard (Blaikie et al, 1994; Cutter et al, 1997;
Mileti, 1999; Cutter et al, 2000; Adger, 2006). It includes: access to resources; weak
infrastructure and access to emergency services; lack of political representation; and
cultural beliefs and customs.
The parameters of social vulnerability vary from study to study; although some
characteristics have been found to be consistent in present social vulnerability assessments.
Among these characteristics, studies (Cutter, 1996; O’Brien & Mileti, 1992; Hewitt, 1997;
Ngo 2001) have shown that high population density areas with a high population aged
under 18 and above 65 are particularly vulnerable to flooding events. This can be attributed
to mobility issues and body development. For example, children are more likely to contract
an illness or communicable disease associated with poor water quality (as is often the case
in flood events) as their immune system and white blood cells that fight diseases tend to
still be developing, resulting in the individuals to be more susceptible to bacteria (Cutter et
al., 2003). In addition to age, low income areas tend to have a high vulnerability to the
impacts of hazards as their ability to relocate and/or be less receptive to harm is lower than
higher income individuals; the loss of one dollar to damages associated with the hazard
will have a greater impact on the individual with a low income compared to that of a high
income individual (Cutter et al., 2000; Morrow, 1999). Similarly, the loss of infrastructure
and lifelines such as emergency service access also results in a greater vulnerability.
Having minimal support or relief post-disaster presumably results in greater stress on
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communities as providing aid to these areas becomes increasingly difficult (Heinz Center
for Science, Economics, and the Environment, 2000; Cutter et al., 2003). Finally, the
collapse of infrastructure such as roads and sewer pipelines increases social vulnerability
as exposure to toxins and bacteria is exacerbated by poor environmental conditions (Heinz
Center for Science, Economics and the Environment, 2000). The loss of infrastructure can
lead to more pathogens entering the water system in which the population can ingest,
absorb, and/or inhale resulting in greater casualties, injuries, and long-term impacts.
Understanding that populations have different risks (Oulahen, 2014; Boateng,
2012; Cutter et al., 2000; Cutter, 1996; Blaikie et al., 1994) makes adaptation design and
implementation complex. Although an effective universal strategy may be ideal to address
flood concerns throughout a city or region, areas have different exposures to floods and
may require alternative responses. Given that responses may be costly in areas where
infrastructure and technology lack, the ability of city or region to fully adapt to future
conditions can be constrained by timing and limited resources.2 As such, social impacts are
unavoidable; however, the severity of these impacts can be reduced through proper
management and adaptation responses.

1.5 Floods and Health
The impacts of floods on health can be categorized into three classifications: immediate
impacts, medium-term impacts, and long-term impacts. Immediate impacts are those that
exposure to the flood results in severe issues such as drowning, injuries, hypothermia, and
animal bites (Du et al., 2009). In 1999, approximately 30,000 died from storms causing
flooding and landslides in Venezuela (IPCC, 2007; Confalonieri et al., 2007). Mediumterm impacts are impacts that are not a direct result of a flood, but increases in toxins into
the water result in lower water quality and subsequent health-related impacts (Du et al.,
2009). Research on floods show the likelihood of medium-term health related incidents
increase as water quality decreases and exposure to the disaster increases (Du et al., 2009;
Confalonieri et al., 2007). Health issues such as infected wounds, poisoning, mental health

2

Refer to Chapters 4 through 6.
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issues, communicable diseases (influenza, measles, mumps, and tuberculosis), and
starvation have been seen as exposure increases. In the long-term, chronic disease,
disability, poor mental health, and malnutrition are possible if inefficient or ineffective
responses are present and exposure is long (Du et al., 2009). A study conducted by Waring
et al. (2002) found that, after Tropical Storm Allison, people whose homes had been
flooded experienced higher mental health issues post-flooding than those whose homes
were not flooded (consistent with Mollica et al., 2004; Ahern et al., 2005). It is imperative
to understand that floods have direct and indirect impacts on people.
Regional topography and demographics have an influence on the impacts of floods.
Based on the literature presented here less developed regions or regions with insufficient
responses to floods (proactive and reactive) have a higher risk of impacts caused by
flooding than those with sufficient and effective responses to floods. As Du et al. (2009)
have stated, “management of the health impacts of floods is dependent upon an extensive
knowledge and understanding of the health risks and on the capacity of the health system
to mitigate or manage those consequences” (266). As the European Economic Area reports
(2005), adaptation through improved infrastructure and social planning has decreased
mortality over the past 30 years. Understanding regional variance of social, economic,
political, technological, cultural, and biophysical characteristics can lead to proper
management of local responses to flooding by mitigating impacts; doing so can save lives
and prevent injury.

1.6 Floods and Politics
In 1972, the UN Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE) accepted the proposal
to focus the attention of governments’ and public opinion on the importance and urgency
of environmental issues (Vogler, 2008). It was evident post-UNCHE that environmental
issues could not be separated from the demands for development, aid and international
economic relations (Vogler, 2008). As such, if these demands supersede the demand for
sustainability, sustainable development is more difficult to pursue. Therefore, policies that
are focusing on sustainable development have greater pressure to ensure that sustainable
development does not interfere with other superseding priorities—something that is
becoming more difficult as flooding and other disasters become more frequent and intense.
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When addressing climate change impacts, the former British foreign secretary, Margaret
Becket stated, “those impacts [of climate change] go far beyond the environmental. Their
consequences reach to the very heart of the security agenda” (Dyer, 2008, ix). One of the
associated impacts of a changing climate is decreased resources (IPCC, 2013). According
to Dyer (2008), resource consumption patterns of oil, gas and food availability will change
as these resources become scarcer. As these resources decrease, geopolitical tension is
expected to increase as countries seek to survive, leading to what Dyer (2008) calls ‘climate
wars’. In a study that attempted to forecast future events related to climate change impacts,
it was concluded that starving immigrants would lead to wars over food, water, and energy
resources (Jurgensen, 2004; Lomborg, 2007). This concept of ‘climate wars’ is being
adopted as a fundamental reason for military strategies. In the United Kingdom, the
military is developing defense strategies against future refugees that will be seeking asylum
due to the lack of resources elsewhere (Dyer, 2008). In order to protect their resources and
their citizens, there is a need to develop these strategies, according to this government.
Flooding and community resilience can be directly linked to this concept of
‘climate wars’. As the frequency and intensity of floods increases, more resources will be
required to respond to floods—to mitigate health impacts, financial loss, and physically
adapt to changing conditions. It is only by developing effective responses to such disasters
at the local, regional, and possibly national level that we can reduce the impacts of floods.
As the IPCC (2007; 2014) indicate, adaptation and local responses to floods do not solely
rely on technology to solve problems. Both social and technology oriented responses can
mitigate the impacts of floods. Ideally, trans-community cooperation can help mitigate the
impacts of flooding by helping with emergency response, but by developing effective local
responses the rate of resource depletion, locally, can decrease. Effective local responses
are still being researched. If we can understand the trajectories of local responses to
flooding, it is possible that more effective responses that mitigate the impacts of floods and
promote regional resiliency and greater response capacity can be developed. With climate
change models suggesting that these types of events are expected to increase and become
more intense, emphasis on disaster risk reduction strategies become a necessity in
governance.
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1.7 An Introduction to the Role of Government
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was created in 1988 and it is one
of the world’s leading organizations on climate change information. In its recent report,
Working Group III recognized that governing global common problems, like climate
change, requires international cooperation working together with local, regional, and
national policies (IPCC, 2014a). It is through a multi-governance approach that efforts to
address climate change and the subsequent hazards is most effective (IPCC, 2014a). One
of the fundamental problems associated with climate change action is the evaluation of
mitigation options. According to the IPCC Working Group III report on policymaking
(2014a), “the evaluation of mitigation options requires taking into account many different
interests, perspectives, and challenges between and within societies” (5). Regional and
national environmental differences make governing issues of climate change and,
subsequently, flooding different from region to region; however, action at the local and
regional levels have been evident in addressing concerns related to localized events—such
as flooding—in an effort to protect citizens and reduce the associated flood impacts.
Emergency management policies related to disasters have multiple dimensions
(Waugh Jr., 2007), including mitigation,3 preparedness, response, and recovery (Henstra,
2013). Canada has three main bodies of government with ancillary branches that focus on
different aspects of governing, but all work to reach a common goal—protecting the safety
and security of Canadians. With respect to issues pertaining to floods, municipal
governments are responsible for waste management, water quality management, mitigation
practices/procedures (this could be technological, land use planning, and/or response
during and post-flooding), and emergency management (Metro Vancouver, 2014). Issues
that extend across multiple municipalities or if provincial and/or federal assistance is
requested can be subject to provincial undertaking by which the role and responsibility to
address these issues is uncertain (Henstra, 2013; Valiante, 2002). The former addresses
issues pertaining to regulation. Municipal governments, like provincial governments, may

3

Mitigation in emergency management is different than mitigation in the context of climate change. The
latter refers to the reduction of greenhouse gases and the former refers to the prevention of an emergency.
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have different strategies/regulations pertaining to flooding (see Chapter 3). When flooding
extends beyond the legally defined boundaries of the city, whose regulation and how to
regulate inter-jurisdictional issues can become blurred, allowing the provincial government
to make decisions and/or take over. This undertaking is designed to reduce conflict between
municipalities, and to ensure that effective and efficient responses to floods are maintained.
The latter addresses financial assistance. Municipal governments have very tight budgets
and high demands for issues unrelated to flooding and other environmental issues (Henstra,
2013). As Donahue and Joyce (2001) argued, local governments worry about existing
issues; the uncertainty of future events and the limited financial resources inhibits
municipal action towards developing, discussing, and implementing solutions to concerns
such as flooding. When a major flood event does occur, the budget of the municipal
government may not be equipped to respond to the associated issues, as was the case in the
2013 Calgary flood. In these instances a local state of emergency may be declared, allowing
the Province to aid in the response to the flood; however, issues pertaining to the regulating
authority between the municipal government and the provincial government become
evident. The provincial government may have the resources available to assist in the
response to a flood, but the municipality does not necessarily have the right to control
where or how these resources are allocated. This can result in political tension as the
autonomy of the municipality is constrained.
Most environmental regulation occurs at the provincial level (Valiante, 2002).
When addressing environmental issues such as flooding, the provinces can only regulate
matters within their spatial boundaries. The provincial governments of Canada have the
authority to make laws on issues, such as managing public lands and resources, nonrenewable natural resources, property and civil rights, forestry, municipal institutions,
electricity generation, and issues of a local or private nature (Valiante, 2002). The limits
on provincial authority and provincial environmental statutes are similar to that of the
municipal authority and regulations. Provincial regulations pertain only to the province;
issues extending beyond the province is federal. If the province requests aid in a provincial
state of emergency, they do not necessarily have control over how the resources are
allocated (similar to a local state of emergency). Another limit concerns inter-jurisdictional
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immunity in which the Crown and its agents may not be forced to abide by the legislation
of another level of government (similar to diplomatic immunity).
The federal government of Canada addresses environmental issues at the national
scale. According to Valiante (2002), “most attention has focused on the residual power, the
power to make laws for the ‘Peace, Order, and Good Government of Canada’ (or POGG)”
(4-5). The courts have recognized two aspects of this power: national concern and national
emergency (Valiante, 2002). POGG is a national concern doctrine that applies to matters
that start out as local within a province but may cause a national disturbance and matters
that did not exist when the Constitution Act of 1867 was adopted. For an issue to qualify
as being a national concern, allowing the federal government to take jurisdiction, the matter
must be distinguished from matters of provincial concern and federal action must not
infringe on the balance of power between the two levels of government. If a province
cannot deal with the issue effectively and the failure to do so would affect the interests
beyond the province, the federal government can intervene in uniform legislative treatment.
A flood event could be considered a national concern if it has the potential to harm the
national economy. For example, Metro-Vancouver is Canada’s largest port for imports and
exports (Port Metro Vancouver, 2014). A flood in this region could prevent the
transportation of goods in and out of the country—depending on the size and severity—
preventing economic production, revenue, and growth in the region as well as the nation.
Therefore, if a flood occurs in this region, federal jurisdiction could be applied if there is
potential for national disruption; however, that necessitates the municipality’s and
province’s inability to manage and respond to the flood effectively and efficiently.

1.7.1

The Emergencies Act

The Emergencies Act (1985) replaced the War Measures Act in 1988. This Act outlines the
provisions by which a national emergency can be declared and the provisions for governing
during these emergencies. Under Section 3,
For the purposes of this Act, a “national emergency” is an urgent and critical situation
of a temporary nature that
(a) seriously endangers the lives, health or safety of Canadians and is of such
proportions or nature as to exceed the capacity or authority of a province to
deal with it, or
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(b) seriously threatens the ability of the Government of Canada to preserve
the sovereignty, security and territorial integrity of Canada
and that cannot be effectively dealt with under any other law of Canada.
This provision of the Act addresses the issue outlined in the previous section regarding a
province’s inability to manage and respond to an emergency and outlines the conditions
necessary to declare that a national emergency has occurred. Ultimately, the purpose of
this Act is to provide the context by which a national emergency is appropriate and is not
construed as infringing on a province’s right to govern by undermining its authority.
Under Section 5(a), a public welfare emergency (PWE) is “an emergency that is
caused by a real or imminent fire, flood, drought, storm, earthquake or other natural
phenomenon and that results or may result in a danger to life or property, social disruption
or a breakdown in the flow of essential goods, services or resources, so serious as to be a
national emergency.” When a PWE has occurred the Governor in Council—the Governor
General who is advised by the Cabinet—must declare so and outline the areas affected
by the emergency if all of Canada is not affected, the measures by which the emergency
can be dealt with, and the reasoning behind the declaration of the PWE (S. 6 (1)(2)).
This Act gives full authority to the federal government to take the lead in
responding to a national emergency, limiting the role of both municipal and provincial
government. Since the Act was legislated in 1988 there have been no national
emergencies declared in Canada; however, the provisions are in place in case that a
situation arises—a precautionary approach addressing disasters.

1.7.2

The Disaster Financial Assistance Arrangements

The Disaster Financial Assistance Arrangements (DFAA) is a program that was
established in 1970 to provide provincial and territorial governments with financial
assistance post-disaster. It is not intended, nor designed, for disaster mitigation projects,
meaning that only after a disaster occurs can a provincial or territorial government be
eligible for financial relief assistance. The federal program is a cost-sharing approach to
disaster relief, administered by Public Safety Canada. This program provides assistance to
the provincial and territorial governments and not individuals or businesses. Individuals
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and businesses can receive financial assistance for costs associated with a disaster through
their territorial and provincial government, however, the program will not directly provide
the assistance to these groups.
When a disaster occurs, provincial and territorial governments can apply for
financial assistance to subsidize some of the costs associated with a number of expenses
and restoration projects, including, but not limited to, evacuation operations, infrastructure
and public works restorations to their pre-disaster state, and replacing or repairing essential
personal property, small businesses and farmsteads. In this application, governments are
responsible for identifying where financial assistance is required and it is up to the DFAA
to decide what costs and how much of the costs will be eligible for cost-sharing. Returning
to the above point regarding ineligible groups for this financial assistance, it is not that they
are ineligible to receive financial assistance, rather they cannot directly apply for the DFAA
but can receive assistance by applying to their territorial government or provincial
government who in turn may be eligible for assistance.
In order to be eligible for disaster financial assistance, a province or territory’s
eligible costs must exceed a threshold based on their provincial or territorial population.
Beginning February 1st, 2015, amendments were made to the cost-sharing that the federal
government would be responsible for. Prior to February 1st, the provincial or territorial
government were responsible for the first dollar per capita of population without federal
assistance. Beginning February 1st, that amount changed from one dollar to three dollars
per capita of population before financial assistance is provided. The next six dollars per
capita of population is split by the provincial or territorial government and the federal
government. As the costs increased for provincial or territorial governments, the more
disaster financial assistance those governments would be eligible for (see Table 1).
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Table 1: Cost-sharing responsibility (DFAA, 2015)
Eligible provincial expense thresholds

Government of Canada share

(per capita of population)

(percentage)

First $3

0

Next $6

50

Next $6

75

Remainder

90

Since the start of the program in 1970, the Government of Canada has been
responsible for more than $3.4 billion of financial assistance to provincial and territorial
governments. Notable examples of recent floods that have involved financial assistance
from this program include the 2005 Alberta floods and the 2006 flood in Newfoundland.
Again, the main point to be made here is that this program is designed for post-disaster
relief. The responsibility to mitigate the risk of a flood occurring and the potential
subsequent impacts is still on the onus of the local governments. It is from this point that
we need to focus our attention towards what measures are in place to mitigate such risk
and impacts, and how and why such measures were developed, decided on, and
implemented.

1.8 Defining Development Pathways
More effective local responses are necessary to mitigate the impacts of floods at local and
regional scales. A development pathway is defined as “a complex integration of economic,
social, technological, institutional, cultural and biophysical characteristics that determines
the interactions between human and natural systems” (Sathaye et al, 2007). Development
pathway components have been examined individually in relation to climate change
adaptation and mitigation at a global scale; however, these components and their
interactions have not been examined in unison (Burch, 2009; Swart et al., 2003; O’Riordan,
2001). Understanding the interactions between the components of development paths are
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essential to the development of effective policies seeking to manage flood causes and
impacts (Swart et al., 2003; O’Riordan, 2001).
The trajectories of development paths are guided by response capacity (Burch &
Robinson, 2007; Winkler et al., 2007). Response capacity is the ability of a group to
respond to risk by utilizing human and financial capital, and institutional resources (Burch,
2009), while adaptive capacity is the ability of a group to implement strategies aimed
towards preventing a disaster from occurring (Smit & Wandel, 2006), and mitigative
capacity is the ability of a group to implement strategies aimed towards reducing the
anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions (Winkler et al., 2007). Response capacity is not
the sum of adaptive and mitigative capacity, rather it is the ability to respond most
effectively. Adaptive and mitigative capacity are a function of response capacity.
Flood policy progress has been made through: growing public awareness on the
issues; new policies that address both causes and impacts; and research (Burch, 2009;
Lorenzoni & Pidgeon, 2006). Inconsistencies in past research practices and response design
have resulted in a confusion between best-practice local responses and knowledge on
effective local responses to flooding (Burch, 2009). Research focusing on identifying
existing development pathways of local responses to floods and the relationships between
development pathway components seek to resolve this disconnect.

1.9 Research Questions
This research addresses the following research questions:
1. What are the development pathways of local responses to floods?
2. How are local responses to floods reflective of the subjective views of and for
flood management?
3. What factors affect municipal action?
The research seeks to develop an understanding of these pathways and address future flood
management concerns on policymaking/response by providing necessary information to
make informed decisions on efforts to increase response capacity to floods. This study is
not comparing the different techniques/approaches to flood response; rather, emphasis is
on how flood action emerges and what factors affect the ability to respond to flood risk.
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1.10 Study Sites
The Metro Vancouver region has been identified as one of many regions that will be under
high stress with rising sea-levels, and increased frequency and intensity of disasters
(Nicholls et al., 2007; IPCC, 2013). The melting of glacial ice and warming of oceans have
resulted in global sea level rise (Pearce et al, 2012). The IPCC (2013) predicted that it is
likely (66-100%) that sea levels will rise up to 0.97 meters by 2100. The damages of floods
to regions are being documented (Pearce et al, 2010; Forbes et al, 2002; Boateng, 2012;
Balica et al, 2012), but reducing the impacts and creating effective local responses to flood
events is an area of concern in this region. The latest Climate Change Adaptation Strategy
report (City of Vancouver, 2013) has argued that current policy and practices that are aimed
towards flood events are outdated and needing revision.

Figure 3: Study Area (Google Maps, 2014)
Two cities in the Metro Vancouver region have been chosen as the study area for
this research, including the City of Vancouver and the District of Maple Ridge (see Figure
3). The purpose of two study areas was to conduct a comparative study that seeks to explore
existing development pathways. As urban characteristics vary from city to city, including
values and vulnerability to flood events, flood responses are likely to differ. Two study
sites allow development pathways to be explored, recognizing that one pathway to flood
responses is unlikely. Together, the two study sites were used to identify and explore the
relationships between development pathway components, seeking to increase knowledge
of local response capacity to floods and provide information that can be used to revise
policy and practices accordingly.
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1.10.1

City of Vancouver

The City of Vancouver has been identified as a top 50 city in the world vulnerable to the
impacts of climate change (Nicholls et al, 2007). The coastal city can expect, and, thus
vulnerable to, rising sea-levels and frequent and intense storm surges (City of Vancouver,
2013; Nicholls et al., 2007). The City of Vancouver (2013) expects to see an increase of
6% and 9% of precipitation during winters by 2050 and 2080. They are expecting that
events that typically occur once every 25 years will occur 2.5 times as frequently by the
2050s. Being an inner city of Metro Vancouver, the existing infrastructure and
development leaves limited room for permeable surfaces. As such, the city has an exposure
to flood events that can only be expected to increase.
With a regional population greater than 2 million people (British Columbia
Statistics, 2013), the City of Vancouver is a hub for economic activity. Port Metro
Vancouver is the largest port in Canada (Port Metro Vancouver, 2014). A major flood in
the City of Vancouver could prevent imports and exports into and out of the city, province,
and country. As such, the importance of flood management from an impact mitigation
standpoint and in response to floods after one occurs is vital in protecting the economy.
Current local responses to floods in Metro Vancouver can be categorized under
three main themes: flood-proofing policy/strategies; waste management; and emergency
management and response practices (City of Vancouver, 2013). Under these different
themes, the latest Climate Change Adaptation Strategy report (City of Vancouver, 2013)
has argued that current policy and practices are outdated. This report has argued that the
latest climate predictions suggest that current policies are not as effective as they could be
and such policy/strategies should be re-evaluated and updated. It identified that a lack of
public participation in flood-response development exists and future response strategies
should be more inclusive and cover multiple layers of development paths.
As the City of Vancouver is already developed and surrounded by other developed
municipalities, there is little room to continue development and expand the urban
boundaries. As such, development is occurring vertically and less emphasis can be placed
on more social or land use responses as opposed to technology or infrastructure related.
Currently, the City is in the process of implementing a storm-wastewater separation system
that allows a greater capacity to reduce the likelihood of a flood event. Although the City
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is looking at all options for flood prevention and impact mitigation responses, it has been
expressed by participants in the study that technological responses are more common than
land use responses due to existing development and limited capacity to expand the urban
boundaries. That said, it is clear through the City of Vancouver report (2013) and recent
flood events that updating flood management policy and practices is a must.
A flood event on September 19th, 2010, publicized the ineffective nature of current
local responses to flooding in Vancouver (City of Vancouver, 2013). As a highly populated
coastal city with local response strategies being identified as outdated, examining
development paths of local response to flooding in Vancouver provides knowledge of
current best-practices, and the relationships between development path components. We
can identify the strengths and limitations of existing responses in the city by understanding
the development pathways of local responses to floods. This knowledge can be used in
discussing policy and practice.

1.10.2

District of Maple Ridge

Maple Ridge is a district municipality in the Metro Vancouver region. It is located along
the Fraser River in the northeastern part of Metro Vancouver with Pitt Meadows and
Mission being adjacent. It has a population of approximately 75,000 people (Statistics
Canada, 2011). In 2006, approximately 65% of the labour force in the District of Maple
Ridge commuted to surrounding communities for work (District of Maple Ridge, 2010). A
flood in the City of Vancouver, the District of Maple Ridge or anywhere between the two
cities could disrupt the economy by restricting commuters to and from work, thus, causing
a reduced labour force and resulting in stress onto the local and regional economies.
Therefore, it is important to examine how these cities approach flood management.
Unlike the City of Vancouver, Maple Ridge has less concern with floods caused by
sea-level rise as the region is further inland. The risk of a flood is less than that of the City
of Vancouver, and, therefore, responses are likely to be different and directed towards
different threats to the system. The primary concern with regards to flooding in this area is
overland flow caused by the flooding of the Fraser River or by heavy rainfall events (see
District of Maple Ridge, 2012). The region has had a number of floods since 1900,
including a 200 year riverine flood in 1948, a 10 year riverine flood in 2007, and, most
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recently, a 10-25 year riverine flood in 2012 (Nagel, 2014). The area’s largest flood on
record was in 1894, too, caused by an excess amount of water that had entered the Fraser
River (Nagel, 2014). Similar to the City of Vancouver, the District of Maple Ridge has
been identified as being vulnerable to future flood events as water volume in the Fraser
River increases (Nagel, 2014; District of Maple Ridge, 2012; Districts of Maple Ridge &
Pitt Meadows, 2008).
According to a Fraser Basin Council’s report (2010), “a major flood today would
result in severe social, economic, and environmental impacts, including billions of dollars
in damage to public and private property, temporary loss of infrastructure and community
services and disruption of business and trade” (2). The Fraser River Freshet Operational
Flood Management Plan (District of Maple Ridge, 2012) suggest that social and economic
impacts of a major flood in the region would likely be “nothing less than catastrophic” (5).
This report suggests the industrial sector, particularly the Albion Industrial Area (see
Figure 4), is a large concern if a flood were to occur due to its contribution towards the
community’s economy. In the Albion Industrial area a flood could cause more than 850
jobs to be lost. With a growing population and the need to develop the urban area, preparing
for future floods has been identified as a priority (District of Maple Ridge, 2012).
In the District of Maple Ridge, the region is mixed with urban and rural areas. As
the population grows, urban development outward is likely to ensue. The mixed land uses
in the region allow the City to explore and implement more social responses to prevent
vulnerable populations from developing. Although the region has not implemented a
storm-wastewater system, the use of pump stations seeks to prevent flooding and reduce
the impact that floods could have on the region. As the region continues to expand
outwards, emphasis is placed on implementing infrastructure that will protect these newly
developed areas. Major flood concerns currently are on the already developed area where
existing infrastructure is needing maintenance or upgrades. Attention to and investment in
flood management is far more limited in the District of Maple Ridge than in the City of
Vancouver, in part, due to a much smaller budget. As such, this research identifies
similarities and differences in flood management decision-making through the
development pathways for flood response capacity and action.
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The District of Maple Ridge was chosen as the second study site because of its
differences with urban and biophysical characteristics, values, and the history of floods to
those of the City of Vancouver. Unlike the City of Vancouver, a large portion of the District
of the District of Maple Ridge’s population commutes elsewhere; although the Albion
Industrial Area is integral to economic activity in District of Maple Ridge. Also, as the
District of Maple Ridge is located on the outskirts of Metro Vancouver the city has both
urban and rural area that is under the City’s governance. The different land uses make
responses towards flood management different than those of the City of Vancouver as
infrastructure and development in the City of Vancouver is already present, whereas some
rural areas in the District of Maple Ridge do not have this infrastructure in place that could
reduce the impact of flood. As District of Maple Ridge continues to expand through
development based on a growing population, how that development occurs in conjunction
with flood responses becomes an important point of inquiry. Finally, District of Maple
Ridge is further upstream along the Fraser River than the City of Vancouver. Its position
relative to the City of Vancouver makes the biophysical vulnerability to overland flow
along the Fraser River greater. As such, response in District of Maple Ridge is oriented
around the Fraser River and storm surges, whereas the City of Vancouver’s response is
directed towards coastal flooding. Comparing the two cities approach to managing floods
are ideal for identifying development pathways for local responses to floods and, thus, were
chosen for this study.
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Figure 4: District of Maple Ridge land use (District of Maple Ridge, 2015)

1.11 Overview of the Proceeding Chapters
This concludes the introduction to the study. To recap, the following was discussed: the
various impacts that floods are having and are expected to be exacerbated by a changing
climate; a brief introduction into the role of Canada’s municipal, provincial, and federal
governments; details of the Emergencies Act and the Disaster Financial Assistance
Arrangements program; development pathways; and the purpose and study area of this
research. In the coming chapters, emphasis is placed on the results of the study. Chapter 2
outlines the methodology that used in this study. Chapter 3 focuses on legal responsibility
and liability of emergency management which is critical in understanding the motivations
and process of decision-making in the City of Vancouver and District of Maple Ridge.
Chapters 4 through 6 focus on variables affecting response capacity to flood response and
municipal action, and mechanisms for increasing response capacity as viewed by
participants of the study. Finally, Chapter 7 concludes the paper by summarizing the
information presented, identifying major limitations and discussing future research needs
for response capacity to floods and flood action.
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2

Q Methodology

Identifying development pathways of local flood response that is present is a major
component of this research. It should be understood before proceeding any further that
development pathways are not a constant, rather they shift over time and space. As such, it
is the conditions by which decisions are made at the present that directly reflect these
development pathways. How and why we make the decisions that we do can be asserted
as a manifestation of social constructs. Social constructionism focuses on shared
viewpoints, knowledge and discourses (McHoul & Grace, 1995) “that represent the
substantive, cumulative and publicly accessible product of innumerable human selections”
(Watts & Stenner, 2012, 42). As Watts & Stenner (2012) further explain, “[constructionist]
research generally attempts to understand and map the currently predominant viewpoints
or bodies of knowledge relative to a particular context, event or object of enquiry” (42).
Making the decisions on the appropriate course of action becomes more based on the social
constructs of the decision-makers—thus, subjectivity—as many possible approaches to
flood response by reducing impacts and increasing the effectiveness of emergency
management exist. The ‘where,’ ‘what,’ ‘how’ and ‘why’ we implement specific responses
to floods becomes a reflection of these shared views.4 Therefore, a methodology designed
and oriented around subjectivity was been chosen to complete this study.

2.1

General Overview of Q Methodology

Q methodology was developed by William Stephenson (1953) and later refined by Block
(1978). The methodology was developed as a measurement technique to examine human
behaviour by attempting to access the views of individuals and groups through a form of
factor analysis. It was designed as an alternative measurement technique to psychology
tests and scales, but it is increasingly being used in various research fields, including public
opinion (Webler, Tuler & Krueger, 2001), policy analysis (Durning, 1999), communication
(Carlson & Trichtinger, 2001), landscape planning (Swaffield & Fairweather, 1996;

4

Refer to Chapter 3, Responsibility and Liability in Emergency Management, for further evidence and
explanation of the subjective nature of decision-making in emergency management.
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Previte, Pini, & Haslam-McKenzie, 2007), and environmental issues (Barry & Proops,
1999). The methodology is centered on subjectivity, self-reference, concourse theory and
abduction.
First, it recognizes that individuals are made meaningful by the nature of the
relationship with and on the immediate environment. As Stephenson (1953) argues
subjectivity is a behavior or activity that is best understood through its impact on the
immediate environment. Decision-making in emergency management is based on the
individual or group’s expertise and judgment towards the best course of action resulting in
a City’s response system, making these actors meaningful in studying decisions-making
and the human-environment relationships that exist. Ultimately, the research conducted is
examining the activity or behavior of decision-making in flood management.
Second, in this study, participants were asked to complete a questionnaire that
focuses on their level of agreement with a number of statements (see Appendix A). The
process of completing this questionnaire is known as Q-sorting and the completed
questionnaire is a Q-sort. The process of Q-sorting is self-referent. As Stephenson (1982)
states, Q methodology uses “a collection of statements, usually verbal, upon which a person
projects feeling, with self-reference” (238). In this methodology, feeling should be
understood as a process or activity. It is the “projection of feeling by an active subject”
(Watts & Stenner, 2012, 32). In other words, participants reflect on their own experience
and opinion to determine their level of agreement with each statement in the questionnaire.
Therefore, the views of a participant on each statement is self-referent.
Third, Q methodology is oriented on the concept of communicability; that is to say,
an observable domain of shared knowledge and meaning through a series of self-referent
statements (Stephenson, 1986). Each identifiable domain is a called a concourse. All
concourses represent “the individual’s cultural heritage, born of history. It is the single
most significant contribution to subjective science. All Q-sorts dip into it, as an empirical
field out of which new subjectivity grows” (Stephenson, 1982, 242). In other words, all Qsorts are in themselves an observable representation of an individual, but together each Qsort represents part of the shared knowledge and meaning on the topic in question.
Therefore, the Q-sorts can be studied individually and as part of the overall collective view
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of many Q-sorts. Similarity among Q-sorts lead to identifying these concourses and, thus,
identifying domains of behaviour for decision-making in flood management practices.
Fourth, Q methodology is an abduction technique. Abduction is an explanatory
framework formalized by Charles S. Peirce (1839-1914). Where deduction refers to a topdown explanatory framework providing a means of linking the cause of a phenomenon to
an effect through law/theory, and induction refers to a bottom-up explanatory framework
of establishing an applicable description that links the observed facts to the cause,
abduction, like induction, is a bottom-up explanatory framework, but it seeks to link the
effect to the cause through suitable laws based on a range of hypothetical conditions
(Inkpen & Wilson, 2013). It is similar to induction in that it consists of linking the effect
to the cause (Shank, 1998); however, it is different in that through induction the effect and
the cause are known, but the linking law/theory is unknown, whereas in abduction the
effect is known, but the cause is unknown because abduction recognizes that different
conditions can lead to different causes (Inkpen & Wilson, 2013). In other words,
“abduction is based on being able to tell a plausible story to link effect and cause together
via a valid law” (Inkpen & Wilson, 2013) and that many possible laws could be applied to
explain an effect which also means that there are a range of possible causes.
In Q methodology, abduction is associated with a factor analysis. Stephenson
(1961) viewed “factor analysis as the technical extension of Peirce’s theory of abduction,
as a way of generating hypotheses de novo” (Brown, 1980, 134). As such, the purpose of
the factor analysis is to identify collective views within the questionnaire in order to
provide a plausible theoretical explanation for these groupings’ existence. As Haig (2008)
and Watts & Stenner (2012) state, a main difference between abduction and induction is
that the latter is an explanatory framework, whereas the former is an exploratory
framework. As abduction recognizes many possible laws that could be applied and many
possible causes that could result, it becomes difficult to ascertain a causal relationship.
Therefore, by using Q methodology, the researcher recognizes that the phenomenon in
question may not have an absolute theory that can be applied and that different variables
have varying influence that will be dependent on a host of characteristics that differ
temporally and spatially.
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2.2

Q-set Design and Content

Q method involves four steps:
1) The collection/review of ideas, beliefs, and opinions;
2) The formulation of a set of meaningful statements based on the first step;
3) The distribution and completion of Q-sorts; and
4) A by-person factor analysis comparing participants’ Q-sorts. (Shinebourne, 2009).

2.2.1

Pre-Q-sort Data Collection

The data collection involved several different methods, including a literature review of
existing responses and theories, in-depth interviews, and the completion of Q-sorts. This
multi-method approach was used to explore, identify consistency, and build on the results
of each other while recognizing that subjectivity is the key to unveiling the development
pathways of local flood response. A multi-method approach to research has been shown to
enrich data collection and explore different angles to the same research question (Nagy
Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2004; Rank, 2004). The following paragraphs and sections to come
explain the process by which data was collected, analysed, and interpreted.
A literature review of existing development pathway theories and current local
responses in the City of Vancouver and District of Maple Ridge was a necessary
component to the research process (see Table 2). It provided background knowledge on
different theories and their critiques, as well as insight into traditional development
pathways. The conducted literature review consisted of research on the relationships
between development pathway components (Swart et al., 2003; O’Riordan, 2001), sociotechnological change theory (Geels & Schot, 2007; Smith et al., 2005; Berkhout, 2002),
organizational theory (Hosmer, 1995; Jones, 2001), social movement theory (Della Porta
and Diani, 2006; Escobar, 1998; Laraña et al., 1994; Della Porta et al., 1999; Melucci,
1984), deliberative and participatory democracy (McLean & McMillan, 2015; Calhoun,
2002; Cohen et al., 2012; Lorenzoni et al., 2007; Ran, 2012), and local responses to
flooding in the City of Vancouver and District of Maple Ridge.

29

Table 2: Theories of Development Pathways
Theory
Socio-Technological Change Theory:
Socio-technological change theory refers to the interaction between human behaviour,
including an organization’s behaviour, and infrastructure. It examines how people use
space and it seeks to identify ways in which technologies or processes can be developed
to optimize a sustainable interaction between the two (Geels & Schot, 2007; Smith et al.,
2005; Berkhout, 2002). As Berkhout (2002) explains, technological innovations for the
betterment of a region involves a desire and commitment to replace the existing
technologies. Without a firm commitment by the organization or institution for a radical
shift towards a new system, the innovation and adoption of such a system is not possible.
One of the biggest issues with developing/shifting to a new technological system is that
it is difficult to determine which system will produce the best results, particularly if such
systems have not been tested or present (Berkhout, 2002). This is one of the reasons why
current organizations or institutions are not accepting of the idea of ‘re-inventing the
wheel’ or re-structuring their current system without evidence showing the success of
the new system. With that success evident comes a greater desire to shift and
commitment for change. It is a function of “resources, interests and expectations of
institutionally embedded networks of actors” (Smith et al., 2005, 1508). Therefore, for
socio-technological change to occur, there needs to be a network of actors committed to
adapting the desired regime (Smith et al., 2005; Berkhout, 2002).

Social Movement Theory:
Social movement theory explores the socio-cultural characteristics of society that are
fundamental to human mobilization (Laraña et al., 1994). Its research provides insight
into the power dynamics, collective identity, and influence of institutions that control
human behaviour (Della Porta et al., 1999; Laraña et al., 1994; Melucci, 1984). This
theory investigates the causes of collective mobilization and the relationship that such
mobilization has on influencing change to institutional behaviour. As Tilly & Wood
(2013) explain, social movements are the result of multiple stressors which often have
negative implications infringing on the human rights of a group of individuals. These
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authors explain that, historically, when human rights have been violated activism
towards correcting/replacing the instigating body with one that meets the wants and
needs of the community.
Organizational Theory:
Organizational Theory (also known as institutional theory) is a philosophical approach
to understanding how organizations, both governments and businesses, function. It
examines the formations of businesses and their relationship with society (Hosmer,
1995). It emphasizes the importance of organizational culture—the set of shared values
and norms that control the interaction between the organization and those that seek the
attributes and products in which the business provides—and gaining a competitive
advantage in the market (Jones, 2001). This theory is formulated around organizational
structure, design and culture (Jones, 2001). It provides insights into an organization or
institution’s behaviour by examining the interaction between its members and its
consumers.
Deliberative Democracy:
Deliberative democracy is a democratic process leading to decisions through publicly
expressed reason, mutual understanding and political inclusion (McLean & McMillan,
2015).
Participatory Democracy:
Participatory democracy emphasizes public engagement and involvement in political
situations (Calhoun, 2002).

Seven interviews of local practitioners were conducted within the two cities. Seven
interviews was sufficient in gathering a data-enriched preliminary view of the development
pathways that may exist in the City of Vancouver and District of Maple Ridge due to the
downloaded responsibility of emergency management and, subsequently, flood
management to municipalities and the internal and external practitioners involved.
Interviewed participants ranged in terms of their field of expertise and their role within the
development, decision-making, and implementation of flood responses in various
organizations and institutions (see Table 3).

31

Table 3: Interviewed Participants5
Interviewed Participants Background
1. Environmental Specialist (City of Vancouver)
2. Environmental Specialist (City of Vancouver)
3. Manager/Executive (City of Vancouver)
4.Technical Expert (District of Maple Ridge)
5. Resource Specialist(District of Maple Ridge)
6. Manager/Executive (District of Maple Ridge)
7. Regional Expert

The purpose of these interviews was to collect ideas, beliefs and opinions and create an
expanded review of the development, implementation, and operation process of existing
local responses to flooding. Based on the theories described in Table 2, the main principles
from these theories were extrapolated and the information gathered regarding the responses
that are current in the City of Vancouver and District of Maple Ridge were used to shape
the main question that were to be asked in the interviews and formed a foundation to
interpret the results of the factor analysis. In the theory presented above, emphasis was
placed on technology, culture and public behaviour as it relates to human-environment
interaction. How these theories compare to local responses to flood risk is critical in
understanding the major components to response capacity to floods and municipal action.
Therefore, major focus points for the conducted interviews were designed to examine
public behaviour as it relates to concern/advocacy and engagement, and the role that
priorities and values have on affecting local response to flood risk. Other major focus points

5

General pseudonyms are provided to protect the identity of participants.
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were centered on science and uncertainty, internal characteristics and interactions with
external stakeholders, local demographics, financial capability of the institution or
organization and the current state of the economy, biophysical characteristics of the area,
and technology and urban planning as these relate to local flood response. This is because
of their relevance to these theories and the supporting literature that suggests these topics
may have an influence in the development, decision-making and operations for
organizations and institutions. Emphasis in these interviews were placed on disaster risk
reduction—how to reduce the likelihood of a flood occurring in a specific area and impact
mitigation if one were to occur.
The interviews were recorded, transcribed and coded into themes based on an
inductive interpretive analysis. The results of the inductive interpretive analysis
categorically addressed 6 themes, including drivers for, controls on, approaches to,
limitations of, dependencies for success, and the direction of future flood management. It
is from the interview data and, thus, within these themes that the statements comprising the
Q-sort were formulated.

2.2.2

Development of the Q-set (Items)

This stage of the Q method included 23 meaningful statements that participants are rankordering based on their level of agreement with each statement. Each of these statements
are referred to as an Item. Together, these 23 Items formulate what is known as the Q-set
(see Appendix A). Although Shinebourne (2009) concludes that Q-sets should be at least
40-80 statements to produce satisfactory results, there is little evidence to justify this
conclusion (Watts & Stenner, 2012). In fact, a smaller number of Items may produce very
satisfactory results (Watts & Stenner, 2005). In studies that involve a larger Q-set, the
process of completing Q-sorts tends to be exhaustive to participants and can lead to skewed
results (Shinebourne, 2009; Watts & Stenner, 2005). In the context of this study, more than
23 Items was not necessary as the Items were designed to allow the participants to complete
the survey in a timely manner and to explore areas needing further interpretation in order
to make the appropriate conclusions.
The Q-set consisted of positive and negative Items (as recommended by Schlinger,
1969) and similar sentence phrasing for Items oriented around the same theme. For
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example, Items 1-4 were worded as “The major driver for developing and implementing
flood management initiatives exceeding provincial and federal legislation is…” As Watts
& Stenner (2012) explain, similar sentence phrasing makes it easier for the participant to
complete the Q-sort by minimizing the confusion between Items that are inquiring about
the same principle component. From here, the design of the Q-sort for which participants
can rank-order Item relative to a corresponding level of agreement was chosen.
In Q method, completed Q-sorts are illustrated through a matrix in which each cell
corresponds to a level of agreement value that an Item can be placed in. The matrix format
is pre-determined prior to the distribution of Q-sorts to participants. It can follow two
different formats: a free distribution format or a forced distribution format. Since the latter
forces participants to order all Items and only a set number of Items can be assigned to
each level of agreement value, the free format was chosen which (refer to Figure 5) allows
participants to assign as many Items a specific value as they feel is appropriate.

Figure 5: Freely Distributed Q-Sort 5
In this stage of the research, the Q-sort followed a free-distribution format in which
local practitioners placed each Item in a valued cell of the Q-sort based on their level of
agreement. Items could be placed in one of nine cells corresponding to a level of agreement
value of -4 (strongly disagree) to 0 (neither agree nor disagree or the participant is unsure)
to +4 (strongly agree). The free distribution format was suited for this study as it allowed
participants to express their views without constraining their ability to rank Items.
Although a forced-distribution format has been shown to produce more stable results (see
Block, 1978; Bracken & Fischel, 2006), this format may not be as accurate for this study
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because the Q-set covered multiple subject areas. Therefore, a forced distribution could
have led to skewed results.

2.2.3

Administering the Q-sort (procedure)

The development of the Q-sort, to be distributed, was completed in December of 2014 and
it was distributed to participants up until January of 2015. In this period, 12 leading local
practitioners within various organizations were involved in completing the Q-sort based on
the position of their organization/institution and/or the department within the
organization/institution that they are affiliated with (see Table 4). A representative of the
requested organizations was ideal in this study for two reasons. First, it became apparent
early on in the distribution phase of this research that individuals within the same
organization have the same position as their colleagues and, as such, they would forward
the request along with a corresponding email indicating thusly.
Second, Q methodology is less concerned with the number of participants due to
its purpose (Watts & Stenner, 2012). As Brown (1980) notes,
Q methodology requires enough subjects [or participants] to establish the existence of a
[collective view] for purposes of comparing one [collective view] with another. What
proportion of the population belongs in one [collective view] rather than another is a
wholly different matter and one about which Q technique…is not concerned (192).
The methodology has little interest in generalizing to a population scale; instead, the focus
is on establishing the “existence of particular viewpoints” (Watts & Stenner, 2012, 72;
Brown, 1980; Stephenson, 1953). It is by this logic that 12 participants representing
different organizations and departments within these organizations was considered suitable
for the purposes of this study.
Completed Q-sorts were placed in a single document in which no identifiers were
present due to the ethical provisions of confidentiality that were conditional for
participation in this study. All ethical information was passed along to the participants
when requesting their involvement in the study (see Appendix D).
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Data collection concluded on February 25th with the completion of the 12th
participant’s Q-sort. All completed Q-sorts were included in the factor analysis, as
described in the next section.

Table 4: Q-sort Participants6
Q-sort Participants’ Background
1. Environmental Developer (City of Vancouver)
2.Technical Expert (City of Vancouver)
3.Technical Expert (City of Vancouver)
4. Emergency Management Expert (District of Maple Ridge)
5.Technical Expert (District of Maple Ridge)
6. Technical Expert (District of Maple Ridge)
7. Development Expert (District of Maple Ridge)
8. Non-governmental organization (District of Maple Ridge)
9. Regional Environmental Organization
10. Regional Environmental Organization
11. Regional Institutional Manager
12. Regional Consulting Expert

6

General pseudonyms are provided to protect the identity of participants.
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2.2.4

Statistical Analysis

Q methodology uses a by-person factor analysis to identify patterns of similarity and
distinct regularities in the Q-sorts. As Watts & Stenner (2012) explain, “it involves a
statistical inspection of the correlation matrix that mimics the conceptual or eyeball
inspection” (98). The process of a by-person factor analysis measures the correlation
among Q-sort configurations. Q methodology is focused on the relationship between
participants. In Q the participants are variables being measured and the Items are the
sample. Therefore, it should be understood that Q method focuses on the relationship
among participants through the factor analysis of completed Q-sorts. The result of this byperson factor analysis is the identification of group(s) representing a collective view or
shared behaviour, known as a Factor. Each Factor is a representation of a group of
participants that have been identified as having similar behaviour with each other, as
expressed through their Q-sorts. They will have their own Q-sort that is outputted,
representing the behaviour/views of the Factor. They are designated as Factors because in
abduction there are many possible links to a cause and because, in Q methodology, each
Factor represents a group’s behaviour through its views and they are involved in flood
response; attributing a single Factor to link the effect to the cause is inappropriate. Each
Item of the Factor’s Q-sort has new calculated value that represents that Factor’s view.
These output values for each Item are known as factor arrays. In order to arrive at these
factor arrays there are a series of steps involved.
The by-person factor analysis process in Q method can be understood as being
complicated and, as such, it will be described in a step-by-step fashion. The statistical
analysis of Q method involves 6 steps, including:
Step 1: Intercorrelation of Q-sorts;
Step 2: Factor extraction;
Step 3: Factor rotation;
Step 4: Factor-defining Q-sorts for 3 factors;
Step 5: Factor weights and estimates; and
Step 6: Factor arrays.
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2.2.4.1

Intercorrelation of Q sorts

The first step in Q method is to examine the relationship that each Q-sort has with every
other Q-sort in the study. The purpose of this step was to identify groupings of high and
low correlations and, thus, variance by producing a correlation matrix (see Table 5). Based
on the correlations among Q-sorts, a factor matrix was outputted, identifying “shared forms
of understandings among [local practitioners]” (Shinebourne, 2009, 94). As Watts &
Stenner (2012) explain, “these initial relationships within the correlation matrix—these
patterns of similarity and difference—are very important because they are the site from
which our Factors will be born” (98).
The calculation of the correlations between Q-sorts involved Pearson’s Coefficient.
The other option was to use Spearman’s Coefficient, but it really did not matter as the
methods would have produced the same results (Brown, 1980). It is from here that a
Principle Component Analysis (PCA) was performed on the correlations, leading to the
extraction of Factors. Since there were 12 responses to the questionnaire, one can see from
Table 5 that some responses were highly correlated and other negatively correlated. For
example, Q-sorts 5 and 3 were correlated at 0.801 and 5 and 9 at 0.695 while 1 and 8 were
negatively correlated and small (-0.073).
Table 5: Correlation Matrix
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2.2.4.2

Factor extraction

The second step, factor extraction, is the process of identifying the number of Factors (also
known as groupings of shared behaviour) in the study through the identification and
removal of common variance from the initial correlation matrix (Kline, 1994; Brown,
1980; Watts & Stenner, 2012). There are two main approaches to factor extraction: 1) a
centroid factor analysis; and 2) a PCA. Harman (1976) argues that the two methods are
likely to produce similar results, the difference being that the PCA will produce a
mathematically best solution.
In this study, the PCA factor extraction technique was performed in which
eigenvalues above 1.00 were indicative of a Factor. It is recommended by Brown (1980)
and Watts & Stenner (2012) that the number of Factors extracted be based on eigenvalues
greater than 1.00—satisfying the Kaiser-Guttman criterion (Guttman, 1954; Kaiser,
1960)—as values less than 1.00 account for less than 1 Q-sort of study variance. As it is
indicated in Table 6, three Factors were extracted, equating to 72.73% of the study
variance.
Table 6: Factor Extraction
Component
Initial Eigenvalues

Extraction Sums of Squared
Loadings

Total

% of

Cumulative

Variance

%

Total

% of

Cumulative

Variance

%

1

5.458

45.485

45.485

5.458

45.485

45.485

2

1.801

15.007

60.492

1.801

15.007

60.492

3

1.469

12.239

72.730

1.469

12.239

72.730

4

0.865

7.212

79.942
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5

0.647

5.388

85.330

6

0.494

4.119

89.449

7

0.422

3.515

92.964

8

0.330

2.747

95.711

9

0.266

2.219

97.930

10

0.119

0.988

98.918

11

0.085

0.708

99.626

12

0.045

0.374

100.000

**Extraction Method: Principle Component Analysis
Q-sorts have a corresponding factor loading to each Factor. A factor loading is the
degree of correlation that each Q-sort has with each Factor (see Appendix B). It is these
factor loadings that become integral to the final product/arrays as their loadings will
determine which Factor they will represent.

2.2.4.3

Factor Rotation

The third step of the by-person factor analysis is a factor rotation. Factor rotation is the
process of manipulating the conceptual dimensions of the extracted Factors in order to best
position the factor loadings relative to each Factor. It is common practice to perform a
factor rotation in Q methodology (Watts & Stenner, 2012; Brown, 1980). As Watts &
Stenner (2012) state, “The close proximity of two mapped Q-sorts signals their general
agreement and the presence of similar viewpoints. The greater their physical separation,
however, the more their respective viewpoints diverge” (115). It is the purpose of factor
rotation to align the unique viewpoints of each Q-sort with a shared viewpoint of a Factor
by rotating the axes and, thus, spatially adjusting the factor loadings and avoiding negative
loading values. This process was undertaken and it is fully described in Appendix B.
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2.2.4.4

Factor-defining Q sorts

The next step of the by-person factor analysis was to define the Q-sorts that would be used
to calculate the final factor arrays for each Factor. Factor rotation results in new factor
loadings for each Q-sort relative to each Factor. It was using these new loadings (see Table
7) that factor-defining Q-sorts were selected. Following the rotation, Q-sort 1’s factor
loading with Factor 2 has increased while the loadings for Factors 1 and 3 have decreased.
It is safe to assume that Q-sort 1 would have a higher significance/role in defining the factor
arrays for Factor 2 as opposed to Factors 1 and 3 in this study. Therefore, Q-sort 1 is factordefining of Factor 2. This process of selecting factor-defining Q-sorts was performed on
each Q-sort, resulting in Table 8.
Table 7: Factor loadings post-rotation
Component (Grouping of Shared
Behaviour)
Factor 1

Factor 2

Factor 3

Q Sort 1

0.132

0.845

-0.287

Q Sort 2

0.09

0.663

0.249

Q Sort 3

0.833

0.069

0.339

Q Sort 4

0.062

0.72

0.401

Q Sort 5

0.835

0.389

0.178

Q Sort 6

0.402

0.212

0.734

Q Sort 7

0.901

0.137

-0.121

Q Sort 8

0.616

-0.079

0.525

Q Sort 9

0.564

0.255

0.586

Q Sort 10

0.039

0.43

0.578

Q Sort 11

0.331

0.765

0.33

Q Sort 12

0.065

0.093

0.823
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Table 8: Factor-defining Q-sorts

It should be noted here that Q-sort 9 had essentially the same loading on Factors 1
and 3.7. According to Watts & Stenner (2012), the significant loading of a Q-sort on two
or more Factors indicates that the Q-sort is a confounding variable and, as such, it cannot
be used as a factor-defining variable. This does not mean that Q-sort 9 is not important or
irrelevant to the results of this study, rather, it just cannot be used in determining the final
factor arrays. It is in the interpretations of the final product of each Factor that Q-sort 9’s
distribution was compared to the final factor arrays of Factor 1 and 3, focusing on
similarities and differences between these products and this variable with regards to the
results of this study. Following the placement of Q-sorts into individual Factors, factor
weights, estimates and z-scores were calculated.

2.2.4.5

Factor weights and estimates

Factor weights and estimates are essential to formulating the final factor arrays. A factor
estimate is “an estimate of the Factor’s viewpoint” (Watts & Stenner, 2012, 129) on a
particular Item. It is calculated using the factor weights of all factor-defining Q-sorts of an
individual Factor. The final factor weights indicate the percentage that each Q-sort will
contribute to the final factor estimates relative to the Q-sort with the highest score (1). It
involves three steps that are indicated in the following tables:

7

Q-sort 9 is the 9th participant’s completed questionnaire.
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Table 9: Calculating Factor Weights
Step 1: Initial Factor Weight (for Q sort 1)=Factor Loading/(1-Factor Loading^2)

Factor 1

Initial Factor
Weight

Initial Factor
Factor 2 Weight

Initial Factor
Factor 3 Weight

Q Sort 3

2.721235108

Q Sort 1

2.954803742

Q Sort 6

1.591348614

Q Sort 5

2.757823466

Q Sort 2

1.18301807

Q Sort 10

0.867977342

Q Sort 7

4.787485587

Q Sort 4

1.495016611

Q Sort 12

2.550585581

Q Sort 8

0.992677393

Q Sort 11

1.844373455

Step 2: Reciprocal of Largest Factor Weight from Step 1=1/Initial Factor Weight of Qx
Reciprocal
Factor 1

Reciprocal

0.208877913

Factor 2

0.338431953

Reciprocal
Factor 3

0.392066829

Step 3: Final Factor Weight (for Q Sort 1)=Initial Factor Weight (Step 1)*Reciprocal of
Largest Factor Weight (Step 2)

Factor 1

Final Factor
Weight

Factor 2

Final Factor
Weight

Factor 3

Final Factor
Weight

Q Sort 3

0.568405911

Q Sort 1

1

Q Sort 6

0.623915004

Q Sort 5

0.576048411

Q Sort 2

0.400371115

Q Sort 10

0.340305124

Q Sort 7

1

Q Sort 4

0.505961391

Q Sort 12

1

Q Sort 8

0.207348383

Q Sort 11

0.62419491

The calculation of factor estimates were derived from these weights by multiplying
the initial score of each Item in the Q-sorts with their corresponding factor weights. The
sum of the weighted scores of an Item is the factor estimate for that Item. These factor
estimates are indicators for the corresponding factor arrays (see Table 10).

43

The tables over the next 4 pages show the weighted scores of each Item based on
the Q-sort weights and the factor estimates under the ‘Total’ column. Again, it is from these
factor estimates that the factor arrays were derived.
Table 10: Factor 1 estimates
Q sort
Weight

3
(0.5684)

5
(0.5760)

7
(1.000)

8
(0.2073)

Total

(Item
Ranking)*Weight=Weighted
Score

Item
1

4.5472

4.032

9

1.6584

19.2376

2

3.4104

3.456

8

1.2438

16.1102

3

4.5472

4.608

5

0.8292

14.9844

4

2.842

3.456

5

0.6219

11.9199

5

2.842

2.304

5

0.4146

10.5606

6

2.842

4.032

6

1.4511

14.3251

7

3.9788

4.608

8

1.6584

18.2452

8

3.9788

4.032

7

1.2438

16.2546

9

4.5472

4.608

5

1.6584

15.8136

10

2.842

2.304

5

0.4146

10.5606

11

3.9788

4.608

9

1.6584

19.2452

12

3.4104

3.456

5

1.4511

13.3175

13

2.842

4.032

5

0.6219

12.4959

14

3.9788

5.184

9

1.2438

19.4066

15

1.7052

1.728

4

0.2073

7.6405

16

2.842

2.88

4

1.6584

11.3804

17

2.842

2.88

5

0.6219

11.3439
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18

2.842

4.032

5

0.6219

12.4959

19

2.2736

0.576

2

0.2073

5.0569

20

3.4104

4.032

5

1.4511

13.8935

21

1.7052

1.728

3

1.4511

7.8843

22

3.9788

4.608

6

1.4511

16.0379

23

3.4104

4.608

8

0.6219

16.6403

Table 11: Factor 2 estimates
Q sort
Weight

1
(1.000)

2
(0.4004)

4
(0.5060)

11
(0.6242)

Total

(Item
Ranking)*Weight=Weighted
Score

Item
1

2

1.2012

1.518

1.2484

5.9676

2

7

3.2032

2.024

4.3694

16.5966

3

7

3.6036

3.036

4.9936

18.6332

4

6

0.8008

3.036

2.4968

12.3336

5

5

0.4004

3.542

3.121

12.0634

6

5

3.6036

3.036

1.8726

13.5122

7

6

2.002

4.048

4.9936

17.0436

8

4

1.6016

4.554

5.6178

15.7734

9

1

3.2032

3.542

3.7452

11.4904

10

6

2.4024

4.048

4.3684

16.8188

11

7

2.8028

4.048

5.6178

19.4686

12

6

3.2032

4.048

4.3694

17.6206

13

6

3.2032

4.048

4.3694

17.6206

14

9

3.2032

3.542

5.6178

21.363
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15

6

1.2012

1.518

0.6242

9.3434

16

3

0.4004

2.53

3.121

9.0514

17

7

2.4024

3.542

3.121

16.0654

18

9

3.6036

4.554

5.6178

22.7754

19

1

1.2012

2.024

1.2484

5.4736

20

6

3.6036

3.036

3.7452

16.3848

21

3

3.2032

3.036

4.3694

13.6086

22

9

2.8028

4.554

5.6178

21.9746

23

3

1.2012

3.036

4.3694

11.6066

Table 12: Factor 3 estimates
Q sort
Weight

6
(0.6239)

10
(0.3403)

12
(1.000)

Total

(Item
Ranking)*Weight=Weighted
Item Score
1

4.9912

2.0418

7

14.033

2

3.7434

1.3612

3

8.1046

3

4.9912

2.0418

6

13.033

4

1.8717

1.0209

6

8.8926

5

3.7434

0.3403

6

10.0837

6

2.4956

2.3821

5

9.8777

7

5.6151

0.6806

7

13.2957

8

5.6151

2.3821

6

13.9972

9

5.6151

2.3821

8

15.9972

10

5.6151

3.0627

8

16.6778

11

5.6151

1.7015

6

13.3166
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2.2.4.6

12

4.9912

1.7015

7

13.6927

13

3.7434

1.0209

6

10.7643

14

4.9912

1.7015

5

11.6927

15

2.4956

0.3403

1

3.8359

16

4.9912

0.6806

7

12.6718

17

1.2478

1.0209

3

5.2687

18

4.9912

3.0627

8

16.0539

19

2.4956

0.6806

4

7.1762

20

4.9912

0.6806

8

13.6718

21

4.9912

2.7224

5

12.7136

22

5.6151

2.3821

5

12.9972

23

4.3673

1.7015

2

8.0688

Factor arrays

The final step of the statistical formulation in Q method is determining the factor arrays of
each Factor. As mentioned, factor arrays are the corresponding values of a Factor’s Items
based on the factor estimates of Q-sorts. They represent the Factor’s view for each Item.
The distribution format (free versus forced) is fundamental in determining the factor arrays.
Factor scores or arrays are derived by identifying the factor estimate range that any Item
could have and dividing that range by the number of possible rankings—in this case, 9.
Each rank is given the same range and Items with factor estimates that fall within a rank’s
given range will receive the corresponding value. The final factor arrays are displayed in
Figures 7-9. It is from the literature review, interview data and these factor arrays that
Chapters 4 through 6 of this paper are centered on.
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Figure 8: Factor 3 arrays
Each Factor can be characterized based on the outputted factor arrays that
correspond to each Item of the Q-sort. Factor 1 is characterized by risk and collaboration.
With Items 1, 11, 14 and 7 being valued the greatest in its configurations (+4 and +3),
Factor 1 views risk as the biggest or most influential driver for flood management.
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Although uncertainty and competing priorities influence investment in flood management,
according to this group, the risk of a flood and the associated impacts make flood
management a priority in the region. This group takes a precautionary approach to flood
response in that they would rather be safe than face the consequences of no preventative
action given that a flood event could occur.
Factor 2 can be characterized by institutional tension that exists among different
levels of government or organizations and the action that results is more social and
economically based as opposed to Factor 1’s risk-based approach. Based on the outputted
factor arrays, Factor 2 views potential economic impacts as the greatest drivers for flood
management. This group views the risk of a flood occurring as less of a driver than public
pressure and economic impact. They operate more based on public input regarding the
existing issues in the region at the present time than the potential risk of a flood occurring.
What can be seen as an issue because the impacts are visible (what their reality is) is more
influential on institutional behaviour than a perceived threat. Therefore, uncertainty of an
event occurring impacts the investment in flood management. Finally, this group views
flood management as being a provincial or federal responsibility as opposed to a municipal
one. This suggests that a lack of acceptance of responsibility could lead to less investment
in and attention to flood response from this group, as will be shown in Chapters 4-6.
Factor 3 is characterized by organizational or institutional structure. It controls the
investment in flood response and who is responsible for the development and
implementation of the organization or institution’s flood response. Although
communication and collaboration are important for successful flood management,
disconnect among staff and more senior officials within the organization or institution is
present and reflects the current state of flood management in the region. This group views
climate change and the potential economic impacts associated with a major flood as being
major drivers for flood management, but how the organization or institution views the state
of the current system and the need to improve that system takes priority. Therefore,
disconnect and disagreement regarding responsibility, in part, shape this group. It is also
characterized by the politics of approaching issues where results can be seen immediately
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for the purpose of re-election and keeping the public happy by approaching their concerns
first followed. Ultimately, response occurs when needed.

2.3

Conclusion

Q methodology studies human behaviour through the views, beliefs and experiences of
individual participants. It identifies clusters of individuals that share similar viewpoints in
order to identify group behaviour. These clusters are known as Factors and the behaviour
is identified through the factor scores/arrays that indicate a group’s level of agreement with
an Item within the Q-sort.
In this study, these Factors and their factor arrays form part of the basis for
understanding how institutions and organizations manage and respond to flood risk. They
identify patterns of behaviour framed by interacting components in order to aid in the
discussion of conceptualizing institutional response capacity to floods and municipal
action. The results of the by-person factor analysis supports interview data and information
gathered in the literature review. Together, these methods of data collection lead to the
conceptual frameworks presented in the coming chapters. Items 4, 5 and 6 of the Q-sort
are excluded in the write-up of Chapters 3-7 because the by-person factor analysis shows
no conclusive evidence that these Items factor in response capacity to floods or municipal
action.
In Chapters 4-6, results of the Q analysis are presented in conjunction with findings
from the literature review and the interviews. The tables presented in these Chapters are
designed to show the views of the three Factors on particular Items. It should be understood
that the values presented on a particular Item should not be taken as a representative value
that can be summed to provide one view for all participants; rather, the factor arrays that
correspond to a Factor represents that Factor’s particular level of agreement with a specific
statement. It is not the purpose of these tables to say that Factor 1’s level of agreement of
an Item is greater or less than that of Factor 2 or 3’s level of agreement. The purpose of
these tables is to show how these Factors view various aspects of flood response to provide
an indication, in conjunction with interview data and literature review findings, of the
components of response capacity to floods and municipal action. Therefore, by
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understanding that these Factors correspond to separate views from each other, this paper
can now proceed with discussing responsibility and liability in emergency management,
followed by response capacity to floods and municipal action.

3

Responsibility and Liability in Emergency Management
3.1

Introduction

Jurisdiction, responsibility and exposure to civil liability in emergency management
situations are major considerations in the development of emergency policy and response
practices. Together, they outline the roles of governments and provide a legal framework
for the approach to emergency management.
The main purpose of this Chapter is to provide context for the Chapters to come
through a review of the applicable statutory and common law principles and to review the
influence that legal responsibility and exposure to civil liability have in emergency
management decision-making. The objectives of this Chapter are:
1. Identify the roles and responsibilities of the municipal, provincial, and federal
governments as derived through legislation;
2. Explain the heterogeneity in emergency management and planning among
municipalities in British Columbia; and
3. Explore the provisions in place that reduce government exposure to liability in
emergencies.

3.2

Jurisdiction and Responsibility

Jurisdiction refers to the authority to make laws. In Canada, jurisdiction is a product of the
Constitution Act of 1867. In 1867, Ontario, Quebec, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick
signed the British North American Act (now referred to as the Constitution Act of 1867),
followed by the remaining provinces and territories at later dates. It established the federal
and provincial governments of Canada, outlining their legislative authority over matters in
Canada. The federal government was given legislative authority over the militia, military
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and naval services, and Defense, as well as criminal law and other matters (Section 91).
Provincial governments had legislative authority on all matters pertaining to land and
water—provided that the body of water is solely contained in that province—and, most
notably, authority over municipal institutions (Section 92).
Probably the most important aspect of this document, at least in the context of
emergency management, is that subject matters not mentioned in the Act allows federal
and provincial governments to define their roles. Both the federal and provincial
governments have the authority to make laws pertaining to emergency management and
can use that authority to define their roles. The federal government’s approach has
traditionally been that emergency management is best suited to be dealt with at the
provincial or local level and should not be a federal responsibility because most emergency
management has to do with waterways and land which are under provincial jurisdiction.
Therefore, the federal government recognizes that responsibility for emergency
management lies with the provinces through the Emergency Management Act. This is not
to say that the federal government is not involved in emergency management, just that the
obligation for planning and implementation of emergency management is not their
responsibility. Instead, the federal government has chosen to take on a funding and
assistance role. The Disaster Financial Assistance Arrangement program is designed to
assist provinces in post-disaster recovery. In events where a state of emergency is declared,
the federal government has provisions in place so that the military can aid in disaster relief
(as described in Chapter 1). The actual involvement in emergency management planning
and implementation, however, has very little to do with the federal government. They
downloaded that responsibility to the provinces.
Provinces also have jurisdiction to make laws on emergency management and can
make laws that impose obligations on local governments to do things or not do things.
While the province has ultimate jurisdiction to make laws governing emergency
preparedness and to establish minimum standards and criteria, that responsibility has
largely been devolved down to municipalities who have limited capacity given the financial
constraints and other priorities facing them.
In British Columbia, the Emergency Program Act passes down responsibility of
emergency management to municipal institutions. Instead of taking the lead on emergency
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management, the province’s approach is that emergency management is best dealt with at
a local scale. Risk to hazards differ between municipalities. The City of Vancouver, for
example, is exposed to coastal flooding caused by sea-level rise and storm surges. Maple
Ridge on the other hand may not have to address direct flooding caused by sea-level rise
because it is further inland. A universal plan at the provincial level that can be applied in
all regions is viewed as not being the most effective strategy. Instead, management at a
local level made more sense to the province. As such, that responsibility was delegated to
the municipalities. The province remains involved in emergency management, but their
position should be recognized as an advisory role with funding and financial assistance
opportunities.
Municipalities, on the other hand, are legal entities defined by provincial
legislation. Municipal governments are representative entities of their communities that
make communal decisions based on what they perceive to be in the best interest of the
community (Local Government Act). Where the province and federal government have the
authority to define their roles in emergency management, municipalities do not.
Municipalities are creatures of statute. They derive their power and existence through
legislation, such as the Local Government Act. Municipalities, like private entities and
citizens, are bound by provincial statutes, including those that direct or require emergency
preparedness. As such, they make emergency planning and implementation decisions in
both a statutory and common law context.
In 1996, the province of British Colombia adopted the Emergency Program Act
outlining the duties and responsibilities of government for emergency management and the
provisions for which a state of emergency can be declared. It was under this Act that
municipalities were given the responsibility for developing and implementing local
emergency plans. As stated under Section 6(2) of the amended Emergency Program Act
(2015), “a local authority must prepare or cause to be prepared local emergency plans
respecting preparation for, response to and recovery from emergencies and disasters.”
Given that sea-levels are rising and storm surges are becoming more frequent and intense,
coastal communities have the responsibility to create an emergency plan that should
address such concerns. However, communities may be subject to multiple types of hazards
and, thus, can interpret this provision of the Act—and the extent to which “preparation for,
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response to and recovery from” is appropriate—however they like. For example,
“preparation for” could be interpreted as developing a plan if a disaster were to occur, but
it does not actually mean that infrastructure has to be implemented that would reduce the
likelihood of a flood occurring in a given area. In the City of Vancouver, there is an entire
department designated with the task of designing a plan and carrying out that plan
addressing climate change which includes reducing flood risk. Other cities will not have
the same emergency plans as the City of Vancouver for a variety reasons, but the point here
is that the wording in Section 6(2) of the Emergency Program Act allows for multiple
interpretations and the policies, programs, and decisions made are reflective of such
interpretations. Although this Act imposes responsibility for emergency management onto
municipalities, there is no defined standard in approaching it. Municipalities are able to
approach emergency management as they see fit.
There are programs that are designed to financially assist municipalities in postdisaster recovery that may influence the decisions that municipalities make due to the
conditions attached. This can deter emergency management by restricting access to
resources if certain requirements are not met. For example, municipalities can receive
financial assistance or compensation through the province. The Compensation and
Disaster Financial Assistance Regulation of the Emergency Program Act is designed to
outline the conditions for which municipalities and homeowners qualify for financial
assistance in the event that a disaster occurs. Claims for compensation by municipalities
can be made for structural repair, rebuilding or replacement; however, Section 30 raises
issues pertaining to flood plain mapping and the ability to receive assistance. Section 30
states,
If an area is designated under the [Local Government Act] as flood plain and a public
facility is built or installed in that area after the area has been so designated, no
assistance will be provided to repair, rebuild or replace the public facility if it is damaged
in a flood unless the structure was determined by the Minister of Environment, Lands
and Parks or by Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation to have been properly flood
protected.
This provision acts as a deterrent for flood plain mapping. It incentivizes local governments
to neglect flood plain mapping in their jurisdictions in order to be eligible for assistance if
a disaster were to occur. In the event that flood plain maps are up-to-date and a flood
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occurs, the burden of the cost to repair, rebuild or replace damaged or destroyed structures
located in the designated flood plain falls completely on the local authority without the
possibility for compensation or assistance. As one participant in this study explained, the
Columbian Basin Trust had the resources to conduct a hydrological assessment in
Kootenay for 20 municipalities, but the municipalities turned it down because of the
liability attached. Therefore, the liability attached to flood plain mapping was the root
deterrent for making this decision. It was decided that the best thing for these communities
was not knowing so that if a flood were to occur they would remain eligible for assistance
and avoid a potential economic collapse.
Claims for financial assistance or compensation can be reduced or declined if the
Minister determines that insufficient measures were taken before, during or after the
disaster (Compensation and Disaster Financial Assistance Regulation, S. 31). Therefore,
although the Emergency Program Act, outlined earlier, requires the coordination of action
to protect the health, safety, well-being and property from damage in the event that a threat
of a disaster exists, if the minister believes that too little action has taken place to protect a
structure then that assistance or compensation can be declined.
It is clear that municipalities are responsible for emergency management defined in
provincial legislation and that there is no defined standard in its approach allowing
municipalities to make decisions on the planning and implementation of responses based
on financial resources and other priorities. Again, municipalities choose whether or not to
act and how to act with regards to emergency management. The assistance provided in the
event that a disaster does occur will be reflective of those choices and, thus, the social
constructions of the community’s reality. The question now becomes: when does the local
authority, having that responsibility to protect the people and property, become legally
liable for their actions—including the choice not to act—and the associated costs in the
event that a disaster does occur.

3.3

Liability

Legal liability refers to a finding that is made by a court that someone did something that
they should not have done or did not do something that they should have which caused
damage to someone else. It is a conclusion of law. Someone who does something wrong to
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someone else is liable to pay damages. There is a distinction to be made between being
responsible and being liable. Having the responsibility does not mean that one is legally
liable.
As described earlier, municipalities are legal entities that are treated at law as a
person; however, there are circumstances by which municipalities have different liability
exposure than private individuals. Like a company, municipalities operate in the interests
of their shareholders. For companies, the interests lie in maximizing profits (Jones, 2001).
For government, they operate for the greater good and, therefore, they have to make tough
decisions at times. As such, municipalities need to be protected against civil liability for
the decisions that they make. Provisions in legislation and court decisions have reduced
government exposure for this reason. In Kamloops (City of) v. Nielsen, the Supreme Court
of Canada found that governments have different exposures to private law, stating
“municipal legislative functions, are different in kind and are not amenable to judicial
constraint by the imposition of a private law duty of care”. The Court distinguished
between policy decisions, to which no civil liability is attached, and operational decisions
where a private law duty of care may arise, the breach of which gives rise to civil liability.
The difference between a policy decision and operational decision is a legal
rationalization (Roman, 2002; Henstra & McBean, 2004). McLachlin C.J. wrote in R. v.
Imperial Tobacco Canada Limited:
“Core policy” government decisions protected from suit are decisions as to a course or
principle of action that are based on public policy considerations, such as economic,
social and political factors, provided they are neither irrational nor taken in bad
faith. This approach is consistent with the basic thrust of Canadian cases on the issue,
although it emphasizes positive features of policy decisions, instead of relying
exclusively on the quality of being “non-operational”. […] Difficult cases may be
expected to arise from time to time where it is not easy to decide whether the degree of
“policy” involved suffices for protection from negligence liability. (para. 90).
Due to the complexity of decision-making, policy versus operational decisions are made
on a case-by-case basis. As McLaclin C.J. further stated, “a black and white test that will
provide a ready and irrefutable answer for every decision in the infinite variety of decisions
that government actors may produce is likely chimerical” (para. 90). The choice to
implement infrastructure in one area, for example, versus another area is a policy decision
due to the economic, social and political factors that influence the decision. If a flood
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occurs, the City may not be liable for the damages in the area without the protecting
infrastructure because a policy decision was made.
The choice not to act is also a policy decision. In Eliopoulis v. Ontario, George
Eliopoulis had been infected with West Nile Virus in 2002 and was treated in hospital but
later died in 2003. His estate and family members sued Her Majesty the Queen in Right of
Ontario for negligence, arguing that Ontario owed the deceased a private duty of care and
had the capability of preventing the outbreak in 2002 but chose not to act. The Ontario
Court of Appeal found that the choice not to act was a policy decision and, therefore,
negated the existence of a private law duty of care, which is a necessary pre-condition to
civil liability in negligence.
It is important to understand that reduced government exposure does not mean no
exposure to civil liability, just that it is limited in comparison to a private company or an
individual. Legislation can limit exposure to liability when acting in face of an emergency
or impeding emergency provided the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous. For
example, under Section 18 of the Emergency Program Act, government cannot be found
liable in private law unless in doing the act, decisions were taken in bad faith or they are
found to be grossly negligent in doing or omitting that act. Their main exposure to legal
liability lies with operational decisions. In a report prepared for the Institute for
Catastrophic Loss Reduction, Henstra & McBean (2004) concluded that in order for a
government to be found legally liable, they have to be “found negligent in the event that
an operational decision breaches a duty of care owed to citizens” (4). Claims regarding the
failure to uphold the duty of care can be made in negligence or nuisance.
Operational negligence is a private law claim that can be asserted against
governments. Negligence is the result of a defendant’s failure to satisfy a duty of care owed
to the plaintiff, which causes damages (Odhavji Estate v. Woodhouse). Returning to
Kamloops (City of) v. Nielsen, municipalities cannot be found negligent for policy
decisions; however, it is important that government not be completely exempt from
liability. In R. v. Imperial Tobacco Canada, McLachlin C.J. wrote:
There is a wide consensus that the law of negligence must account for the unique role
of government agencies: Just. On the one hand, it is important for public authorities to
be liable in general for their negligent conduct in light of the pervasive role that they
play in all aspects of society. Exempting all government actions from liability would
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result in intolerable outcomes. On the other hand, “the Crown is not a person and must
be free to govern and make true policy decisions without becoming subject to tort
liability as a result of those decisions.” (Just v. British Columbia, 1239).
Thus, governments have exposure to liability in negligence for operational decisions. The
key issues remain with the existence of a duty of care and proximity. If it is determined
that a private law duty of care is owed, and proximity exist, and, if the decision was
operational, a local government can be eligible in negligence.
Under the Emergency Program Act, a government has to be grossly negligent in
their actions for liability to rise. Claims for gross negligence must show damages occurred
where there exists a duty of care. A duty of care is an obligation to take reasonable care to
avoid actions that result in an unreasonable risk of harm to others (Odhavji Estate v.
Woodhouse). The plaintiff must prove that a private law duty of care exists, as defined
through:
(a) A statutory scheme;
(b) Interactions between the local authority and the plaintiff without interference
from a statute;
(c) Proximity based on (a) and (b); or
(d) Common law for operational action. (R. v. Imperial Tobacco Canada;
Swinamer v. Nova Scotia (Attorney General)).
Foreseeability of the risk of injury can give rise to a duty of care if the harm is a reasonably
foreseeable by-product of the action in question. For example, in Anderson et al. v.
Manitoba, the province diverted water resulting in massive flooding in other communities.
The question became whether or not a duty of care existed knowing that by diverting water
away from one area to another, the receiving community would be more vulnerable to
massive flooding. Although the court declined to certify the action as appropriate for a
class action, the court found that the allegations in negligence against Manitoba disclosed
a cause of action and permitted that claim to proceed as individual actions by affected
persons.
Nuisance is a further ground of civil liability that may apply to flood situations.
Nuisance refers to the interference with an individual’s use and enjoyment of property
through a thing or activity (MacGregor v. Penner; Antrim Truck Centre Ltd. v. Ontario
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(Transportation)). It may be the result of negligence (Penno v. Manitoba). In order to prove
a nuisance claim the plaintiff must prove that the interference was substantial and
unreasonable. To put this into context, in emergency situations there are times where an
evacuation order can be implemented. In the event that an evacuation order is implemented
during a disaster, the government has the legal authority to occupy private land, under
Section 10 of the Emergency Program Act. It is expected that the owner tolerates the
adverse effects of that occupation (Anne Hotel Co. v. Ashcroft; Smith v. Inco). As stated by
the Supreme Court of Canada,
Under the common law of nuisance, sometimes the person whose property suffered the
adverse effects is expected to tolerate those effects as the price of membership in the
larger community. Sometimes, however, the party causing the adverse effect can be
compelled, even if his or her conduct is lawful and reasonable, to desist from engaging
in that conduct and to compensate the other party for any harm caused to that person’s
property. (Royal Anne Hotel Co. V. Ashcroft (Village), paras 8-10).
Therefore, civil liability claims on the grounds of nuisance need to show the local authority
either acted unlawfully causing harm to the enjoyment or use of one’s self or property or
even if the municipality acted under lawful authority, the interference with the individual
landowner’s property is so great that it is unfair to expect that person to absorb those
adverse effects without due compensation. In the event that no physical damage has been
done, the question becomes whether it is unreasonable for the plaintiff to accept
interference for the greater good of the public in all situations or if certain provisions should
be in place to protect the plaintiff from such interference (MacGregor v. Penner; Royal
Anne Hotel Co. v. Ashcroft; Smith v. Inco Ltd.). As stated in MacGregor v. Penner:
In essence, the common law of nuisance decided which party’s interest must give way.
That determination is made by asking whether in all the circumstances the harm caused
or the interference done to one person’s property by the other person’s use of his or her
property is reasonable. (2).
Hypothetically, an argument could be made that the local authority could be found guilty
of nuisance in a disaster situation or impeding disaster if the authority occupied land from
private landowners and exceeded the necessary time to respond to the disaster thereby,
causing an unreasonable interference with the owner’s enjoyment and use of their land. In
such cases, compensation may be awarded to the plaintiff/landowner.
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Municipalities have tight budgets and many duties to fulfill (Henstra, 2013). With
responsibility for the cost of emergency mitigation measures remaining in large part with
municipalities, exposure to civil liability for decisions made have to be carefully
considered. Natural disasters can affect local, regional and national economies. Evidence
in Haiti, the Philippines, Christchurch (New Zealand) and others have shown that the
ability to recover post-disaster is highly dependent on resource capacity. When issues
pertaining to wrongdoing by the government to an individual or group of individuals arises
in the event of a disaster, the ability to recover can be further constrained as it lessens
resources available to the institution and region. Resources that would otherwise be used
for the collective are restricted, particularly if compensation is owed to a few individuals.
That said, compensation is usually awarded at a much later date, but it impedes the region’s
ability to develop and reduce exposure in the event that a disaster does occur.
Liability for operational decisions could facilitate even tighter budgets and result in
delays or dissolution of projects in emergency management or other areas. In the interviews
conducted in the City of Vancouver and District of Maple Ridge, participants described
resources as being tight which has affected on-going projects. The results of the Q analysis
suggests that priorities have a role in the investment in emergency management planning
and implementation. If decisions made are found to be liable for damages the available
resources allocated to projects can become constrained. Again, governments act in the
greater good for their communities. A government that is found liable for an operational
decision impedes the ability for governments to act. Therefore, it is important for
municipalities to ensure that resources can be allocated for the benefit of the community as
a whole. To do so, exposure to civil liability needs to minimized and, thus, it becomes
integral in the emergency management decision-making process.
To conclude, statutory responsibilities and potential legal liabilities inform municipal
decisions in emergency management. Although municipalities have less exposure to civil
liability than that of a company or private individual, they do have to be careful in their
approach to emergency management as to not act in bad faith or grossly negligent.
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3.4

Conclusion

Jurisdiction, responsibility and legal liability are critical considerations in planning and
implementing emergency management. The absence of emergency management in the
Constitution Act of 1867 has allowed the federal and provincial governments to define their
roles. While the province has ultimate jurisdiction to make laws governing emergency
preparedness and to establish minimum standards and criteria, that responsibility has
largely been devolved down to municipalities who have limited capacity given the financial
constraints and other priorities facing them. Although municipalities are responsible for
emergency management in British Columbia, there is no defined standard in its approach,
allowing municipalities to address emergency management as they see fit. Financial
assistance and compensation by the provincial and federal government for damages
resulting from a disaster can come with conditions, such as no assistance or compensation
being provided to municipalities that develop in a designated flood plain. Such conditions
have been found to inform emergency management decisions and, in some cases, deter it.
Governments have to make tough decisions at times and, as such, they need to be
protected from civil liability for the decisions that they make. Although municipalities have
the responsibility for emergency management that does not mean that they are legally
liable. When decisions are made, governments have less exposure to civil liability than that
of a private individual or company. Policy decisions made are exempt from civil liability
unless those decisions were taken in bad faith. Governments do have exposure to civil
liability when the government is found to be grossly negligent in their actions. Although
that exposure is reduced, governments still take into account their exposure to inform
planning and decision-making. Decisions that have greater exposure to civil liability are
less likely to be made than a decision that has minimal or no exposure.
Municipalities act in the interest of their communities. The decisions that they make
are for the greater good. Their approach to emergency management can be viewed as a
social construction of the community’s reality. Consistent with organizational theory that
argues that culture dictates institutional or organizational behaviour by framing behaviour
to meet societal demands, emergency management, too, conforms to this theory. The laws
that are in place dictate what is acceptable, unacceptable and the standards to which
municipalities, organizations and even the population must conform to reflect the cultural
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values of the region. Therefore, emergency policy and practices of communities are a
reflection of wants, needs and values of their populations. Although statutory
responsibilities and legal liabilities inform the decisions that they make, those decisions
will not impede on the interests and values of the community; instead, they work in tandem
for the purpose of the greater good. The question becomes what other variables influence
planning and decision-making in emergency management, particularly in the context of
flood management.

4

Development Pathways of Response Capacity to
Floods
4.1

Introduction

Response capacity is a term that depends on context for its meaning. As Burch (2009)
explains, response capacity is the ability of a group to respond to any risk by utilizing
human capital, financial capital, and institutional resources. The IPCC report (2007)
describes response capacity as the ability of humans to manage greenhouse gas emissions
and associated effects of climate change (Tompkins & Adger, 2005). In both Burch (2009)
and the IPCC (2007), the researchers viewed response capacity as being the ability to
manage risk. A nation or region’s ability to manage risk is viewed as being highly
dependent on resources as related to their socio-technical systems and economic
development. Past research has focused on economic elements that influence response
capacity (Handmer et al., 1999) but as the IPCC (2001b; 2007) and Sathaye et al. (2007)
argue, response capacity is complex and should include other factors that influence a
region’s ability to respond, such as socio-cultural dimensions.
As Hadfield & Seaton (1999) explain, environmental management involves the
complex interactions of human capital, social capital and institutional behaviour and
physical change (see Figure 9). Together, these variables affect the way resources are
allocated and used in natural and human systems. These authors claim that a change in any
component of this interactive model would result in change in environmental management.
This model is relevant to the discussion on response capacity to floods as the same themes
influencing change in this model are present in what is described throughout this Chapter.
As knowledge of flood management continues to develop and emergency management
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changes as a priority within institutions, the effect on what resources are allocated to
address the issue will result. What is described in this Chapter are the major components
by which response capacity is influenced, which are consistent with findings made by
Hadfield & Seaton (1999) and Burch (2009).

Figure 9: Factors influencing change in environmental management (Hadfield &
Seaton, 1999, 586).
In the previous Chapter, the process of downloading responsibility and the legal
mechanisms in place that influence decision-making in emergency management are
examined. Questions of response capacity and development pathways to flood
management now become the critical focus of this Chapter. What influences a
community’s ability to respond to flood risk is difficult to quantify due to complex issues.
What needs to be noted at this time is that response capacity and action are separate.
Although action is reflective of response capacity, having the ability to manage risk does
not necessarily mean that action takes place.
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The purpose of this Chapter is to identify and explain some of the factors influencing
response capacity in flood management. It does not offer a complete picture of all
influencing factors, rather it seeks to identify and explain some of the main elements
affecting response capacity, including: legislation; institutional behavior as seen through
priorities and collective agreements; collective action; technological pathways; and
resource management. Evidence is presented based on the interview data, literature review
and Q analysis.
This Chapter argues that provinces have the ability to develop a baseline response
capacity through legislation that mandates a standard for emergency management.
Although in Chapter 3 it became clear how responsibility and liability can inform decisionmaking, how legislation affects response capacity remained incomplete. Beyond the legal
aspect, this Chapter argues that institutional behavior in recognizing that flooding is an
issue needing attention and investment and collective action, both internally within a
municipal institution and with external stakeholders and levels of government, can act as a
control mechanism on response capacity as it dictates how resources are allocated. Next,
this Chapter focuses on technological pathways and the relationship of technology
responses and land use responses with cultural values and urban development. This paper
argues that cultural values and urban development influence the orientation of responses
in a region, particularly as highly developed areas with limited space to expand place
greater reliance on technological responses as the population grows compared to areas
where space for urban expansion is greater. Finally, this Chapter concludes with a brief
explanation of resource management as it pertains to response capacity, arguing that it is
fundamental to institutional response capacity.

4.2

Jurisdiction and Baseline Response Capacity

The provinces have the ability to establish baseline conditions for response capacity of
emergency management and, subsequently, flood management through their authority to
make laws governing land, water, and municipalities within their provincial boundaries.
They can force municipalities to abide by a specific set of conditions that would control
institutional behaviour in what practices would be considered legally acceptable or
unacceptable with regards to land use and emergency management. Provinces have the
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ability to create a standard for emergency and flood management which all municipalities
and organizations would be required to meet.
It is evident in the previous Chapter that no standard is set in British Columbia’s
legislation on how municipalities are to proceed with regards to emergency management;
instead, municipalities can approach the situation however they see fit provided that there
is at least a plan for the “preparation for, response to and recovery from emergencies and
disasters” (Emergency Program Act, 2015, 6.2). What those plans consist of and what
action results are, in part, a function of the responsibilities imposed on local governments
and the liability attached. Legislation imposing a minimum standard in emergency
management can be viewed as reflective of response capacity as it can provide boundaries
for action. More laissez-faire legislation allows municipalities to interpret statutes and
regulations more freely, whereas stricter policies on emergency management practices
would increase what is minimally required by municipalities. As such, the provinces have
the ability to influence response capacity by mandating a standard in emergency
management practice that municipalities would be forced to abide by.
To illustrate this in an international context, in the United States, state
environmental employees in Florida were told by state officials not to use terms such as
climate change and global warming because the state was not convinced that climate
change is occurring (Korten, 2015; Jaffe, 2015; The McCoy, 20015). By not recognizing
climate change as occurring and, thus, an issue, the state does not have to respond.
Therefore, although there is no official policy that states climate change is not occurring,
baseline response capacity in Florida remains low because precautionary municipal and
state action is not needed for something that is not recognized as occurring. If the state
recognizes sea-level rise, for example, as an issue then it can impose obligations onto
municipalities for action. If the state’s position rejects the need for action then the
municipalities would have to take it upon themselves to recognize sea-level rise as an issue
needing action, but due to the state’s position, they are not required to.
In British Columbia, however, climate change is an issue and the disasters that are
likely to occur in the future are recognized as a concern. Although in the Emergency
Program Act there is no mention of climate change, municipalities are required to have
plans for emergencies that they are likely to experience, which can include flooding.
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Therefore, municipal response capacity is greater because they are forced to address
emergency management to the degree set out by the province. With stricter legislation
obligating a standard, municipal response capacity would increase as it would force
municipalities to meet greater minimum requirements.
Response capacity in flood management, therefore, is, in part, a reflection of legislation
as controlled by the institutional behaviour of the actor with the greatest authority to impose
obligations through law. Their position can dictate bottom-line behaviour by mandating a
minimum standard for local governments and organizations. Therefore, baseline response
capacity can be viewed as the outcome of a product (legislation) that is developed through
a jurisdictional body. However, this is not to say that developing a standard for emergency
management through legislation is the appropriate course of action to increase response as
it will be clear in the upcoming sections that factors interact with each other, creating a
complex system that must be carefully managed.

4.3

Institutional Behaviour and Collective Action

Baseline response capacity should be referred to when discussing what is minimally
required by municipalities and organizations. It speaks to the entire region where such
requirements are imposed; however, within the region different municipalities and
organizations will act beyond what is minimally required to different degrees. What factors
influences these municipalities and organizations’ ability to manage flood risk should be
kept separate from baseline response capacity or, if viewed as a mathematical equation, an
addition to the baseline response capacity where baseline response capacity remains a
constant.
Fundamental to the concept of institutional response capacity—which exceeds
minimum requirements—is institutional behaviour and collective action. The former refers
to “individual behaviour [that] can be simply aggregated into collective phenomena, thus
yielding the behaviour of institutions amenable to explanation simply by reference to the
preferences of the individuals that compose that institution” (Burch, 2009, 180). How an
institution prioritizes items affects how much investment is placed on any given item. In
other words, the response capacity of an institution is influenced by competing priorities.
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The lower flood management is as a priority results in a smaller financial investment and,
thus, reducing the response capacity of an institution on flood management.
This claim is evident in a comparison of the City of Vancouver and District of
Maple Ridge. The results of the Q analysis show that competing priorities affect investment
in flood management (see Table 13). Such findings are consistent with interview data. In
the study sites, participants agreed that flood management is a high priority, but other
priorities, such as transit, economic development, and environmental conservation, can
deter focus on and investment in flood response as was particularly the case in the District
of Maple Ridge. As one interviewed participant in the study explains, governments have
to balance response with other priorities. As a result, competing priorities can inhibit action
by deterring investment or focus on issues that are not as high of a priority as others.
Table 13: Results for Items 12-15 of the Q-sort analysis
Item

Factor (factor array)

12. Success of flood management is dependent on or will Factor 1 (1)
increase depending on competing priorities elsewhere that
put less emphasis on and investment in flood management. Factor 2 (2)
Factor 3 (2)
13. Economic and relating activities, such as tourism, are Factor 1 (0)
controls on updating existing infrastructure.
Factor 2 (2)
Factor 3 (1)
14. Flood management and initiatives that focus on reducing Factor 1 (4)
the impacts if a flood occurs are a high priority within your
Factor 2 (4)
municipal boundaries and/or in your profession.
Factor 3 (1)
15. Flood management is the top priority in the region, Factor 1 (-2)
above, for example, transit, economic activity, and
Factor 2 (-1)
environmental conservation.
Factor 3 (-3)
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Similar to the discussion in the last section, collective agreements can increase
response capacity to floods by mandating action on particular issues. They can force
response by prioritizing items in which response beyond provincial legislation is voluntary.
For example, the Metro Vancouver 2040 was adopted by 21 municipalities in 2011 as a
regional growth strategy, representing a “collective vision” for accommodating population
growth. It contains strategies relating to urban development, regional economy, the
environment and climate change, housing, and land use and transportation (Metro
Vancouver, 2015). Under Section 3.4.1 of Metro Vancouver 2040, risk assessments are to
be incorporated “into the planning and location of Metro Vancouver utilities, assets and
operations” (42). For municipalities, they must adopt Regional Context Statements
outlining policies that promote settlement in areas while minimizing risk associated with
natural hazards and they must also consider using risk assessments in planning.
Therefore, what can be concluded here is two-fold. First, the Metro Vancouver
2040 is a reflection of emergency management response capacity exceeding baseline
requirements as it recognizes emergency management from a risk-mitigation standpoint as
a primary objective in the region as the population continues to grow. As it was identified
in the previous section of this Chapter, by recognizing climate change and the need for
disaster risk reduction, the response capacity of an institution is greater than those that do
not recognize the issue because a region will not plan or prioritize if they believe that
response is not necessary. Recognizing the issue can make it a priority. As several
interviewed participants explained, the flood management response in the City of
Vancouver has, in large part, resulted because the municipality believes that potential
flooding is an issue that endangers the population, assets and operations within the city.
This is consistent with findings by Burch (2009), Lawrence & Suddaby (2006), and
DiMaggio (1988) regarding institutional theory. As Burch (2009) explains, “organized
actors with resources may significantly impact the structure and function of institutions by
utilizing strategies such as lobbying or leadership. […] Strategies are revealed by which
actors may guide the evolution of institutions” (181). The behaviour of individuals within
the institutions have made flood management a priority for the municipality. The focus on
and investment in flood management will be dependent on where this issue stands as a
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priority when compared with other concerns and responsibilities as determined by
institutional behaviour.
Second, similar to the previous section, the wording of the regional growth strategy
is open to interpretation as to the degree to which risk assessments in planning are used.
Risk assessments are powerful tools in planning as they can provide the basis for
formulating strategies that align with the values of the region while mitigating the impacts
that disasters could have. As Adger (2006) explains, vulnerability assessments challenge
“the design of good governance to promote resilience to minimize exclusion thereby
reducing the severity of perceived vulnerability and its structural causes” (276). They
spatially allow practitioners and government to identify areas at highest risk for flooding
and populations where the greatest impacts may be experienced. It reflects response
capacity by reducing uncertainty for areas at greatest risk, thereby, providing a framework
for the strategic development and implementation of responses.
The other major components in this section regarding institutional behaviour and
collective action are the concepts of group cohesion and collaboration. Group cohesion
refers to factors influencing group performance among a diverse group of individuals
(Harrison, Price & Bell, 1998). In Chansler, Swamidass & Cammann (2003), the authors
concluded that poor cohesion can lead to reduced performance.
In the City of Vancouver and District of Maple Ridge, interviewed participants and
the results of the Q analysis indicated that although participants believe flood management
should be the responsibility of a different level of government, communication among
departments within organizations and among organizations, and strong collaboration with
the province are major factors in the region’s current state of flood management. It was
evident in these interviews that a lack of cohesion internally could disrupt flood
management response as issues pertaining to the appropriate course of action, the resources
that should be allocated, and debates over whether or not flooding is within that
organization’s purview, could become a major factor in preventing flood response.
That said, it was also evident in the District of Maple Ridge that miscommunication
between senior officials within organizations and their staffs have produced a
misconception regarding the need for greater flood response. The interview data shows
several staff members in an organization discussing the need for greater flood response;
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however, when discussing the current state of flood response with more senior ranking
officials within this organization they mention only minor issues that need to be addressed,
their perception overall remains that the current state of flood management in the region
does not require major revisions. As one participant in the District of Maple stated,
I would say this community is pretty solid in terms of flood risk. I do not think we really
have to make that a big consideration. Like the areas that we are at risk to flood—like
I’m talking about the Fraser now—I do not think we are particularly. I think that we
have kind of built that into the way that the community has been built. I do not think
there are any areas that could flood where we would be going.
The results of the Q analysis are consistent with this claim. Approximately one-third of the
participants gave a negative score to Item 23—our flood management approach has been
very successful here and can be seen as a leader for others to follow—indicating that the
overall perception on flood management in this region is diverse, which can ultimately
influence flood response as discussed. In fact, the results of the Q analysis for Item 21
further indicates that a disconnect among staff may exist. Factor 3’s factor array for Item
21 is 2, which corroborates the above claim regarding a disconnect; however, Factor 1’s
factor array of -2 shows the opposite. Factor 1’s position supports interview data in the
City of Vancouver as participants indicated strong cohesion among staff, other
organizations and council, whereas several participants in the District of Maple Ridge
argued that disconnect in the region exists, thereby effecting flood response (consistent
with Factor 3).8
Therefore, an organization’s cohesion internally, among various organizations and
levels of government, act as a control mechanism in response capacity as it influences
institutional behaviour. The ability to respond to flood risk can decrease as tensions
increase and information is miscommunicated among these actors.
Institutional response capacity exceeding provincial legislation is, therefore, a function
of institutional behaviour and collective action as dictated through competing priorities,
collective agreements, group cohesion and collaboration. Together, they provide a key part
of the foundation for institutional response capacity by accepting the responsibility for

8

Factor 2’s factor array of 0 does not provide any indication to whether or not disconnect exists as this
Factor’s view is that it neither agrees or disagrees or it is unsure whether disconnect is present.
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flood management exceeding baseline requirements. Institutional behaviour is an
important factor in evaluating response capacity, but it represents only part of the system
comprised of interrelating variables.

4.4

Technological Pathways

How an institution recognizes the risk of flooding, combined with the characteristics of the
region, influences the orientation of responses and can limit options for response, which,
in turn, may adversely affect the region’s ability to respond to flood risk. As Burch (2009)
explains, there has been a recent shift in technological pathway research that recognizes
the role of cultures, perceptions and institutions in decision-making with regards to the type
and extent of response. The purpose of this section is to present technological pathways of
flood response as influenced by culture and land use, making clear connections with the
way these pathways relate to response capacity to floods.
As it relates to decision-making on the type and extent of flood response, the
cultural values of a region play an important role. Elected officials are representatives of
the people. They make sure the wants and needs of the people are being met while ensuring
that cultural values are maintained. As one participant explains, regarding the response in
the City of Vancouver,
Vancouver has traditionally had a very ‘Green’ attitude. You know, we are very proud
of our parks and outdoor spaces, sea-wall, and Stanley Park and whatnot, so I think that
carries through with flood work, that we don’t want to diminish any aesthetics of our
city and they want to make sure what measures are put forward are still ‘Green’.
In the District of Maple Ridge, the Official Community Plan (2014) suggests that one of
the priorities of the region is to maintain Maple Ridge’s unique identity as it relates to the
environment. As several participants noted, inputting infrastructure that would impinge on
the values of the region, even though it would increase protection from floods, is not
necessarily the best course of action. Planners and decision-makers must work together to
find a solution that increases flood protection while not impinging on those values.
Therefore, cultural values act as a control on response capacity as it aids in dictating how
responses are developed and decided on.
Urban development is another major component influencing technological
pathways of response capacity to floods. It is evident in this study that highly developed
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areas with limited space to expand are more likely to have technological/infrastructure
related responses as the population grows compared to areas where space for urban
expansion is greater. This is not to say that highly developed areas, like the City of
Vancouver, do not explore and utilize a diverse range of options that include land use
planning responses, but when it comes to protecting the population and assets of the region
technological solutions are more likely than social responses (see Table 14). As another
participant stated,
Some areas may not have technologies built to be clear. It is not just looking at
infrastructure. The City is looking at the full range of approaches—and emergency
management and response, building construction—those are all things that are definitely
on the table. Planning tools are definitely on the table. For us it is a little challenging in
that most of the city is built out, so retreat takes a long time.
In the District of Maple Ridge, with urban development continuing, land use planning and
more socially-oriented responses are able to be included in flood management practices
because the space is there to make these types of decisions. As one participant explained,
they can implement the necessary infrastructure without having to remove existing
infrastructure that is out-of-date or they can designate areas for different land uses in order
to minimize vulnerable populations before they can become highly vulnerable based on
where they live. It is in these developing areas where infrastructure design and other
technological responses become the primary way to respond to mitigate risk.
Again, the argument being made here is not that highly developed areas are more
likely to seek out technological responses to mitigate potential flood impacts; rather, major
responses that exist in these areas are more likely to be technologically-based due to the
degree of mitigation impact and the fact that infrastructure is likely already in place. It
influences response capacity because it controls what response occurs and how response is
developed. What is concluded in this section of the Chapter is that culture and urban
characteristics can influence institutional behaviour and, therefore, responses. As Burch
(2009) stated, with reference to Anderson (1998) and Arthur (1989), “the institutional and
cultural contexts within which innovation occurs are of equal importance to the
technologies themselves and represent path dependent trajectories, which are not easily reoriented” (180).
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Table 14: Results of Q analysis for Items 16-17
Item

Factor (factor array)

16. Response to reduce flood impacts are Factor 1 (0)
primarily based on technology with some
Factor 2 (-2)
social components.
Factor 3 (2)
17. Responses to flooding are primarily Factor 1 (0)
based on social approaches (land use
designations) with some technological Factor 2 (2)
components.
Factor 3 (-3)

4.5

Institutional Behaviour and Resource Management

As it has been alluded to in all previous sections of this Chapter, resources are critical to
response capacity. It is through resource management that institutional responses are
developed, decided on, implemented and maintained. As Mitchell (2002) defines it,
resource management is “the capacity to control, handle or direct” how resources are
allocated and used (6). It can include action and decisions pertaining to “money, materials,
staff, and other assets that can be drawn on by a person or organization in order to function
effectively” (Oxford Dictionary, 2015).
Response capacity is, in part, a function of resource availability as controlled
through resource management. How resources are managed depends on institutional
behaviour as dictated by priorities. With tight budgets and a host of duties to fulfill,
resources within organizations have to be carefully managed. For example, municipalities
in British Columbia receive 8 cents of every dollar paid to the government which is
inadequate to allow municipalities to address all issues at once and develop a perfect
system. As one participant states, “for municipalities to shoulder the burden of massive
environmental catastrophe is very challenging. Unfortunately the way it works is that the
federal government, if there is a flood, they will come and help you financially, but they
will not help you prevent the damage from a flood.” Municipal ability to respond is affected
by the resources that they have available to them.
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At times, institutions have not had the resources available to properly handle flood
management responses. As several participants explained, in the District of Maple Ridge
there are several dykes that need to be fixed; however, the municipality is not equipped to
handle such projects. As one participant stated,
The modelling on the Fraser River has changed. So they came out with one that said
‘you have to raise the dykes by half a meter’ and the next one says ‘oh, well they need
another half of a meter.’ It’s like when is it going to stop. Unfortunately, that model
keeps making a worse and worse case scenario, but we are not catching up with raising
the dykes. Raising the dykes in the Albion area is like a $20 million endeavor. It’s not
going to happen.
It exposes the reality of the situation, that the ability to respond to flood risk is a function
of the available resources. Without the resources—whether it be money, materials, staff,
or other assets—the ability to invest in developing, implementing and maintaining flood
initiatives becomes constrained.
As another participant stated in the City of Vancouver, “I would say by far, in a
way, the single biggest barrier to investment is how we are feeling about climate change
which is a very hard thing to write a policy to overcome and then right after that would be
just competing priorities for municipal dollars.” What it comes down to is where flood
management is as a priority within an organization and the available resources for any
given project. The priority of flood response will dictate how much is invested.
Therefore, response capacity to floods is, in part, a function of available resources as it
dictates the degree of response that can occur. As such, municipalities have to assess the
risk, compare the need to act with other priorities and make a decision as to how much of
their resources they can afford to spend on flood management given a flood might not even
occur. It is a complex system that involves government weighing many different factors
(see Chapter 5).

4.6

Conclusion

The literature review, interview data and Q analysis findings indicate that legislation,
institutional behaviour, technological pathways, and resource management are major
factors affecting response capacity. The jurisdiction over land, water, and environmental
issues within provincial boundaries allows a province to determine a baseline response
capacity to floods by mandating a precise or imprecise (or no) standard in emergency
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management practices. While the province can establish a baseline response capacity to
floods, institutional response capacity will vary from region to region, but the factors
influencing their abilities to respond to flood risk remain consistent.
As it has been reiterated time and again in this paper, municipal governments are
representatives of and for the people. Their political platforms are a reflection of the wants
and needs of the public as voted on through an electoral system. As such, the priorities of
local governments are a reflection of the wants, needs, and values of the public. Literature
on the politics of disaster risk reduction has argued that political conflict in disaster risk
reduction policy is the result of differences of stakeholders’ interests, jurisdictional conflict
between levels of government, and citizens as ‘aggressive consumers’ of policy (Prater &
Lindell, 2000). In fact, some researchers assert the claim that local governments often reject
adopting risk reduction strategies due to liability concerns (see Chapter 3), competing
priorities, and disruption of cultural values favouring aesthetics (Prater & Lindell, 2000;
Burby & French, 1981; Burby et al., 1985).
It is evident in this Chapter that institutional response capacity is a function of
interacting variables. Changes to any one of these variables could impact a region’s overall
ability to manage risk. With limited resources, tight budgets, many responsibilities,
changing environmental conditions and urban growth, understanding the interactions that
affect institutional response capacity remains an important aspect of flood response and
research. As one participant noted on flood management practices in the District of Maple
Ridge,
I think one of the biggest issues related to flooding is the limited resources and attention
given by senior governments to the issue and more and more downloading the
responsibility to local governments with their limited resources, time and talents for
such a task. Maple Ridge is influenced by a number local rivers that in themselves have
significant flood issues that are not well understood or documented. The occurrences of
significant storm events is increasing significantly each year. It is not uncommon now
in any winter to experience not just one but multiple 1 in 100 year storm
events. Development continues to be allowed in the region on all flood plain protected
by dykes that are both public and privately managed, some of which are
probably inadequate to the task.
It is evident that there are clearly some issues between levels of government, each
having limited resources that impact the effective management of risk. The questions now
become: when does response capacity lead to action knowing that it is, in large part,
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controlled by competing priorities and resource management; and how can response
capacity to floods increase so that the effectiveness of flood management in regions can
too increase?

5
5.1

Municipal Priorities Dictating Flood Response
Introduction

To recall, response capacity to floods, exceeding baseline requirements, is a function of
institutional behaviour, collective action, technological pathways and resource
management; however, having a high response capacity does not necessarily lead to action.
Action is the result of institutional behaviour as dictated by competing priorities within an
organization or institution. The priority that an issue is given by the organization or
institution will determine whether or not action takes place. If an issue is recognized as
needing action that exceeds the minimum requirements set in legislation then the degree of
action will depend on how the need for action for this priority compares to other priorities
as prioritization will determine the amount of resources allocated.
Institutions and organizations have a responsibility to their stakeholders. For many
organizations, that responsibility is to maximize revenues for the benefit of investors and
the company (Jones, 2001). For municipalities, their responsibilities and duties are vast,
requiring decision-makers to evaluate the wants and needs of the city and their individual
objectives in determining the appropriate course of action. Evidence from the literature
review, interview data and Q analysis shows that competing priorities act as a control
mechanism for action in terms of timing, resource management and response capacity.
Establishing priorities within these institutions is complex, involving many interacting
variables. It is through public concerns and advocacy, risk, vulnerability and uncertainty,
politics and collective agreements, that municipal priorities are influenced and the degree
of action is determined.
In Chapter 3, it is evident that responsibility and liability exposure have influenced
decision-making in emergency management and, subsequently, flood management. In
Chapter 4, evidence from this research and others is presented to discuss factors influencing
response capacity, including institutional behaviour through competing priorities. What
remains absent in these chapters are the factors which influence institutional priorities
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requiring action that exceeds minimum requirements. As responsibility and liability in
emergency management have already been discussed in Chapter 3, and collective
agreements in mandating institutional attention were discussed in Chapter 49, the emphasis
of this Chapter is on additional factors influencing institutional priorities that, ultimately,
dictate action beyond baseline requirements and collective agreements. In this Chapter, this
paper argues that flood response is, in part, a function of resource management that is
determined by institutional priorities. The purpose of this Chapter is to identify and discuss:
1. The role of the public in setting municipal priorities through cultural values and
collective action;
2. The link between uncertainty, risk and vulnerability in establishing municipal
priorities; and
3. The influence of politics and re-election on investment in and focus on flood
management.

5.2

The Role of the Public

One of the most critical factors influencing institutional priorities is public advocacy for
action. Public behaviour has the ability to influence policy and practices through collective
action. High advocacy on an issue can force institutions to examine their current position
on the matter and re-evaluate their approach. Past research suggests that collective action
in the public sphere can affect environmental management by influencing public policies
through environmental citizenship and the support or acceptance of public policies (Stern,
2002; Jamison, 2010). As Stern (2002) notes, individual behaviour for action is less
influential on public policies and practices than collective movements. The author further
notes that the influence on public policies and practices can change the behaviour of
individuals, groups and organizations.
In Canada, municipalities are representatives of the people and operate in the
interests of their community’s wants, needs and values. As such, the public can aid in
establishing municipal priorities through collective action. By pressuring practitioners and

9

See pages 79 & 80 of Chapter 4, Development Pathways of Response Capacity to Floods.
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government, action can be facilitated by mandating priorities. In fact, current investment
in and focus on floods in the City of Vancouver and District of Maple Ridge are, in part,
the result of the public’s concern for the need for action. As one participant explains, “[the
City of Vancouver] routinely gets in the high 80 percentage points for support on the
Greenest City Action Plan and climate adaptation is even higher than that still, so obviously
it is something people want to see the City working to address.”
The results of the Q analysis reinforce this position as Factors 1 and 2 view public
concern and advocacy for flood management as a major driver for action exceeding
provincial and federal legislation (Item 2). Factor 3 yielded a score of -1, which suggests
that the overall influence of public concern/advocacy for action has less influence on
developing and implementing flood response than other drivers. This is not to say that the
collective action on flood response has no influence on action in the view of this group, but
that it tends not to be the dominant influencing driver. In fact, all interviewed participants
and Factors of the Q analysis suggest that greater public pressure on practitioners and
government will lead to more successful flood management practices (see Table 15).
Table 15: Results of Q analysis for Items 2, 8, 11 & 19
Item

Factor (factor array)

2. The major driver for developing and Factor 1 (2)
implementing
flood
management
initiatives exceeding provincial and Factor 2 (2)
federal
legislation
is
public
concern/advocacy for flood management. Factor 3 (-1)
8. Successful flood management is Factor 1 (2)
dependent on or will increase with public
pressure on local practitioners and on Factor 2 (1)
government for increased action.
Factor 3 (2)
11. Success of flood management is Factor 1 (4)
dependent on or will increase with having
an engaged community and a community Factor 2 (3)
voicing their concerns towards flooding.
Factor 3 (2)
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19. The public/community is not or has Factor 1 (-3)
not expressed concerns about
Factor 2 (-3)
flooding since the 2010 election.
Factor 3 (-2)
Even so, as this paper has noted previously, institutions, including municipalities,
have to balance resources with many responsibilities and other priorities. As a result, what
the public views as the most pressing issues requiring immediate attention will be given
higher priority, which affects investment in and focus on other priorities, including flood
management. As one interviewed participant stated regarding competing priorities and
operating in the District of Maple Ridge,
It definitely has an impact. You know we’ve got the Golden Ears Park up here, one of
the busiest parks in the lower mainland during the summer. You are stupid to do any
road work on the way to the park during the summer. […] You have all this traffic.
Thursday is the worst day. That is the mother with the kids screaming, pulling the fifth
wheel up there to get a campsite. Don’t even think about working on the way to the park
on Thursday.
It is evident here that competing priorities have the ability to inhibit action, not just through
investment in or focus on, but when and where action can take place which is controlled,
at least in part, by the public.
Priorities are not a constant, rather they shift over time. What the public values
affects the priorities of government. As priorities shift, investment in and focus on such
priorities will also shift. As another participant explains regarding the District of Maple
Ridge,
What is a priority one year is not necessarily a priority the next. Priorities shift. Right
now, I think we are more focused than we were on economic sustainability [which]
relies on having a healthy local economy. […] The creation of local jobs is a huge part
of what we need to do to help our environment. […] The priority is to build a balance,
healthy, sustainable community. What we need to do at any given time changes to try
and hit that target. Where our needs are and where our gaps are changes. It changes with
the economy. It changes with the reality.
In the City of Vancouver, participants emphasized when the public’s concern for
flood action is highest and when their voices are the loudest on the issue. Financially, flood
management is a high priority according to participants, but as a day-to-day matter that
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people worry about, it is not something that people are very concerned with. As one
participant stated, “People worry about: how much they are paying for housing; are their
children looked after; are they going to a job during the day or school or whatever it is that
they want to be; increasingly, are my parents looked after if they are seniors; and then
transit.” When it comes to flood management, “people tend not to prioritize things that are
working well even though they may value it.”
In the District of Maple Ridge, several interviewed participants noted that public
concern over flooding remains minimal and that it is only after the Fraser River water levels
are high that a few people start to initiate discussion with the City. In fact, these participants
argued that public concern and advocacy for flood management tended to be highest when
a flood in the area had occurred and, ultimately, this has affected the behaviour of the
municipality. The municipality’s attention to and investment have fluctuated with the
public’s stance on the issue.
Attention to public problems increase when events exploit failures in practice (True et
al., 2008; Baumgartner & Jones, 1993; Light, 1982; Walker, 1977). Such an incident is
known as a ‘focusing event’. As Birkland (1998) explains, a focusing event is an event that
is sudden, relatively uncommon, defined as harmful or has the possibility to be harmful,
and is known to the public and policy-makers simultaneously. Past research by
Baumgartner & Jones (1993) and others have found that following a focusing event,
interest groups, government leaders, media and/or members of the public pay greater
attention to problems that highlight a failure of policy for the purpose of developing an
active search for solutions that would lead to policy change (Birkland, 1998).
Concern over issues become something that the public prioritizes when a perceived
threat becomes a reality. Consistent with findings made by Baumgartner & Jones (1993),
Kingdon (1995) and Birkland (1998), interviewed participants in this study stated that
following the 2008 flood, there was greater public concern and advocacy for better flood
management practices. Although attention to flood management dissipated over a short
period and focus on flood management in government shifted in response to the public’s
concern, it is evident that it was not until a perceived threat became a reality that public
scrutiny over the governance of that issue was brought to bear. Focusing events have an
impact on institutional priorities as stakeholders want to be protected and the failure of
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existing policy and practices show the public that their needs are not being met to the degree
of satisfaction that they require. It is when these events occur that the public’s voices tend
to be loudest. This is not to say that flood response is not a priority currently within these
institutions; rather, the focus on and investment in flood response tends to be partially
reflective of the public’s behaviour.
Municipal priorities, therefore, are a function of the public’s behaviour on issues. When
the public is able to see first-hand what issues are present in the community, their advocacy
on those issues tends to be higher. This is fundamental to understanding why public
concern on flood action is typically at its highest following a focusing event. The reality is
that the public does not necessarily know or recognize their vulnerability until a disaster
happens because it becomes difficult to analyze the effectiveness of current practices and
policy without an event. Without the direct impacts being visible to the public, their
behaviour on the issue tends to be reduced and so does focus on flooding within
government. Therefore, what can be concluded from the data is that collective action can
facilitate or inhibit action by controlling competing priorities and, thus, resource
management.

5.3
5.3.1

Risk, Vulnerability and Uncertainty
Risk and Vulnerability

The second major factor influencing municipal prioritization of flood action that will be
discussed in this Chapter is risk and vulnerability to a flood event. Risk is often referred to
as the product of a hazard’s probability of occurrence and its consequences (Birkmann,
2007). As Birkmann (2007) explains, “risk can be viewed as a function of the hazard event
and the vulnerability of the elements exposed” (21). Vulnerability, as defined earlier as
“the potential for loss” (Cutter, 1996, 529), can be viewed as an inherent characteristic of
a system (Birkmann, 2007). Together, risk and vulnerability are integral in disaster risk
reduction action as they provide the foundation warranting action. Without risk or
vulnerability action is not necessary. As the findings from this research will show,
questions surrounding whether or not risk and vulnerability exist remain absent; however,
the question becomes whether or not the risk and vulnerability present warrant action. As
one participant noted,
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The two big factors [for action] are the likelihood of something happening and
severity/repercussions/downside if it does happen. Low likelihood and severity then we
do not have to worry about it. If it is a high-high then it is a no brainer, we have deal
with it. It is when you get that low-high mix that we get differences in opinions.
It is up to decision-makers to evaluate the region’s risk and vulnerability, knowing that
high risk does not necessarily mean high vulnerability, and determine whether the current
risk and vulnerability is acceptable to not act or should immediate action take place and, if
so, the degree of that action.
The results of the Q analysis suggests that the risk of climate change and its disasterrelated effects on people and the economy motivates municipalities to address disaster risk
reduction. Factors 1 and 3’s scores for Item 1 and Item 3 suggest an association between
risk and action (see Table 16). In the City of Vancouver, interviewed participants argued
that by knowing that various models suggest the region is vulnerable to flooding caused,
primarily, by sea-level rise and more frequent and intense storm surges as the result of
climate change has motivated the City to act. In part, it facilitates action by making flood
management a municipal priority. These interviewed participants went further in
suggesting that climate change and its potential impacts are the most influential drivers in
promoting action beyond provincial and federal legislation.
In the District of Maple Ridge, interviewed participants sported the claim that the
risk of a flood event is a major driver for action. They argued that safety of the public is
the most important priority when it comes to flooding. The fact that there is risk of flooding
which ultimately poses a threat to the safety and well-being of the population puts flood
management on the political agenda. As one participant explained, “People sleeping in bed
drowning is not a good scenario. A business getting wet at night, okay, yeah a lot of money
but less life. Life is high on the list; property not as high. So it really helps with
prioritizing.”
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Table 16: Results of Q analysis for Items 1 & 3
Item

Factor (factor array)

1. The major driver for developing and Factor 1 (4)
implementing
flood
management
initiatives exceeding provincial and Factor 2 (-3)
federal legislation is climate change and
impacts from storm surges, sea-level rise, Factor 3 (2)
and/or spring snowmelt.
3. The major driver for developing and Factor 1 (2)

implementing
flood
management
initiatives exceeding provincial and Factor 2 (3)
federal legislation is the potential
economic impact that a flood could have Factor 3 (2)
on the city or business.
Institutions will use a number of tools to aid discussions surrounding risk,
vulnerability and action, including forecasting models, history, and risk and vulnerability
assessments. The use of forecasting models and the history of flood events in the region
have assisted discussions surrounding the need for action. For example, the District of
Maple Ridge is further inland and, thus, does not have to worry about overland flow
encroaching as the result of sea-level rise. Instead, focus has been on the annual freshet
snowmelt further up the Fraser River and potential severe weather-related events.
Historically, the area has not experienced a major flood event since 1948 (200 year event).
As several participants explained, this has been used to fuel differences in opinion among
decision-makers regarding the likelihood of a major flood event happening, the severity of
that potential event and, thus, the need for action. In the City of Vancouver, the
municipality’s Climate Change Adaptation Strategy (2012) set out a need to conduct a
coastal flood risk assessment, including the types and severity of impacts that would likely
occur through storm surge and sea-level rise. Through this assessment the municipality has
recognized that the results of various models and extreme scenarios present a range of risk
to the region for which the costs to not act, given that these models are correct, is too great.
With the population of the city growing, emphasis on protecting the public in the event of
a flood has become a priority.
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In both study locations, the use of forecasting models and the history of floods in
the region have been critical in determining flood action. Where these two regions’
approaches differ is in the value that forecasting models versus the history of floods in the
area have on local flood response. The City of Vancouver emphasized forecasting models
as the main motivation for local response, whereas the District of Maple Ridge, although
they value and use forecasting models in their approach, the history of floods in the area
has weighed more heavily in the attention and investment in flood response. Although the
actual degree to which each of these tools influenced decision-making on flood action
remains incomplete here, it is evident that risk and vulnerability are being measured to
determine if action is needed.

5.3.2

Uncertainty

The other major component influencing priorities and action as it relates to risk and
vulnerability is centered on uncertainty. The uncertainty of when and where an event will
occur and the intensity of the event is integral to decision-makers in prioritizing issues.
Decision-makers examine uncertainty to assess the degree of risk requiring action and
whether or not action can be delayed. As one participant stated,
Uncertainty is more around the details and stuff and I don’t think municipalities
care so much about the fact that we don’t know whether sea-levels are going to rise
by 20 centimeters or 30 centimeters—that’s not the uncertainty. The uncertainty
that concerns municipalities in terms of their lack of action is we don’t know when
it is going to happen or where it is going to occur; that is the bigger issue for
municipalities.
As other interviewed participants explained, uncertainty leads to differences in opinions in
terms of whether or not to act, where to act and how to act. As Donahue and Joyce (2001)
argue, local governments worry about existing issues; the uncertainty of future events and
the limited financial resources inhibit municipal action in developing, discussing, and
implementing solutions to concerns, such as flooding. Reinforcing these findings, the
results of the Q analysis shows that uncertainty does affect investment in flood
management initiatives (see Table 17). With greater uncertainty, participants argued that
flood management becomes less of a priority than issues where the impacts can already be
seen or are more readily apparent. Similar to the argument made in the previous section on
public behaviour, it is not until a disaster occurs that municipalities focus more on flood
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action. As the quoted participant above further stated, “It is not a priority until it is
happening and then it is too late.”
Table 17: Results of Q analysis for Item 20
Item

Factor (factor array)

20. The uncertainty of floods—in terms of Factor 1 (1)
when, where and intensity—and frequent
changes to recommendations on how to Factor 2 (2)
reduce impacts of flooding deter
investment in flood management and Factor 3 (2)
more towards other high priority projects.
Risk and vulnerability are integral to prioritizing issues in a municipality. They act
as drivers for and controls on action that interact with a number of variables. For action to
result, municipalities must recognize that the risk of an event and the vulnerability to its
impacts are great enough to cause action—that a threshold for acceptable risk without
action has been breached. As described by participants, this is usually determined through
cost-benefit analyses, but other information tools are clearly evident in the decision-making
process. Although municipal focus on floods tends to be highest when risk becomes a
reality, it has not prevented action in the absence of an event in the City of Vancouver and
District of Maple Ridge. It is clear in these two cities that proactive measures are being
taken in the event that a flood may occur. It has been recognized by the municipalities that
the choice to not act could be detrimental to the city and its citizens. Therefore, municipal
priority-setting is, in part, a balancing of risk, vulnerability and uncertainty. With greater
risk and vulnerability, issues tend to be a higher priority. The question now becomes what
is the role of decision-makers in priority-setting, given their personal goals/objectives.

5.4
5.4.1

Politics and Prioritizing Flood Action
Political Cycle

In British Columbia, local elections for mayor and council have to be held every four years
as required under the Local Government Act. Elections are a time for municipal leaders to
raise awareness on the concerns of the public and address their plans to ensure that the
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wants, needs and values of the public are kept. During the time of election, however,
emphasis on flood management in campaigning tends to be pushed aside. Despite flood
management being a high priority, during ‘election season’ candidates’ campaign on other
issues where evidence of their past success on other relevant issues can be seen or on issues
where there is the greatest ongoing debate. As one participant explains, there is little
emphasis on flood management in campaigning, in part, because “nobody cares” about
how much is spent on flood management even though the “single largest allocation in the
Capital Plan is flood management related.” This participant further stated, “people will
argue over the $3 million for whatever bike related infrastructure is in [the Capital Plan],
but the $325 million for the sewage upgrades is like ‘meh. Whatever. Fine. Sure.’” The
reality is candidates focus on the issues where there is the greatest public debate because
these are the issues that the public really wants something to be done and it is what will
determine winners in elections. Why campaign about the problems of the current flood
management policy and practices if the public does not think that the system is broken?
In the District of Maple Ridge, a participant viewed the current flood management
system as successful, emphasizing the major issues in the area relate to post-secondary
education, mental health and policing. Another participant discussed tourism and that dyke
maintenance is done in advance of the “busy season” in coordination with park managers
because the tourism industry is a high economic priority in the area. A third participant
argued that work on flood management is really controlled by shifting politics as it
determines the amount of resources that will be allocated to fund different projects. In all
three interviews, emphasis was on the effects of competing priorities which take away from
the need for and investment in flood management; instead, the emphasis rests on the key
issues being debated.
As was described earlier, public awareness and advocacy for more focus on and
investment in flood management is highest post-disaster—also known as a focusing event
(True et al., 2008; Jensen, 2010; Green-Pedersen, 2007; Green-Pedersen & Krogstrup,
2008). This is due in large part to the realization by the public that the current emergency
management system is ‘flawed’ and ‘should be’ better; however, it escapes most political
campaigns in the absence of these events because it is not until an event occurs that the
effectiveness of the emergency management system can really be evaluated and used to
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promote or leverage a candidate’s campaign. In the Q-sort of this study, participants were
asked to provide their view on the dependency of flood management action in relation to
the political cycle (Item 10). The results can be seen in Table 18 below. All three Factors
viewed the political cycle as having an influence on flood management action. It supports
the claims made by interviewed participants—that flood management falls into the
background at certain times in political cycles, most notably during elections, and that the
politics of re-election is a reflection of other municipal priorities.
Table 18: Results of Q analysis of Item 10
Item

Factor (factor array)

10. Flood management initiatives are Factor 1 (1)
dependent on the political cycle.
Factor 2 (2)
Factor 3 (4)

5.4.2

Champions for Action

The downloading of responsibility and acceptance of that responsibility for emergency
management by municipal governments are critical in establishing municipal priorities.
Although municipalities are required to address emergency management under the
Emergency Program Act, response exceeding provincial legislation is directly affected by
the degree of willingness to accept that responsibility. A municipal government’s
unwillingness to accept responsibility for emergency and flood management translates into
resources allocated to address the matter only to what is necessary to meet minimum
requirements. As the majority of interviewed participants noted, flood management action
is highly dependent on council recognizing that flooding is an issue that needs to be
addressed, even if the view is that efforts to mitigate flood risk should be the province’s
responsibility. As one participant stated, “it really does come down to 1 or 2 champions,
whether it is citizen champions or someone on staff, who decides this is their issue.” If a
municipal government does not recognize that flooding is their responsibility, then the
resources allocated to address it will be minimal.
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In the City of Vancouver, interviewed participants noted that it was council’s acceptance
of the need for climate change adaptation and, subsequently, flood management that has
increased action. By accepting that responsibility and investing in flood management, the
municipal government prioritizes the issue. As the four interviewed participants in the City
of Vancouver argued, residents in the city have been concerned about the environment,
their natural environment, and, increasingly, toxins and climate, which has translated into
municipal action. From the municipality’s perspective, these are issues that the public
wants to see their government working on. The government’s willingness to accept an issue
as their responsibility makes it a priority in the region. Again, this returns to the public’s
behaviour in establishing municipal priorities, but what is being noted here is that there is
a relationship that exists between the public behaviour and politics.
In the District of Maple Ridge, several participants concurred with the above
argument, stating that the council’s willingness to accept responsibility for a potential
threat to the city is fundamental to municipal priority-setting and, thus, resource
management. What became evident in these interviews is that changes in government have
resulted in a fluctuation in government focus on and investment in flood management over
time as different players have different objectives and political platforms. Where the
District of Maple Ridge differs from the City of Vancouver is in the recognition and
acceptance that the current flood management system needs to be revised. Contradictory
views were expressed by several participants in the District of Maple Ridge with respect
to the need to invest more and pay greater attention to the changing environmental
conditions to which the area will be exposed. One participant went as far as to say that the
current state of flood management in the District of Maple Ridge is good because they have
not experienced a flood in a long period of time, but where the major issues of the area are
is in post-secondary education and mental illness. This is consistent with the views
expressed by other participants in the area that although they believe that there is a need
for greater attention and investment in flood management, they perceive that others in
management within various organizations, businesses, and the municipality do not
necessarily agree and this can be seen in the area’s current response. As changes in
government, including staff, occurred, municipal priorities have been affected. These
changes did not and do not occur overnight, but took and continue to take, at least, months
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to years of restructuring. Such changes are a reflection of changes in public behaviour that
translate into political will.

5.5

Conclusion

Competing priorities are the foundation for institutional resource management. Legal
responsibility and liability (Chapter 3), collective agreements (Chapter 4), public
behaviour, risk, vulnerability and uncertainty, and the politics of municipal governance are
factors affecting decision-making with regards to action on municipal priorities. Together,
they interact to inform decision-makers as to what degree of response is necessary on any
given issue. The complexity of balancing resources and priorities in government makes it
difficult to assess the thresholds and the degree of influence that each factor affects action
in relation to one another.
In the City of Vancouver and the District of Maple Ridge, participants viewed their
flood management response as being highly dependent on public concern and advocacy for
action, council recognizing that the costs not to act breaches the threshold of acceptable
risk, and champions in government or through external institutions who take the lead on
flood management. The evidence presented in this Chapter has suggested that public
advocacy for action is reduced, most notably during ‘election season’ and in the long
absence of an extreme event. Although this is not to say that flood management is not a
municipal priority, interviewed participants have noted that attention to and investment in
flood response has faded in the past as a result. Therefore, increasing the awareness of the
issues and increasing municipal response is critical to flood management.
Past research (Birkland, 1998; Jensen, 2010; True et al., 2008) has shown that
municipal response tends to be highest in the immediate aftermath of a disaster, forcing
municipalities to (re)engage in the environmental stressors that face their region. Some
have argued that focusing events are necessary to facilitate action. As one participant
explained, to re-engage municipalities in greater flood management practices another flood
event is needed because “at the end of the day that is what really motivates municipalities
to change.” It shows the failure of existing policy and practices, and thereby changes public
behaviour, and translates into municipal action.
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The premise of social movement theory is that socio-cultural characteristics
influence the collective behaviour of citizens guiding the decisions and behaviour of
institutions (Passy, 2003). The success of such movements are rooted through networks;
the more networks connected to the socio-cultural characteristics of the region has resulted
in a greater turnover (Diani and McAdam, 2003). As Passy (2003) explains, people
participate in social movements because they “share certain norms and values” that are
related to a political disagreement. In these instances social movements provide an outlet
for the collective voice of a subset of the population, providing individuals with an identity
or a sense of purpose (Freeman, 1973; Morris, 1984; Andrews, 1991; and Melucci, 1996).
The networks aid in the development of an identity by acting as the forum through which
groups of people can express their views and they reinforce these identities by reaffirming
individuals that their views are representative of the movement. By creating a collective
identity through networks, social movements grow in numbers and strength (Passy, 2003).
As Tilly & Wood (2013) explain, social movements are the result of multiple
stressors which often have negative implications infringing on the human rights of a group
of individuals. These authors explain that, historically, when human rights have been
violated, activism leads to correcting/replacing the instigating body with one that meets the
wants and needs of the community. By raising the issue to the municipality for a better
management system, the public has expressed to the institution their expectations which in
turn forces the institution address the issue.
This process can lead to a socio-technological regime shift as institutions recognize
that the current system is undesirable as evidenced by the outcome of an event, and that
the culture may have changed by the event to value greater environmental management. It
may lead to greater investment in flood management technological innovation or even the
adoption of a system that has been employed elsewhere. In the City of Vancouver, the
municipality adopted a sustainable adaptive framework developed by ICLEI (Local
Governments for Sustainability). They recognized a need for a different climate change
adaptation system, which includes flood response, and they are making that transition to a
new socio-technological regime.
Therefore, there is a relationship that exists between the factors presented in this
Chapter regarding institutional behaviour and the dynamic interaction that physical change
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and technological systems have with each other, as Hadfield & Seaton’s (1999)
environmental management model suggests (Figure 10). In this Chapter, it was evident that
factors affecting municipal priorities are diverse and range from forces within institutions
to external pressures. Although major contributors to action have been discussed and
analyzed in the Chapter, questions surrounding how to increase an institution’s ability to
manage flood risk becomes a main point of discussion for flood response policy and
practice.

6
6.1

Mechanisms to Increase Response Capacity
Introduction

While the ability to respond to flood risk is dependent on a number of components,
including resources, institutional behaviour and collective action, and technological
pathways, attention to approaches that would enhance an organization or institution’s
ability to respond to flood risk is critical in flood response research. Evidence from the
research conducted shows that tight budgets and limited resources, combined with limited
knowledge and disconnect internally among organizations and levels of government can
inhibit response capacity to floods. Together, they act as barriers to response capacity. As
such, future flood management response will depend on minimizing these barriers so that
an organization or institution can increase its response capacity to floods.
The purpose of this Chapter is to identify and discuss mechanisms—as identified
by participants—that have the potential to increase the response capacity of an organization
or institution. Resource efficiency, increasing cohesion through greater communication
and interdisciplinary collaboration, shared responsibility and management, and utilizing an
adaptive framework for flood response are mechanisms viewed by participants that could
have this effect on response capacity to floods and will be discussed in this Chapter. This
Chapter does not focus on the ‘how to’ develop an adaptive framework or increase
cohesion through interdisciplinary collaboration as that is an area of further research that
goes beyond the scope of this research; rather, this Chapter provides a simple explanation
of four mechanisms that have the potential to enhance response capacity.
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6.2
Resource Efficiency and Interdisciplinary
Collaboration
Resource efficiency is a term focused on production and consumption patterns of a system.
It emphasizes maximizing a system’s output while minimizing input in a sustainable way
(Huselid, 1995). It does not mean that a system is increasing its means of production; rather
that the system is increasing the value of every input into the system. A number studies
that have focused on strategies that have potential for significant cost-savings (Arney et al.,
1998; Clinch & Healy, 2000) have been recognized since the early 1970s (Delmas &
Pekovic, 2015). Efficient use of human capital, social capital, financial capital and
materials can increase a system’s output and allow for more investment in any given project
within that system. Emphasis is on how to maximize the output of these resources.
In this study, the majority of those interviewed and Q sort participants argued that
increasing resource efficiency is integral to the success of flood response (see Table 19).
One participant strongly disagreed with this argument, indicating a score of -4, consistent
with the view of Factor 2. One other participant did not provide a positive score to Item 9,
indicating that the participant neither agreed nor disagreed or was unsure whether or not
resource efficiency is important to the success of flood response. Although there was not
100% agreement in the Q analysis regarding Item 9, two important conclusions can be
made. First, most participants view resource efficiency as it relates to resource management
as being influential to the success of a system’s flood response; and second, cross-sector
communication may be able increase resource efficiency through proper coordination with
other projects. With overlapping projects, such as upgrading sewers and road
infrastructure, time and financial capital can be conserved by efficiently using resources
that would otherwise be used separately and drain resources more quickly. 10
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Evidence of the latter’s effectiveness in flood response remains incomplete and is recognized here as
such. Further research and more data would be needed to provide a definitive, in-depth analysis of this
claim. Therefore, it stands in this report as a hypothesis.
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Table 19: Results of Q analysis for Item 9

Item

Factor (factor array)

9. Success of flood management is Factor 1 (2)
dependent on or will increase with
efficient use of resources such as working Factor 2 (-1)
in tandem with other projects. For
example, updating existing infrastructure Factor 3 (4)
at the same time as doing road work.
As Chapter 4 notes, group cohesion can affect response capacity by increasing or
decreasing an institution’s ability to respond to flood risk depending on whether or not
strong cohesion exists. As Huselid (1995) explains, human resource management policies
and practices can impact a firm’s performance. This author argues that High Performance
Work Practices “can improve knowledge, skills, and abilities of a firm’s current and
potential employees, increase their motivation, reduce shirking, and enhance retention of
quality employees while encouraging non-performers to leave the firm” (Huselid, 1995,
635; Jones & Wright, 1992). They have the ability to affect group cohesion within an
institution as actors within these institutions work together toward a common goal. By
regulating who is working on what and the communication among staff and departments,
response capacity is ultimately affected because it affects the ability to develop and execute
plans (Begin, 1991; Butler, Ferris & Napier, 1991; Wright & McMahan, 1992, 2011).
According to the IPCC (2014b), leadership, staffing and skill development affect
institutional capacity to respond to risk. Beyond recognizing flooding as an issue needing
action (see Chapters 4 and 5; Anguelovski & Carmin, 2011; Carmin et al., 2012), an
interdisciplinary approach to flood response is necessary for greater institutional response
capacity. The dynamic human-environment interactions require environmental problems
to be understood as complex and, as such, they extend beyond any one discipline’s
knowledge. To understand the complexity, Lubchenco (1998) argued that an integration of
knowledge from many disciplines is necessary. Kinzig (2001) argues that noninterdisciplinary approaches to such complex problems limit the capability to respond to a
problem. Taking an interdisciplinary approach to complex environmental issues like
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flooding by including policymakers, scientists, managers, and other stakeholders,
essentially ‘opens the door’ to more possible solutions to address a given problem. It
increases the collaboration and communication that takes place among disciplines.
These arguments are consistent with the views of interviewed participants in the
City of Vancouver and District of Maple Ridge. In the City of Vancouver, one participant
notes, “where the City has had great success with the Greenest City Plan is because the
departments have figured out how to work collaboratively together.” This participant
argued that other projects that have been done in the past or are currently being done do
not have the same degree of collaboration which has translated into the degree of success
of that project. Therefore, by working together towards a common goal and recognizing
individual limitations in accomplishing that goal, the ability to respond can be affected.
More broadly, establishing an environmental focal point or office in an institution
or organization can aid in coordinating action across departments and agencies (IPCC,
2014a; Roberts, 2008, 2010; Anguelovski & Carmin, 2011; Hunt & Watkiss, 2011; OECD,
2011; Brown et al., 2012). When dealing with the complexity of environmental issues,
responsibility can become blurred within an institution on as basic a principle as who is to
take the lead on an issue, including flooding. Is it a problem needing an engineering
solution or is it a problem needing an urban planning solution or is it a problem needing
both and, if so, who should take the lead and who should be held responsible given that an
event occurs and exposes a system’s failure? As one participant stated, “often times in
government what you will see across departments is ‘I don’t want to get stuck holding that
bag so I am not going to step up for this, so you do it’ and everybody else has the same
thoughts, so nobody actually gets around to doing it.” Having a specific department as the
focal point in an institution with a clear mandate outlined can increase response capacity
because it establishes overarching responsibilities that cannot be diverted to other
departments. It creates a lead for action and clears any confusion as to which department
is responsible.
Therefore, the ability to respond to risk can be expected to improve with an
established focal point from which action stems together with an interdisciplinary approach
with appropriate staff involved. In the City of Vancouver, the City has a Sustainability
Department which is responsible for climate change adaptation. This department is the
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focal point for flood action within this institution. They have mandated responsibilities by
the municipal government to focus on these issues. Responsibility within this institution is
clear. This department is known to be working with multiple stakeholders and consulting
with other departments to develop a flood management system that is designed to better
protect the city’s population and assets (see City of Vancouver’s Climate Change
Adaptation Strategy, 2013). As participants in both the City of Vancouver and District of
Maple Ridge noted, this communication among departments and stakeholders is critical to
establishing an interdisciplinary framework for flood response and can be indicative of an
institution’s response capacity as it pertains to cohesion, collaboration and leadership.
In the District of Maple Ridge, Planning, Engineering, Operations, and Emergency
Services are City departments that have a role in flood response. Together, they make up
the institution’s flood response and share responsibility. Participants have noted that the
fragmented structure of the institution can influence the flood response system, but
especially critical to flood response is the interdisciplinary communication that takes place
between these departments and with external stakeholders.
Therefore, it is important to increase response capacity to floods in an institution
by fostering an environment of increased cohesiveness of the actors involved and by
maintaining an interdisciplinary network. Focus on enhancing social networks among
internal and external stakeholders and managing human capital effectively is viewed by
participants as important to being able to increase response capacity as it grants access to
more resources that can be used to aid the development and execution of response
strategies. Knowing that municipal resources are limited and budgets are tight, maximizing
the input value into a project can relieve stress to the system and enhance the system’s
performance.

6.3

Co-Management and Collaborative Management

One of the other major focus points from participants as it relates to increasing response
capacity is through increased intergovernmental collaboration and having shared
responsibility for flood response. This is not to say that should an event happen, failure of
policy and practice is shared; rather, the investment in flood management should be shared
among levels of government. As it stands now, municipalities are solely responsible for
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developing an emergency management plan (see Chapter 3) and the implementation of that
plan is dependent on municipal resources (see Chapters 4 & 5). The province’s role is more
of an informative one with assistance being provided should an event occur, but it is not
something that they plan and practice for on a day-to-day basis. As one participant
describes it,
They think of it as something you plan for and practice for, but they don’t really think
about the day-to-day integration of it. It is like, Cities have to make sure that every
soccer player, every baseball player, anyone who wants to do a sport today can do that,
and tomorrow and the day after and the day after. The province is more like ‘breakup’,
right. So they are like ‘put on the big spectacle and then everybody goes home and then
we will do it again next year’, and that is kind of how their approach to emergency
management is. I get the sense that should there be some big disaster they would actually
do a reasonably good job for the first sort of 72 hours to maybe week and then we are
kind of on our own.
The main issue in emergency and subsequent flood management is a lack of resources
and capacity to address the issues. As the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD, 2010) noted, approximately 70% of public spending in urban areas
is the responsibility of local governments. Carmin et al. (2012) found that approximately
60% of local governments are not receiving any financial support for climate change
adaptation, which includes emergency management preparation. As participants noted in
this study, it can be difficult to receive financial support for emergency preparation or
disaster risk reduction efforts; financial support is often reactive after the results of a
disaster are known or are occurring and it is for the purpose of rebounding back to the
original state. As the IPCC (2014b) further notes, large cities that have administrative
capacity and strong economies best attract external funding. This leaves smaller cities more
vulnerable to be stuck with the burden of funding projects with no assistance and as this
paper has noted several times, the capacity to respond to risk is highly dependent on having
those resources.
Co-management and collaborative management contemplates management
techniques “conveying the sharing of rights and responsibilities by the government and
civil society” (Plummer & FitzGibbon, 2004, 63). Collaborative forms of management are
increasingly appealing to policymakers and decision-makers because learning and
innovation is likely to occur through meaningful interactions where uncertainty exists
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(Armitage, Berkes & Doubleday, 2007). Co-management techniques are appealing because
they include more efficient, appropriate and equitable governance and they can improve
processes and functions of management (Armitage, Berkes & Doubleday, 2007). As
Pinkerton (1989) notes, co-management may enhance data gathering, logistical decisions,
allocation decisions, protection of resources from environmental damage, regulation
enforcement, long-term planning, and more inclusive decision-making.
For emergency management, including flood management, Henstra (2013) argues
that “management requires authority and resources from all levels of government as well
as collaboration with stakeholders from the private and voluntary sector.” The latter half
of that argument is not in dispute. Evidence in the previous section shows the necessity for
collaboration with stakeholders from industry and civil society. For the former, evidence
in this study shows that government assistance and responsibility beyond the municipality
remains minimal. It is clear that both the province and the federal government are involved
in emergency management, but whether or not the degree of involvement is adequate could
be debated.
In this study, interviewed participants, particularly in the District of Maple Ridge,
indicated that flood management of the Fraser River should be the responsibility of the BC
government because it crosses municipal boundaries and the scope of managing the system
within the municipal boundaries is too great for any one municipality to handle. In the Q
analysis, the majority of participants felt that the provincial and/or federal governments
should have some responsibility to financially assist municipalities in flood management
(see Table 20). Factor 1’s score of 0 does not indicate disagreement with this finding. In
fact, only one participant in the Q study assigned a negative value (-2) to Item 18 and two
others gave a value of 0. Overall, the results indicate that participants’ view that the
provincial and federal governments should have an increased role in flood management
policy and practice than is currently the practice. The results of the Q analysis are consistent
with views expressed by interviewed participants in the District of Maple Ridge and three
of four in the City of Vancouver. Participants of the Q analysis further expressed their
position on future flood management success (see Table 20). All but one participant gave
a value greater than 0 and the other participant gave a value of 0 on Item 22. The concepts
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of co-management and collaborative management appealed to these participants as the
appropriate direction for future flood response practice.
Table 20: Results of Q analysis for Items 18 & 22
Item

Factor (factor array)

18. The Provincial and/or Federal Factor 1 (0)
Government should be taking the lead on
flood management, including the financing Factor 2 (4)
of flood management initiatives being
done at the local level by either the Factor 3 (4)
municipality or local practitioners.
22. Future flood management is Factor 1 (2)
dependent on increasing communication
and collaboration between different levels Factor 2 (4)
of government to work together and share
Factor 3 (2)
the responsibility of flood management.
In the City of Vancouver and the District of Maple Ridge, it is clear that collaborative
management is characteristic of their flood management approach. Their interactions with
stakeholders inform decision-making and reflect existing flood response policy and
practices. Evidence in this study suggests that emergency and flood management practice
is less co-managed than is desired. Shared responsibility and greater input into an
emergency management system would increase response capacity because co-management
of emergency management would increase municipal access to external resources. One of
the challenges to co-management with provincial and federal governments in the context
of emergency management is whether or not it is feasible to provide all municipalities with
access to provincial and federal resources. In other words, what would intergovernmental
co-management of emergency management look like?
Increased communication and collaboration with stakeholders, other municipalities and
among levels of government could lead to greater response capacity as it relates to
increasing group cohesion among multiple actors and access to external resources. How to
achieve this is beyond the scope of this research and should be explored further. What can
be concluded from this section is that municipal response capacity may be affected by co-
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management and collaborative management techniques and future flood management will
be dependent on maximizing these relationships.

6.4

Adaptive Co-Management

Adaptive co-management is an adaptive management approach. It is an experimental
management technique focused on monitoring, learning and recalibration (Noble, 2013;
Ruhl, 2004; Armitage, Berkes & Doubleday, 2007) and can be defined as the “process by
which institutional arrangements and ecological knowledge are tested and revised in a
dynamic, ongoing, self-organized process of learning-by-doing” (Folke et al., 2002, 20).
As Noble (2013) and Olsson et al. (2004) explain, adaptive co-management often involves
networks of actors sharing responsibility and management power. Its principles include:
favour action; accept and benefit from uncertainty; be experimental; emphasize resiliency;
provide feedback; use as a learning tool that leads to action; and it is adjustable as
knowledge increases (Noble, 2013). As Morghan et al. (2006) note, it is designed to
provide feedback to researchers and managers so that decisions can be improved as the
information regarding natural systems, human systems and their interactions with each
other continue to develop. It recognizes that the current state of the management system is
not necessarily perfect and that adjustments will likely be required at some point. It is the
purpose of this system to be able to make those adjustments quickly and with as little
restraint as possible.
As it relates to response capacity for floods, participants view that collaboration,
shared responsibility and management, and an adaptive framework (see Table 21) would
lead to more successful flood response. Referring to the latter, ten out of twelve Q
participants ranked Item 7 greater than 0 and only one participant gave a negative value (3). The majority of participants viewed that an adaptive framework is critical in flood
management. Interviewed participants supported this position, arguing that the knowledge
on flood response is incomplete; having the ability to adjust current policy and practices is
fundamental in emergency management because what works today may not necessarily
work tomorrow. It is critical in post-recovery emergency management that a system is able
to change policy and practices so as to make the necessary adjustments to better protect the
population and assets. By contrast, static systems would be as vulnerable to the impacts of
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another event as they were prior to that initial event; their ability to reduce those impacts
further are constrained.
Table 21: Results of Q analysis for Item 7
Item

Factor (factor array)

7. Successful flood management is Factor 1 (3)
dependent on or will increase if an
adaptive framework is used so that new Factor 2 (2)
information and technology and changing
conditions can effectively and efficiently Factor 3 (2)
lead to necessary adjustments.
For example, under Section 25 of the Compensation and Disaster Financial
Assistance Regulation of British Columbia’s Emergency Program Act, financial assistance
can be awarded to a municipality for the purpose of repairing, rebuilding, or replacing
public facilities; however, repairs must be made to return to the original state of the facility
as it existed prior to the disaster. Assistance will not be provided to repair a public facility
if it is determined that changes to that facility will be made using these resources even if
those changes would minimize future risk to a similar event. The problem is that in the
event that a flood does occur and failures in existing policy and practices are determined,
adjusting municipal practice by enhancing infrastructure, for example, becomes very
difficult because access to external resources is reduced.
By having an adaptive framework in place so that institutional policy and
practices can be adjusted as knowledge on flood response increases, the ability to respond
to flood risk is less constricted. As one participant stated,
Everything is fluid. It sounds like some pun on flood management, but it really is. The
important thing is that your adaptation strategy is able to adapt and that is the
challenge of it because politicians and staff, especially professional staff, do not like to
say things that tomorrow might no longer be true, but the reality of flood management
in a changing climate is we only know what we know today and tomorrow we are
going to have to be prepared to go ‘who knew’ and ‘now we know’. So we need to
take more action.
Therefore, it can influence response capacity to floods as it can affect an institution’s ability
to make necessary adjustments to policy and practices when needed in a timely manner.
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6.5

Conclusion

Literature, interview data and Q analysis findings indicate resource efficiency and
collaborative management, co-management, and adaptive co-management as mechanisms
that can increase an institution’s ability to respond. More efficient use of resources allows
institutions to maximize their flood management system’s output by optimizing the value
of every input. Collaborative management focuses on maximizing performance through
meaningful interactions with stakeholders. Co-management increases an institution’s
access to external resources and lessens the burden of emergency management through
shared responsibility and shared managing power. Finally, adaptive co-management is a
hybrid management approach combining collaborative management and co-management,
but with emphasis on adjusting policy and practice with minimal interference as knowledge
on flood and emergency management continues to increase.
Interviewed and Q participants viewed interdisciplinary collaboration, shared
responsibility among levels of government, and an adaptive framework as essential
mechanisms for successful flood response. Data suggested a need for greater involvement
at higher levels of government beyond the municipality. Focus on enhancing cohesion
among departments within an institution, with other institutions, and among levels of
government is viewed by participants as necessary for future flood management success.
Although the participants in the City of Vancouver and District of Maple Ridge noted
strong collaboration and communication with external stakeholders, they also noted that
the involvement from higher levels of government in emergency and flood management is
sporadic, needing greater communication.
Organizational theory is oriented on organizational structure, design and culture as
fundamental to identifying organizational behaviour (Jones, 2001; Hosmer, 1995). The
mechanisms presented in this Chapter show that organizational behaviour is influenced by
the interactions that take place internally and with other organizations or institutions. The
mechanisms show that the organization or institution’s output is highly dependent on
networks of actors contributing to a common goal and the resources that can be attributed
to having those connections in place.
Under the various management approaches, it was evident how these approaches
could affect response capacity, but what remained unanswered was what these flood
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management systems should look like. This goes beyond the scope of this study although
it is a logical next step. At this juncture, the outcome of such study would be highly
speculative. Interviewed participants in the City of Vancouver did note that an ICLEI
framework for climate change adaptation, which includes their flood response, is being
undertaken at the moment, and has been reported as being successful in other
municipalities that follow the same framework. Again, there is a need to further explore
adaptive co-management as it relates to increasing an institution’s response capacity to
floods. It is through future research on increasing response capacity to floods that the
knowledge gap in flood response may be reduced.

7
7.1

Conclusion

Introduction

Evidence of climate change and increases in disasters around the world suggest a necessity
to adapt to future conditions; however, disaster risk reduction policy and practice has
developed into a complicated system due to the complexity of municipal, regional, and
national governance. The purpose of this paper is to aid decision-makers of flood response
by creating a conceptual framework for discussion of institutional response capacity and
municipal action. The purpose is not to expose any failure in policy and practice, but
instead to assist decision-makers in understanding how response capacity is built and
identify areas by which institutional action can be affected.
This study also addresses a knowledge gap in literature relating to community-based
response capacity and action. It is argued that the ability to manage risk is complex and
involves many interacting variables, including institutional behaviour and collective
action, technological pathways, and resource management. This study promotes
precautionary adaptive co-management and it provides a foundation for further research
that seeks to increase response capacity through different management techniques. It offers
a preliminary investigation into urban governance and flood and emergency response.
The purpose of this final Chapter is to summarize the findings presented in this project,
identify significant limitations of this study, and discuss the direction of future research on
flood response.
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7.2

Summary of the Results

This paper addresses questions surrounding emergency and, subsequently, flood
management in a changing climate. With RCP scenarios and other models suggesting
future climate conditions will lead to more frequent and intense weather-related events,
sea-level rise, and other disaster scenarios, research on managing risk and adapting to these
future conditions have become major focus points in environmental management,
academically and in government. It is the purpose of this paper to address a gap in literature
for which flood and emergency management policy and practices at a community scale can
be understood in order to aid in guiding future research and governance. It addresses three
distinct questions identified in Chapter 1:
1. What are development pathways of local responses to floods?
2. What factors affect municipal priority-setting?
3. How is local response reflective of a community’s reality?
From the by-person factor analysis (Q analysis), three groups of behaviour known
as Factors emerged: Factor 1 was highlighted as having a risk-based approach to flood
response; Factor 2 was identified as relying on the public to identify issues needing
immediate attention which really dictates the priority that flood response receives; and
Factor 3 was oriented more towards the politics of institutional behaviour and the
arrangements that these institutions or organizations have with each other and different
levels of government in relation to their flood response.
As the information presented throughout this paper has shown, the approach to
flood risk differs among organizations and institutions in the City of Vancouver from those
in the District of Maple Ridge. Certain Factors can be seen as similar or common with the
organizations and institutions within these two regions, based on a comparison of the
interview data gathered and the Q analysis. For example, in the City of Vancouver,
interviewed participants argued that risk is the dominant factor in their approach to flood
response and that, although the public is influential in institutional/organizational
behaviour, their approach to flood risk is more associated with taking a
proactive/precautionary approach using forecast models. Again, public advocacy and
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concern do have a role in the attention and investment that flood management receives, but
the probability of a flood occurring in the area necessitates action. Therefore, the
organizations and institutions in the City of Vancouver can be associated closely with
Factor 1.
The views of the interviewed participants in the District of Maple Ridge is more
oriented toward Factor 2’s association. In the interviews conducted in the District of Maple
Ridge, participants frequently attested to the public’s involvement in institutional and
organizational behaviour, arguing that, although the history and forecasting models show
the region’s vulnerability/exposure to flooding, the public’s concern and advocacy for
various issues is essential in determining the issue’s priority within the organization or
institution and, thus, their action. According to these participants, it is less about the risk
of a flood occurring at higher positions within the organization or institution and more
about meeting the demands of the public first.
Finally, Factor 3 is associated more with department leads within organizations and
institutions in the District of Maple Ridge and their views on flood response as it compares
with the views of more senior ranking officials within the organization or among
organizations. Where Factor 1 argues strong communication and collaboration exists—
both internally and externally and is consistent with interviewed participants in the City of
Vancouver—several interviewed participants in the District of Maple Ridge noted a
disconnect between departments and other organizations, as well as with higher
management which is consistent with Factor 3’s description. This group emphasizes
politics as being influential on response, suggesting that action at the municipal level is
typically directed toward issues where an impact can be immediately seen as opposed to
one that has not occurred recently like a flood; the results of that action cannot be seen until
an event allows for an evaluation. This has resulted in greater attention to and investment
in addressing issues where results can be seen in a short turnaround time rather than for a
perceived but only potential threat. Again, this is not to say that this group’s behaviour in
respect of floods does not involve action, rather politics and structure are critical in its
approach.
Therefore, it is evident that Factors 2 and 3 are more apparent in the District of
Maple Ridge while Factor 1 is predominately associated with the organizations and
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institutions in the City of Vancouver. The factors that define response capacity and
municipal action are consistent among interviewed participants and the Factors in both
regions; however, the degree of influence that these components have with regards to
response capacity to floods and institutional action in these two regions varies. The
information presented throughout this paper demonstrates the importance of these
components to response capacity for floods and institutional action and these Factors aid
in illustrating the differences in the two regions’ approach to flood response and emergency
management.

7.2.1

Defining Response Capacity to Floods

Through interviews, literature, legal documents, and a by-person factor analysis on
participants’ view of flood response in the City of Vancouver and District of Maple Ridge,
major indicators of an institution or organization’s ability to manage flood risk are
identified. This paper argues that the governing body with the greatest jurisdictional
authority has the ability to mandate a minimum standard for emergency and, subsequently,
flood management, thereby establishing a baseline response capacity to floods. Beyond
this baseline response capacity, this paper notes institutional behaviour and collective
action, technological pathways, and resource management characterize an institution or
organization’s response capacity to floods.
The evidence presented throughout this paper show that in a broader context, these
components are consistent with Burch’s (2009) findings on sustainable development
pathways to climate change and Hadfield & Seaton’s (1999) environmental management
model. These factors influencing community scale response capacity should not be
understood as being the same as action. These two components of emergency management
are separate, but related; action is a function of response capacity. An institution or
organization’s flood response does not have to equal their response capacity, but it also
cannot exceed it.
This paper notes the factors affecting action differ in terms of their degree of
influence on action at a local or community as to what may exist at a national level. It
should be understood that the factors affecting local or institutional action, in terms of the
orientation of the responses that occur, is likely to be different at a smaller scale than at a
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national or sub-national level. The way that emergency management is approached at
different levels of government show that emergency management response capacity and
action is different among levels of government, organizations and institutions.

7.2.2

Urban Governance as Social Constructions of Reality

Under the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA), five priorities were identified to assist in
building disaster resilient communities and countries. They included: making disaster risk
reduction a local and national priority with strong institutional arrangements; monitor and
assess risk and vulnerability; use knowledge, innovation and education to create a culture
of resilience; reduce risk through appropriate management; and strengthen disaster
preparedness at all levels of government (UNISDR, n.d.). Understanding what influences
an institution or organization’s ability to manage risk is fundamental to this Framework. It
is clear that educating decision-makers and the public could increase awareness and lead
to more radical shifts in disaster governance; however, the public’s behaviour on issues
with uncertainty surrounding the likelihood of something occurring is critical to action.
Human behaviour, as it relates to institutional action, has traditionally been oriented
to the ‘here and now’ scenario by which advocacy for action is loudest only when an
individual or group’s traditional way of life is infringed upon (see Chapter 5). Whether the
infringement comes from an organization or institution imposing certain restrictions
impacting cultural values and traditions or from a natural disaster causing various social,
economic, health, political or biophysical impacts, it is not until that abstract becomes a
reality that people’s behaviour toward an issue really takes flight, increasing advocacy for
action. The public activism translates to an institution or organization’s behavioural change
because these institutions have a responsibility to meet the public’s wants, needs and values
and organizations have a responsibility to their shareholders which are typically aimed at
maximizing access to the market (Jones, 2001).
Institutions have to make difficult decisions that involve many interacting factors.
Beyond the influence of the public, but still important to institutional behaviour for local
response to floods, are risk, vulnerability and uncertainty and the politics of action,
including responsibility and liability. It is through these factors and by this logic that urban
governance can be understood as a social construct of a community’s reality.
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7.3

Q Methodology in Hindsight

Q methodology is an approach to study the subjective views of an individual or group of
individuals in order to identify group behaviour on a particular topic (Stephenson, 1953).
In this study, participants completed a questionnaire, known as a Q-sort, on their own. By
not being present during the Q-sorting process the depth of the data gathered was more
narrow than it could have been. It would have benefited the study if the researcher was
present during the Q-sorting process to make inquiries as to why the participant rankordered each Item the way that they did. By having a brief interview regarding each
statement in the Q-sort, the researcher may access the individual’s behaviour with more
empirical thought as oppose to speculation as to why such behaviour exists. In the study,
interviews were conducted prior to the distribution of the Q-sort, allowing for this empirical
thought, but to enrich the data, an interview post-Q-sorting is recommended.
It can be difficult to identify the behaviour of an individual or even group behaviour
when the content of the Q-set can be interpreted loosely by the participant. In the study,
several participants needed clarification as to what was being stated in the questionnaire
and whether or not their interpretation of the statements were correct. In particular, the
wording of Item 12 in the Q-sort was considered confusing to some participants and to
others nothing was stated. Again, having the researcher present during the Q-sorting
process would benefit the study as the researcher can guide participants through the Q-sort
to ensure that all participants understand each statement to the same extent and reduce that
degree of inference by the participant. As it stands in this paper, some of the results
presented using Q findings had cautionary statements attached to the Factors factor arrays,
such as Factor 3’s factor array for Item 2 (see pages 77). An argument can be made that
having the researcher present during the Q-sorting could assist in eliminating or reducing
the need for such statements.

7.4

Limitations

While the study provides an analysis of flood management policy and practice, the
framework for understanding response capacity and municipal action was derived through
two study sites and should not be applied, with certainty, to all communities and
organizations. As participants noted, the applicability of this research to other regions
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should be approached with caution. The research provides an overview for small-scale
response capacity to floods and urban governance in a First World city. The degree that
each component has on response capacity and municipal action in relation to one another
remains incomplete and is likely to differ among municipalities and regions. How the
results compare to response capacity to floods and urban governance in other cities and
countries and other political regimes remain incomplete. An analysis of intergovernmental
politics in other countries could aid in this discussion by providing greater insight into
emergency management and flood response.
The study identifies components that determine baseline and institutional response
capacity and municipal action, but it fails to analyze the degree of influence that each
component has in relation to one another. In part, this is due to the methodology that was
chosen. In Q methodology, the purpose is not to compare Item 1 against Item 2, for
example, rather identify the subjective views of individuals and groups through a by-person
factor analysis. It is not suited to examining the degree of influence that each variable has
on municipal action, particularly due to the complexity of urban governance and the small
number of participants included. Performing R methodology factor analysis on the factors
affecting municipal action and response capacity to floods could provide greater insight
into the findings presented in this paper, but to do so would require significantly more
participants, a greater understanding of all variables that could affect response capacity to
floods and municipal action, and a way to standardize the variables.
In the paper, it is argued that public behaviour is influential to politics. Examining
this relationship more closely by talking with residents and business owners to understand
differences in opinion and power relations with government could provide greater
knowledge on flood response. The evidence presented show response capacity to floods
and municipal action as a complex system involving many interacting variables. The study
focuses on developing a conceptual framework for discussion and identifying further
research needs.

7.5

Future Research

In Chapters 4 and 5, it is argued that cohesion and collaboration with stakeholders act as
control mechanisms on response capacity. The evidence presented show co-management,
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collaborative management and adaptive co-management as management techniques that
could positively affect response capacity by increasing access to external resources and
allow smooth transitions to new policy and practices as knowledge on flood response
increase. What remains absent in these Chapters, however, is how these management
techniques should be framed to allow optimal response capacity. The research conducted
here in the City of Vancouver and District of Maple Ridge fails to include provincial and
federal government input as it is designed to focus on municipal governments and other
organizations working on flooding. Therefore, further research on intergovernmental
management and local management techniques that addresses this gap is a key focus point
for future flood research. Questions surrounding the feasibility of intergovernmental
adaptive co-management or the degree of co-management that could exists through
strategic planning are fundamental to future response capacity research.
It is presented in the previous section that this study focuses on two sites to make
the conclusions that are presented throughout the paper and it presents a major limitation
as to its applicability to other communities, both within British Columbia, across provinces,
and to other urban centers around the world with different political regimes. Response
capacity is recognized in Chapter 4 as being different from region to region, and the degree
that factors affecting municipal action have (Chapter 5) will differ on a case-by-case basis.
Where further research is needed is on the conceptual framework’s applicability throughout
the province and even across provinces. The wants, needs and values are different
throughout the provinces in Canada and in other countries, but whether or not the same
components of response capacity to floods and municipal action are consistent is necessary
in validating and further exploring this topic. By exploring this area more in other regions,
research could provide the groundwork for developing a response capacity index.
The study indicates major factors affecting both response capacity to floods and
municipal action, but it should be recognized that not all factors may have been included.
In particular, the study did not examine or discuss the influence that the state of local,
provincial, and national economies have on response capacity and municipal action.
Questions surrounding whether or not the ability to respond and the investment in flood
response shift in times of economic downturn was not investigated enough to determine its
relevance to this research. Emphasis in this study is placed on the role of the public, risk
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and the politics of local flood management and not on the economic processes ongoing
within the cities. When asked about the role of the state of the local economy on investment
in flood management, most participants said it is hard to determine as there has not been
enough evidence in the study areas to describe what would happen. To provide an in-depth
analysis into the role of the economic status in emergency and flood management in the
City of Vancouver and District of Maple Ridge would have been highly speculative.
Therefore, further research examining economic downturn and its influence on response
capacity to floods through institutional behaviour could provide greater insight into this
research area.
Similar to the above argument, provincial and national influence on local flood
response remains largely absent in the study, excluding jurisdiction, responsibility and
liability. Although the roles of each level of government was defined, the operations of
these higher levels of government remain absent in the study, in part, due to the complexity
of intergovernmental politics and to do so goes beyond the scope of the research. Further
research is needed to understand intergovernmental relations and their impacts on flood
response.
The conducted research focuses on organizations and institutional flood response;
however, response capacity to floods should not be understood as being solely institutional
and/or organizational. Further research is needed to examine individual response capacity
and neighbourhood response capacity. Interviewing local residents and business owners on
how they respond to flood risk beyond what their municipality provides could lead to
greater tools for institutional practices to work with and optimize local response capacity.
It could provide interesting community-government research and collaboration
opportunities.
Finally, the role of aboriginal communities on decision-making with regards to flood
and emergency management is not included in this study. The history of aboriginal
relations with government throughout Canada can be described as tenuous. Relocating
communities, violating land treaties, and efforts to assimilate aboriginals into Canadian
culture (including the use of residential schools), have aided to developing a complicated
aboriginal-government relationship. In the study, interviewed participants in the District of
Maple Ridge acknowledged that communication and collaboration with aboriginal
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communities are important to decision-making. Clearly, these communities have a role in
urban governance, but due to the complicated history of aboriginal-government relations
and the limited time period to conduct the research it made sense to keep this subject matter
separate. Further research needs to consult with these communities as the evidence
provided by interviewed participants representing various organizations and institutions
can only provide a piece of an incomplete picture into the role that aboriginal communities
have on urban governance and flood management. By consulting both parties, a further
understanding can be developed, but for the purpose of this paper their role remains
incomplete.

7.6

Conclusion

While the study provides insight into response capacity to floods and municipal action, it
is clear that the findings should act as no more than a preliminary inquiry into flood
response. The information presented in the paper contributes to the overall knowledge on
response capacity to floods and urban governance, but it is evident that further work is
needed to complete our understanding of response capacity to floods and institutional
behaviour. As disasters continue to rise in frequency and intensity, it is be critical to
understand response capacity and the mechanisms that can increase local response.
Investigating intergovernmental management and adaptive co-management techniques
may prove to increase local response capacity to disasters, but the knowledge on such
approaches and its feasibility in disaster risk reduction research remains incomplete.
Although research on flood response and disaster risk reduction is incomplete, the findings
presented in this paper make significant contributions for policy-makers and decisionmakers of institutions and organizations working in urban environments and provides
groundwork for future research.
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9

Glossary

Abduction: a bottom-up explanatory framework that seeks to link an effect to a cause
through suitable laws based on a range of hypothetical conditions. It is different from
induction in that in abduction the linking law/theory that connects the effect and the cause
is unknown.
Adaptive co-management: the process by which institutional arrangements and
ecological knowledge are tested and revised in a dynamic, ongoing, self-organized process
of learning-by-doing. It often involves networks of actors sharing responsibility and
management power.
Baseline response capacity: the minimum requirements mandated for municipalities and
organizations as set out by the governing body with the greatest jurisdictional authority.
By-person factor analysis: a statistical inspection of the correlation matrix identifying
distinct regularities or patterns of similarity among Q-sorts.
Co-management: management techniques that convey the sharing of rights and
responsibility by government and civil society.
Collaborative management: management techniques that recognize that learning and
innovation is likely to occur where uncertainty exists through meaningful interactions.
Concourse: an observable domain of shared knowledge and meaning.
Confounding variable: a Q-sort that loads significantly in two or more Factors.
Deduction: a top-down explanatory framework providing a means of linking the cause of
a phenomenon to an effect through law/theory.
Development pathway: a complex integration of economic, social, technological,
institutional, cultural and biophysical characteristics that determines the interactions
between human and natural systems. They characterize response capacity.

129

Factor: a collective view of particular participants manifested through a by-person factor
analysis on completed Q-sorts.
Factor array: a corresponding value representing a Factor’s view for a particular Item in
the Q-sort.
Factor-defining Q-sort: a Q-sort used in the by-person factor analysis that aids in
determining the collective view of a particular Factor.
Factor estimate: an estimate of the Factor’s viewpoint on a particular Item.
Factor extraction: the process of identifying the number of Factors in the study through
the identification and removal of common variance from the initial correlation matrix.
Factor loading: the degree of correlation that each Q-sort has with the Factor.
Factor rotation: the process of manipulating the conceptual dimensions of extracted
Factors in order to best position the factor loadings relative to each Factor.
Factor weights: the percentage that each Q-sort will contribute to the final factor estimates
relative to the Q-sort with the highest score.
Flood: an overflow of water onto normally dry land. The inundation of a normally dry area
caused by rising water in an existing waterway, such as a river, stream or drainage ditch.
Ponding of water at or near the point where the rain fell.
Focusing event: an event that is sudden, relatively uncommon, defined as harmful or has
the possibility to be harmful, and is known to the public and policy-makers simultaneously.
Forced distribution format: a Q-sort format that allows participants to rank-order a set
number of Items per value. Each cell can correspond with one Item.
Free distribution format: a Q-sort format that allows participants to rank-order as many
Items as they choose with a particular value.

130

Group cohesion: factors influencing group performance among a diverse group of
individuals.
Induction: induction refers to a bottoms-up explanatory framework of establishing an
applicable description that links the observed facts to the cause.
Institutional behaviour: individual behaviour that can be aggregated into collective
phenomena, thus yielding the behaviour of institutions amenable to explanation by
reference to the preferences of the individuals that compose that institution.
Institutional response capacity: the ability of an institution to manage risk.
Item: a meaningful statement that participants rank-ordered in the process of Q-sorting.
Jurisdiction: the authority to make laws.
Legal liability: a finding that is made by a court that someone did something that they
should not have done or did not do something that they should have which caused damage
to someone else. It is a conclusion of law.
Negligence: the result of a defendant’s failure to satisfy a duty of care owed to the plaintiff,
which causes damages.
Nuisance: the interference with an individual’s use and enjoyment of property through a
thing or activity.
Operational decision: decisions as to a course or principle of action that are not based on
public policy considerations and may give rise to a private law duty of care which, if
breached, can lead to civil liability.
Policy decision: decisions as to a course or principle of action that are based on public
policy considerations, such as economic, social and political factors, provided they are
neither irrational nor taken in bad faith.
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Q methodology: a methodology developed as an alternative measurement technique to
psychology tests and scales. It attempts to access the subjective views of individuals and
groups through an inverted or by-person factor analysis.
Q-set: all Items that participants in the Q study are to rank-order.
Q-sort: a completed rank-order questionnaire focused on a participant’s level of agreement
with each Item.
Risk: the product of a hazard’s probability of occurrence and its consequences.
Resource: money, materials, staff, and other assets that can be drawn on by a person or
organization in order to function effectively.
Resource efficiency: the process of maximizing a system’s output while minimizing its
input in a sustainable way.
Resource management: the capacity to control, handle or direct how resources are
allocated and used.
Response capacity: the ability to manage risk.
Self-reference: a reflection of one’s own experience and opinion.
Varimax rotation: an orthogonal rotation—axes remain 90 degrees relative to each
other—that rotates Factors to account for the maximum amount of study variance.
Vulnerability: the potential for loss.
Z-score: a statistical value that allows for cross-Factor comparison.
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Appendix A: Q Sort Questionnaire
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Understanding Development Pathways of
Local Responses to Floods: Responses in the
City of Vancouver and Maple Ridge, British
Columbia
Department of Geography
Social Science Centre
The University of Western Ontario
1151 Richmond Street
London, Ontario, Canada, N6A 5C2

1. The major driver for developing and implementing flood management initiatives
exceeding provincial and federal legislation is climate change and impacts from storm
surges, sea-level rise, and/or spring snowmelt.



Strongly


-3


-2


-1

Neither Agree

Disagree (-

or Disagree, or

4)

Are Unsure




+1


+2

 Strongly Agree (+4)

+3

2. The major driver for developing and implementing flood management initiatives
exceeding provincial and federal legislation is public concern/advocacy for flood
management.



Strongly


-3


-2

Disagree (-4)


-1

Neither
Agree

or

Disagree, or
Are Unsure



+1


+2

+3

 Strongly Agree (+4)
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3. The major driver for developing and implementing flood management initiatives
exceeding provincial and federal legislation is the potential economic impact that a flood
could have on the city or business.



Strongly


-3


-2


-1

Neither

Disagree (-4)

Agree

or

Disagree, or
Are Unsure



+1


+2

 Strongly Agree (+4)

+3

4. The major driver for developing and implementing flood management initiatives
exceeding provincial and federal legislation is the demographic characteristics and
available technological solutions in the region.



Strongly


-3


-2


-1

Neither

Disagree (-4)

Agree

or

Disagree, or
Are Unsure



+1


+2

 Strongly Agree (+4)

+3

5. The implementation of flood management responses is based primarily on
demographic characteristics with the risk of a flood occurring having less influence.



Strongly


-3


-2

Disagree (-4)


-1

Neither
Agree

or

Disagree, or
Are Unsure



+1


+2

+3

 Strongly Agree (+4)
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6. The implementation of flood management responses is based primarily on the risk of a
flood occurring with the demographic characteristics having less influence.



Strongly


-3


-2


-1

Neither

Disagree (-4)

Agree

or

Disagree, or
Are Unsure



+1


+2

 Strongly Agree (+4)

+3

7. Successful flood management is dependent on or will increase if an adaptive
framework is used so that new information and technology and changing conditions can
effectively and efficiently lead to necessary adjustments.



Strongly


-3


-2


-1

Neither

Disagree (-4)

Agree

or

Disagree, or
Are Unsure



+1


+2

 Strongly Agree (+4)

+3

8. Successful flood management is dependent on or will increase with public pressure on
local practitioners and on government for increased action.



Strongly


-3


-2

Disagree (-4)


-1

Neither
Agree

or

Disagree, or
Are Unsure



+1


+2

+3

 Strongly Agree (+4)
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9. Success of flood management is dependent on or will increase with efficient use of
resources such as working in tandem with other projects. For example, updating existing
infrastructure at the same time as doing road work.



Strongly


-3


-2


-1

Neither

Disagree (-4)

Agree

or

Disagree, or
Are Unsure



+1


+2

 Strongly Agree (+4)

+3

10. Flood management initiatives are dependent on the political cycle.



Strongly


-3


-2


-1

Neither

Disagree (-4)

Agree

or

Disagree, or
Are Unsure



+1


+2

 Strongly Agree (+4)

+3

11. Success of flood management is dependent on or will increase with having an engaged
community and a community voicing their concerns towards flooding.



Strongly


-3


-2

Disagree (-4)


-1

Neither
Agree

or

Disagree, or
Are Unsure



+1


+2

+3

 Strongly Agree (+4)
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12. Success of flood management is dependent on or will increase depending on competing
priorities elsewhere that put less emphasis on and investment in flood management.



Strongly


-3


-2


-1

Neither

Disagree (-4)

Agree

or

Disagree, or
Are Unsure



+1


+2

 Strongly Agree (+4)

+3

13. Economic and relating activities, such as tourism, are controls on updating existing
infrastructure.



Strongly


-3


-2


-1

Neither

Disagree (-4)

Agree

or

Disagree, or
Are Unsure



+1


+2

 Strongly Agree (+4)

+3

14. Flood management and initiatives that focus on reducing the impacts if a flood occurs
are a high priority within your municipal boundaries and/or in your profession.



Strongly


-3


-2

Disagree (-4)


-1

Neither
Agree

or

Disagree, or
Are Unsure



+1


+2

+3

 Strongly Agree (+4)
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15. Flood management is the top priority in the region, above, for example, transit,
economic activity, and environmental conservation.



Strongly


-3


-2


-1

Neither

Disagree (-4)

Agree

or

Disagree, or
Are Unsure



+1


+2

 Strongly Agree (+4)

+3

16. Responses to reduce flood impacts are primarily based on technology with some social
components.



Strongly


-3


-2


-1

Neither

Disagree (-4)

Agree

or

Disagree, or
Are Unsure



+1


+2

 Strongly Agree (+4)

+3

17. Responses to flooding are primarily based on social approaches (land use designations)
with some technological components.



Strongly


-3


-2

Disagree (-4)


-1

Neither
Agree

or

Disagree, or
Are Unsure



+1


+2

+3

 Strongly Agree (+4)
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18. The Provincial and/or Federal Government should be taking the lead on flood
management, including the financing of flood management initiatives being done at the
local level by either the municipality or local practitioners.



Strongly


-3


-2


-1

Neither

Disagree (-4)

Agree

or

Disagree, or
Are Unsure



+1


+2

 Strongly Agree (+4)

+3

19. The public/community is not or has not expressed concerns about flooding since the
2010 election.



Strongly


-3


-2


-1

Neither

Disagree (-4)

Agree

or

Disagree, or
Are Unsure



+1


+2

 Strongly Agree (+4)

+3

20. The uncertainty of floods—in terms of when, where and intensity—and frequent
changes to recommendations on how to reduce impacts of flooding deter investment in
flood management and more towards other high priority projects.



Strongly


-3


-2

Disagree (-4)


-1

Neither
Agree

or

Disagree, or
Are Unsure



+1


+2

+3

 Strongly Agree (+4)
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21. There is disconnect between staff with each other, others in your profession, and/or
council on the understanding of the effectiveness of existing flood management in the city.



Strongly


-3


-2


-1

Neither

Disagree (-4)

Agree

or

Disagree, or
Are Unsure



+1


+2

 Strongly Agree (+4)

+3

22. Future flood management is dependent on increasing communication and collaboration
between different levels of government to work together and share the responsibility of
flood management.



Strongly


-3


-2


-1

Neither

Disagree (-4)

Agree

or

Disagree, or
Are Unsure



+1


+2

 Strongly Agree (+4)

+3

23. Our flood management approach has been very successful here and can be seen as a
leader for others to follow.



Strongly


-3


-2

Disagree (-4)


-1

Neither
Agree

or

Disagree, or
Are Unsure



+1


+2

+3

 Strongly Agree (+4)
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Appendix B: Factor Rotation in Q
methodology
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Factor rotation is common practice in Q methodology (see Watts & Stenner, 2012; Brown,
1980). To recall, it is the process of manipulating the conceptual dimensions of the
extracted Factors in order to best position the factor loadings of each Q-sort relative to each
Factor. Before manipulating the conceptual dimensions of the factor loadings of Q-sorts, it
should be understood that these factor loadings can be spatially mapped out as coordinates
in a space of meaning. The poles of the x and y axis represent the shared viewpoint of two
Factors. Each Q-sort represents a unique viewpoint. By mapping these unique viewpoints
we can conceptually visualize each viewpoints’ position relative to the shared
viewpoints—that are the Factors—and to each other. The closer that an individual Q-sort
is to an axis indicates that the behaviour of this participant aligns with the Factor
represented by that axis. Each mapped Q-sort can be compared to each other and to the
Factors themselves.
For example, Figure 11 shows the mapped out Q-sort loadings for Factor 1 and
Factor 2 based on the factor loadings in Table 22. In the top-right quadrant of the diagram,
Q-sorts 1, 2, 4, 10 and 11 have significant loadings to both Factor 1 and Factor 2. By
performing a factor rotation, it is the purpose to have these Q-sorts align more close with
one axis as oppose to both and thus load significantly more to one Factor. In Figure 12, the
results of this rotation can be seen. It is evident in this rotation that Q-sorts 1, 2, 4, 10 and
11 no longer load significantly with Factors 1 and 2; rather they load more significantly
with Factor 2. This process is important in determining Factor-defining Q-sorts (see
Section 2.2.4.4).
Table 22: Factor Loadings of Extracted Factors
Component (Grouping of Shared Behaviour)
Factor 1

Factor 2

Factor 3

Q sort 1

0.363

0.659

0.498

Q-sort 2

0.544

0.463

-0.003
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Q-sort 3

0.761

-0.449

0.183

Q-sort 4

0.653

0.523

-0.124

Q-sort 5

0.838

-0.166

0.388

Q-sort 6

0.782

-0.144

-0.336

Q-sort 7

0.580

-0.371

0.609

Q-sort 8

0.649

-0.475

-0.119

Q-sort 9

0.825

-0.179

-0.119

Q-sort 10

0.575

0.257

-0.351

Q-sort 11

0.797

0.403

0.083

Q-sort 12

0.555

-0.067

-0.615

**Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis
Different factor rotation techniques can be used in factor analysis. The factor
rotation method performed in this study was a varimax rotation. The varimax rotation is an
orthogonal rotation—axes remain 90 degrees relative to each other—that rotates Factors to
account for the maximum amount of study variance. Figures 10-15 illustrate the process of
the varimax factor rotation that was performed in this study. Again, the objective of this
rotation is to align the viewpoints of individual Q-sorts with the shared meanings of
Factors. The output to this step was an adjusted factor loading matrix of Q-sorts relative to
each Factor (see Table 7 in the section 2.2.4.4). From here, the next step was to place each
Q-sort into 1 of the 3 Factors based on their new loadings (see Section 2.2.4.4).
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Project Title: Understanding Development Pathways of Local Responses to Floods:
Response in the City of Vancouver and Maple Ridge to Flooding, British Columbia.
Investigators: Professor Gordon McBean (Principal Investigator) and Jonathan Raikes,
Master of Arts Candidate, Department of Geography, University of Western Ontario
Letter of Information
Purpose of Letter
The purpose of this letter is to provide you with the information necessary to make an
informed decision to participate in a study focusing on local responses to flooding in
proposed study locations. You are being invited to participate in this research study because
you have experience with flood-related response development, decision-making, and/or
implementation. To participate, you must be an existing local practitioner and/or policy
maker that makes design and development criteria in response to flood-related issues in the
City of Vancouver or District of Maple Ridge. Your knowledge and professional
experience addressing flood issues makes you the ideal candidate in which understanding
development pathways of local responses to flooding can be optimized. Participants will
not excluded from the study based on gender, race, or sexuality, however, participants must
be literate and able to speak English fluently. If at any point of the research you would like
to discontinue your involvement in data collection, you are welcome to do so with no
impact on your participation on future studies or on your employment.
Purpose of Study
Evidence has suggested that efforts to reduce the impacts of floods are dependent on social,
economic, institutional, cultural and biophysical characteristics of a region. The complex
integration of these characteristics that is deterministic of the effectiveness of local
responses to flooding is referred to as a development pathway. Research on development
pathway components (social, economic, institutional, cultural, and biophysical
characteristics) tend to focus on these components separately, failing to examine the
relationships between them. Understanding the interactions between the components of
development paths is essential to the development of effective policies and responses
seeking to manage flood causes and impacts.
The purpose of this research is to identify existing development pathways of local
responses to flooding in the City of Vancouver and the District of Maple Ridge, and explore
the component relationships of such responses. This research seeks to develop an
understanding of these relationships and optimize the potential that these relationships
could have on policy/response formulation by providing the necessary information to make
informed decisions through the knowledge gained from this study.
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Why the City of Vancouver and District of Maple Ridge?
The Metro-Vancouver region has been identified as one of many regions that will be under
high stress with rising sea-levels, and increased frequency and intensity of disasters. The
melting of glacial ice and warming of oceans have resulted in global sea-level rise. The
2013 IPCC report has stated that sea-levels are predicted to rise by 0.97 meters by 2100.
The damages of flooding to regions are being documented but reducing the impacts and
creating effecting local responses to flood events is an area of concern in this region. The
latest Climate Change Adaptation Strategy report (prepared by the City of Vancouver in
2013) and the Fraser River Freshet Operational Flood Management Plan (prepared by the
District of Maple Ridge, 2012) have argued that current policy and practices that are aimed
towards flood events are outdated and needing revision. Evidence in these reports, among
others, have argued that existing dikes are not equipped to handle a major flood. As the
climate continues to change stronger and more frequent weather events suggest an increase
in major flood events occurring. Your participation in this study is critical in the
development and implantation of future strategies seeking to prepare and prevent future
floods.
Participation
There are two phases to this study where participation in warranted. You have the option
of participating in a single stage or both stages if you choose to participate, but you must
have experience developing, deciding on, and/or implementing responses that addresses
flooding. For example, strategies could be anything from land use planning to emergency
procedures or technological solutions when developing land; any strategy that addresses
floods qualifies you as a suitable candidate to participate.
The first stage of this research consists of in-depth interviews with existing local
practitioners and/or policy makers. Written consent is required to participate in an
interview due to the exchange of personal experience related to flood responses. The
purpose of these interviews is to collect ideas, beliefs and opinions on existing local
responses to flooding. These interviews will explore the relationships between
development pathways components. Prior to the commencement of interview questions,
you will be asked to confirm your understanding of what is meant by a development
pathway. If there is any confusion on the definition of a development pathway clarification
will be provided to you before proceeding. Emphasis in this stage is on the subjective
understanding (i.e. individual approach) of response development and decision-making.
Questions regarding your opinions on the effectiveness of local responses will be avoided;
rather, inquiring what factors are considered when you develop, decide on, and/or
implement local responses will be the focus of these interviews. As stated, you can choose
at any point to withdraw from the interview or refuse to answer any questions.
It is anticipated that the interview will take a little more than an hour and no longer than
1.5 hours. Interview date and time are flexible but will be conducted from September 22nd
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to October 4th. The interview location will be at your workplace; however, if you would be
more comfortable elsewhere the interview location will be discussed.
Interviews will be recorded using an audio recording device and transcribed post-interview.
If you choose you do not want to be recorded with the use of an audio recording device,
you will not be excluded from participating in an interview. The transcribed interviews will
be analyzed and used to develop a set of approximately 20 statements that will be the basis
for the second stage of the study.
The second stage of the study where participation is warranted is the completion of a
questionnaire. The questionnaire is a rank ordering exercise in which participants will be
provided a set of statements that they are to identify their level of agreement (strongly
disagree, disagree, agree, strongly agree, or no opinion). Each of these level of agreements
will be given a representative number that will be used in a factor analysis. For the purpose
of this study a set of approximately 20 statements regarding individual component
characteristics and component relationships when developing, deciding on, and
implementing responses to strategies will be given. Completed questionnaires will be
compared through a factor analysis identifying shared forms of understanding among
participants, confounding and non-significant respondents.
As a participant you will be filling out the questionnaire at your own convenience without
a Project Team Member present. The questionnaire could take up to a couple hours of your
time, but you will have approximately three weeks to sort statements. Completed
questionnaires are to be sent via email to Jonathan Raikes at _______. Addressed envelopes
are provided to participants.
Your participation in this study is voluntary. Participants will NOT be asked to provide
personal information during the questionnaire. Completion of the questionnaire gives the
Project Team implicit consent to use your completed questionnaire. Instructions and
provisions for implicit consent to participate in the questionnaire are provided on the first
page of the questionnaire.
Possible Risks and Harms
There are no known or anticipated risks or discomforts associated with participating in this
study.
Possible Benefits
Benefits to Participants
The data that you provide will lead to knowledge on existing development pathways and
component relationships. This information will be useful to you as it will provide you with
knowledge/information needed to develop more effective responses to flooding.
Benefits to Society
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This study has the potential to create a more effective procedures in flood situations. It has
the potential to enhance our knowledge on strategies to reduce flood impacts; ultimately,
this research seeks to provide the regions with the opportunity to save lives and protect the
economy.
Confidentiality
All data collected will remain confidential and accessible only to the investigators of this
study. Data collected will be stored on a password protected computer and/or locked
cabinet in a locked office at the University of Western Ontario. If the results are published,
your name will not be used. If you choose to withdraw from this study, your data will be
removed and destroyed from our database. While we will do our best to protect your
information there is no guarantee that we will be able to do so. Representatives of The
University of Western Ontario Non-Medical Research Ethics Board may contact you or
require access to your study-related records to monitor the conduct of the research.
Contact Information
If you have any questions or concerns regarding your participation in this study please
contact Jonathan Raikes (primary contact) or Dr. Gordon McBean.
Jonathan Raikes
Email: ________
OR
Dr. Gordon McBean
Email: _________
Phone: ___________
If you have any questions about your rights as a research participant or the conduct of this
study, you may contact The Office of Research Ethics (519) 661-3036, email:
ethics@uwo.ca.

This letter is yours to keep for future reference.
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Consent Form
Project Title: Understanding Development Pathways of Local Responses to Floods:
Response in the City of Vancouver and Maple Ridge to Flooding, British Columbia.
Study Investigator’s Name: Professor Gordon McBean (Principal Investigator) and
Jonathan Raikes, Master of Arts Candidate, Geography, University of Western Ontario.
I have read the Letter of Information, have had the nature of the study explained to me
and I agree to participate. All questions have been answered to my satisfaction. The
completion of this form gives the Study Investigators permission to contact and interview
me.

Participant’s Name (please print):
_______________________________________________
Participant’s Signature:
_______________________________________________
Email That Investigator Can Contact Participant:
_______________________________________________
Telephone Number That Investigator Can Contact Participant (Optional):

_______________________________________________
Date:
_______________________________________________

Person Obtaining Informed Consent (please print):
_____________________________
Signature:
_____________________________
Date:
_____________________________
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Questionnaire Instructions and Consent
Project Title: Understanding Development Pathways of Local Responses to Floods:
Response in the City of Vancouver and Maple Ridge to Flooding, British Columbia.
Study Investigator’s Name: Professor Gordon McBean (Principal Investigator) and
Jonathan Raikes, Master of Arts Candidate, Geography, University of Western Ontario.
Instructions
Non-interviewed local practitioners and policy-makers will express their views on the
development, deciding on, and implementation of local responses to flooding by
completing a questionnaire. The questionnaire involves a set of meaningful statements that
are to be ranked according to the participant’s level of agreement of each statement.
There are 23 statements in this questionnaire. As a participant we ask you to read each
statement carefully and mark the level of agreement you share with the statement. Views
will be expressed through a rank order between negative four (strongly disagree) and
positive four (strongly agree). Upon completion of the questionnaire, please send the
completed questionnaire to Jonathan Raikes at the University of Western Ontario via email.
Upon completion of the questionnaire each questionnaire will be placed in a single
document where no names of participants will be included and a factor analysis will be
conducted that compares the correlation between respondents. Your email address will be
attached to the email you send Jonathan Raikes upon completion of the questionnaire,
however such data will not be included in analyzing the data. Upon placing the completed
questionnaire into a single separate document, your email will be deleted to ensure
confidentiality purposes.
As a participant you are to complete the questionnaire at your own convenience, separate
from the presence of a Project Team member. Please complete and have the questionnaire
sent to Jonathan Raikes by January 1st, 2015 to ensure that your views on local responses
to flooding are included in the data analysis and results of this study.
Consent
I have read the Letter of Information, have had the nature of the study explained to me and
I agree to participate. All questions have been answered to my satisfaction. I understand
that no personal information of myself or others will be asked in the completion of this
questionnaire. The completion of the questionnaire gives the Study Investigators
permission to use data expressing my views on developing, deciding on, and implementing
local responses to flooding towards the results and discussion of this study.
If you have any questions or concerns regarding your participation or access to the results
of this study please contact Jonathan Raikes (primary contact) or Dr. Gordon McBean.
This letter is yours to keep for future reference.
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Contact Information
Jonathan Raikes
Email: ________
OR
Dr. Gordon McBean
Email: ________
Phone: ________
If you have any questions about your rights as a research participant or the conduct of this
study, you may contact The Office of Research Ethics (519) 661-3036, email:
ethics@uwo.ca.
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